Åke Boquist

Trisvabhāva

A Study of the Development of the Three-nature-theory in Yogācāra Buddhism

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Preface

The successful as well as unsuccessful results of the actions of a human being depend to a very large extent on interaction with various aspects of her total environment. One of these aspects is the fellow beings without which she is, for good or ill, virtually nothing. I will not anticipate the extent to which my work may be the successful or unsuccessful outcome of years of attention to the enigma of the three natures. I would rather like to extend my deeply felt gratitude to a variety of sentient beings who have contributed to my well-being during this time - one way or the other.

Hence, I sincerely thank:

Shiva, a remarkable black cat, for never failing to remind me that I am; Jan and Stefan for telling me who I am; Royne, Tony and Mats-Erik for helping me to know what I am not; Dag for trying to show me what I could be and Maria for being close to my being.

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Åke Boquist

Abbreviations

Adk	Abhidharmakośa = Louis de la Vallée Poussin. *L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu*, nouvelle édition présentée par Étienne Lamotte, Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques XVI tome 1-6, Bruxelles 1971.
Adhbh	Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, see Adk.
Bsb	Bodhisattvabhūmi = Unrai Wogihara, *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, Tokyo 1930-36.
Las	The Laṅkāvatārasūtra = P. L.Vaidya, *Saddharmalaṅkāvatārasūtram*, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts - No. 3, Darbhanga 1963.
Mhk	The Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā = Olle Qvarnström, *Hindu Philosophy in Buddhist Perspective*, Lund Studies in African and Asian religions IV, Lund 1989.
Mmk	The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā = Chr. Lindtner, *Nagarjunas Filosofiske værker*, ed. Chr. Lindtner, Indiske Studier II, Copenhagen 1982.
Mvb	The Madhyāntavibhāga = Gadjin Nagao, *Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya, A Buddhist philosophical treatise edited for the first time from a Sanskrit manuscript*, Tokyo 1964.
Mvbbh	The Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya, see Mvb.
Msa	The Māhāyanasūtrālaṃkāra = Sylvain Lévi *Asaṅga. Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra,* tome I - II, Bibliothèque de l'école des hautes études, sciences historiques et philologiques, 159ᵉ & 190ᵉ fascicule, Paris 1907 & 1911.
Msabh	The Māhāyanasūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya, see Msa.
Msg	The Mahāyānasaṃgraha = Étienne Lamotte, *La somme de la grand véhicule d'Asanga* (*Mahāyānasaṃgraha*), Publications de l'institut orientaliste de Louvain 8, tome 1&2, Louvain le-neuve 1973.
Sns	The Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra = Étienne Lamotte *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra, l'explication des mystères.* Conférences d'histoire et de philologie 2ᵉ série, 34ᵉ fascicule, Louvain 1935.
Trk	*Trikāya* (The triple body of the Buddha)
Trś	The Triṃśikā = Sylvain Lévi *Matériaux pour l'étude du système Vijñaptimātratā*, Bibliothèque de l'école des hautes études, sciences historiques et philologiques, 260ᵉ fascicule, Paris 1932.
Trśbh	The Triṃśikābhāṣya, see Trś.
Tsn	The Trisvabhāvanirdeśa = Fernando Tola & Carmen Dragonetti "The Trisvabhāvakārikā of Vasubandhu", *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 11:3, Dordrecht 1983.
Vms	The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi = Louis de la Vallée Poussin "Vijñaptimātrasiddhi - La siddhi de Hiuan-tsang", ed. Jean Przyluski, *Buddhica, documents et travaux pour l'étude du Bouddhisme; prèmiere série: mémoirs*, tome 1, 5, 8, Paris 1928-48.
Vś	The Viṃśatikā, see Trś.

1 Introduction

1.1 Aim

The aim of this thesis is to outline the development of the concept of *trisvabhāva* (TSB) which was central to the Yogācāra school of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Since, to my knowledge, no such task has been undertaken, I will try to use a set of criteria by which a conceptual development may be discerned. In order to achieve this, I will select seven texts which satisfy the requirements of being representative of a distinct phase, or a certain author in Yogācāra history and clearly emphasizing the notion of the three natures.

Depending on the narrative structure of each text, I will try to display the main characteristics of each of the three natures and also to outline the general level of conceptual development of the three-nature-complex. The criteria of choice will be depicted in I. 4. Last, I will attempt to compare the different textual expressions of the TSB as a function of time, thereby hopefully arriving at a picture of its conceptual development.

Since it has not been my intention to undertake major philological analyses of the texts used in this study, I have mainly represented published translations into modern european languages of these texts in my work. Having used Sanskrit terms throughout the discussions of the three natures in my thesis, I have tried as far as possible to provide the interested reader with the Sanskrit texts in the footnotes.

1.2 A presentation of Yogācāra-Buddhism

For the reader who is not acquainted with Yogācāra Buddhism, I have provided a short introduction into its history and main tenets. The following exposition, it should be noted, reflects a very simplified comprehension of the subject matter and does not take into account various approaches to controversial topics. In order to avoid anticipation of the conclusions drawn from the study proper, I have mainly included the consensual view on Yogācāra history as found in any authoritative handbook in this field.

Yogācāra[1] has very likely emerged as a branch of the common Mahāyāna-tradition during the first century C.E., and it clearly comprises the majority of tenets associated with this major strand in Buddhism. In the oldest literary stratum of the Yogācāra, comprising works such as the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (Bsb), the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* (Sns) and the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* (Las), we find evidence of speculation on the ontological status of the mental images visualized and

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[1] Bibliographical information can be found in e.g. Hajime Nakamura 1989, Potter 1974 and Reynolds 1981. A short general introduction to Yogācāra thought is found in Boquist 1992 and Masaaki 1987.
Some very good accounts of various fields of Yogācāra philosophy should be mentioned : May 1971, Eckel 1985, Matilal 1974, p. 139 ff. A very unorthodox and perhaps irrelevant though thought-provoking study of TSB is made by Stephen Kaplan 1982. The role of language in Las was studied by Edward Hamlin 1983, p. 267 ff. On the differing emphasis and interpretations of the support of percepts in the Yogācāra tradition see Kajiyama 1964, pp. 429-418. On the dependent nature see Noritoshi Aramiki 1967-68. On the soteriological function of TSB see Minuro Kiyota 1962, pp. 386-381.

contemplated during meditative practice.[2] The emphasis came to be put on examinations of the mental processes and so a religious philosophy, which claimed the ideal status of phenomena, grew forth. This development - of "ideation-only" (*vijñaptimātratā*) - can be clearly discerned in the Yogācāra *abhidharma* which soon came to discard the objective *dharmas*. This does not, however, seem to amount to sheer solipsism, but rather to the notion of a virtually infinite number of monads.[3]

Now, since every intentional human action - and hence reaction - would have to take place within a consciousness, in the broadest sense of the word, the karmic device was forced to assume a place of its own in the psychic complex. Thereby the notion of "store-consciousness" (*ālayavijñāna*) had emerged, and this concept along with *manas*, whose primary task seems to be the ego-function and the six "empirical consciousnesses", it made up the eight-layered "consciousness" of the Yogācāra.[4]

The notions of "ideation-only" and "store-house-consciousness" were not yet explicitly developed within the thought of the at least allegedly historic Maitreya [-nātha] (250-300) as found in *Madhyāntavibhāga* (Mvb) and *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* (Msa) although similar notions are found.

Although already represented in the very earliest works, TSB is found in Mvb and Msa as well. This concept is surely one of the most complex and subtle outbursts of creative Buddhist thought and its soteriological value could not be underestimated. Briefly, TSB means that the neutral "reality", which is reduced to moments of causality labelled *dharma*, is the substrate out of which discursive thought arises, or metaphorically - on which our intellectualizations are projected. This world of eternal flux is called the dependent nature (DN) (*paratantrasvabhāva*). An unenlightened person projects his delusions, usually said to consist of the distinction between subject and object, on the relative nature and thereby an erroneous image of reality appears: because of this illusion he will remain in the bondage of *saṃsāra*. . This deceptive perspective is called the imagined nature (IN) (*parikalpitasvabhāva*) and its cessation, i.e. when reality is seen as it really is, is defined in different ways, leads to enlightenment and it is called the consummated nature (CN) (*pariniṣpannasvabhāva*).

The conception that the relative nature is the perpetual process of causation , commonly designated as "dependent co-arising" (*pratītysamutpāda*), is soon modified by the addition that the causing and the caused are ideas (*vijñapti*). This is a natural consequence of the thought of "ideation-only" since the neutral substrate on which the imagined is projected is the ideas themselves.

This integration of principal tenets in the Yogācāra thought is distinctly expressed in the writings of Asaṅga (375-425), whose most important work might have been the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* (Msg). In its tenth chapter is found the idea of the three bodies of the Buddha (*trikāya*). The first body or apparitional form is the essential

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[2] Cf. Schmithausen 1984, p. 433 f.
[3] Cf. Schmithausen 1987, p. 1.
[4] Schmithausen (1987, p. 33 and notes 224-225 on p. 299) denies the material connection between the origin of the doctrines of "ideation-only" and that of "store-consciousness". Various attempts of explaining the origin of the notion of "store-consciousness" are listed in *op. cit.* p. 3 ff.

body (*svābhāvikakāya*), usually named the dharma-body (*dharmakāya*), since it is the aspect of the Buddha which is the support of all *dharmas*. Hence, this is the ultimate reality, a formulation of *nirvāṇa*. The second aspect of the Buddha is the enjoyment-body (*saṃbhogakāya*), in the shining form of which the law reveals itself to the heavenly bodhisattvas, and the third finally is the apparition-body (*nirmāṇakāya*), the shape in which the law is expressed for all beings trapped in *saṃsāra*.

According to Tāranātha,[5] Asaṅga grew up in Puruṣapura - the Peshawar of today - as the oldest son of a brahmin family in the kingdom of Gāndhāra and subsequently encouraged his younger brother Vasubandhu's conversion to Mahāyāna-Buddhism. Vasubandhu is undoubtedly the most prominent figure in Yogācāra and has composed a number of works from various philosophical and religious points of view. Prior to his conversion to Mahāyāna, however, he studied the *abhidharma* of the scholastic *Mahāvibhāṣā* which was advocated by the *Vaibhāṣikas* of the *Sarvāstivāda*-school. He then wrote the famous *Abhidharmakośa* (Adk), an enormous exposition of *abhidharma* from Sarvāstivadic standpoint and later an autocommentary in order to express his own *Sautrāntika* views. As a Mahāyānist he composed several commentaries on the old *Prajñāpāramitā* and later both logical tracts as well as Yogācāra works proper. Apart from commentaries on the works of Maitreya and Asaṅga he composed works of his own, like the *Viṃśatikā* (Vś), the *Trisvabhāvanirdeśa* (Tsn) and above all the *Triṃśikā* (Trś). In Trś the concept of *vijñānapariṇāma* first appears - denoting the evolution of the store-house-consciousness into *manas* and the six empirical senses. This eight-layered mental complex can only be brought to cessation by a shift of basis (*āśrayaparāvṛtti*), i.e. that the seeds of past deeds in the store-house-consciousness are exhausted, which prevents maturing of these seeds in the empirical consciousnesses. Thus, the whole complex annihilates itself, since with the expiration of the karmic content there will be no further moments of consciousness; according to the Yogācāra, consciousness requires an object to qualify as an entity.

After this, the formative period of Yogācāra had virtually come to an end.[6] It continued either in the tracks laid by the earlier masters or by almost merging with the rivalling Mādhyamikas or finally by diversification in compliance with the scholastic tendencies of this time. In the last case we find two groups with different perspectives on knowledge.[7] The *sākāra*-Yogācāra claimed that knowledge in itself always has an image (*ākāra*) of its "object" - or perhaps *support* of the cognition - whilst the *nirākāra*-Yogācāra advocated the notion of the non-conceptual, and hence imageless, knowledge of the liberated person.

As a representative of the former tradition can be mentioned the logician and epistemologist *Dignāga* (480-540) and his successor, the great logician *Dharmakīrti* (600-660) as well as *Dharmapāla* (530-561), whose compilation of ten commentaries on Trś, the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* (Vms) for centuries was the major idealistic manual of East Asia.

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5 Biographical information on the lives of Yogācāra masters can e.g. be extracted from Tāranātha 1990.

6 Cf. May, 1971, p. 297: "L'œuvre de Vasubandhu le jeune ferme le série des grands traités originaux du Vijñānavāda."

7 Cf. Chr. Lindtner & Georges Dreyfus 1989, p. 27 f. especially pp. 32-33.

Proponents of the latter tradition were *Sthiramati* (425-500), who wrote commentaries on earlier Yogācāra works and above all Trś, *Kambala* (450-525), author of the *Ālokamālā* and Vasubandhu's biographer *Paramārtha* (499-590).

1.3 Sources and delimitation in time

I have chosen to restrict my examination of the three natures to the period of time which begins with the Sns and ends with the Trś. Some important considerations may account for this choice. First, the Sns seems to be the oldest scripture though it may presuppose some of the peculiar concepts and doctrines of the *basic section* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*.[8] Second, virtually all those scholars in my field or close fields of study seem unanimous in regarding the Trś as the last innovative piece of work of the Yogācāra school proper.[9] It may be argued that Vasubandhu's treatment of the three natures was mere repetitions of earlier forms and that the ideas of the logicians Dignāga and Dharmakīrti were considered as a novel way of defending the Yogācāra notion of "mind-only" without having to face the problems met by using an ontological defence of this notion. The three natures are even discussed by Dignāga and linked to his epistemology.[10] However, since Vasubandhu differs from the logicians in that he does not advocate the cognitive aspects in cognition itself and conforms all too well with the old tradition, I regard Dignāga and Dharmakīrti as originators of a new tradition differing in many aspects from that which ended with Vasubandhu.

As for the selection of texts within this period of time, the main criteria of choice are the extent to which a text is representative of a well delimited phase of Yogācā ra history or of a certain author, and whether a text gives importance to the three natures. The only texts within the Yogācāra tradition, apart from a number of commentaries, known to me to deal with the three natures which are excluded from the study are the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* and the Bsb. The first text gives only very slight attention to the three natures and the second, as part of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, lies outside the scope of the thesis. The seven texts used by me are indicated in the contents.

1.4 Method

My overall view of science is that of a model-making activity. It may be argued that any investigation of reality is a study of entities which are related to each other in what may be called a structure. If this assumption is accepted, the fundamental issue is the ontological status of "structure". The general dividing line lies between those who maintain that structure is an empirical field of study and those who claim that it is a construction made by the investigator. In this issue, I rather tend to side with the latter view which in my own field of work is represented by Claude Lévi-

[8] Cf. e.g. Schmithausen 1987, p. 13 and Frauwallner 1969, p. 281.
[9] Cf. Nakamura 1989, p. 274 and note 6.
[10] Cf. Lindtner & Dreyfuss 1989, pp. 30-33 and 49.

Strauss.[11] Although I am not a hard-line structuralist, I believe that his views on the scientist as primarily model-making is very fruitful when trying to understand what science fundamentally is.

Hence, structure is made by the investigator who studies reality. In making this structure, he creates a model of that which he studies. A model exhibits the characteristics of a system in such a way that if one element changes, all other elements are changed and it should also be able to be transformed so as to generate similar isomorphic models of the same kind. Furthermore, predictions could be made about the the reaction of the system if modifications are made and all observed components could be contiguously comprehendible. In such studies, observation is the empirical study and experimentation is the analysis made by comparing models and exposing them to change.[12] Models may also have been made by those behind investigated texts or by people in their making of world-views. These culturally produced models which may be conscious or unconscious should be distinguished from those made by the researcher.

Therefore I believe that science is very much like drawing a map. Depending on the aim of the study different aspects are emphazised. To the person interested in business an economic map is more interesting than a geological or purely topographic one and to the orienteerer a small-scale map is preferred to a terrestrial globe. Yet, all maps describe the same reality, none is scaled 1:1 and it goes without saying that temporal change may be easily represented by a series of isomorphic maps.

This attitude has largely guided my study. On a lower, though still general level the present work is based on a historical-descriptive method. This inclusive approach is necessitated by the very nature of this study. Any investigation of an entity assumed to change as a function of time is historical and when this entity is a delimited complex of ideas verbally expressed in texts, the main approach should be descriptive. I have therefore tried to fit in many translated parts of the texts which refer to TSB in order to give the reader a chance to make his own impression of the subject matter.

As for my main aim, to delineate conceptual development of the concept of *trisvabhāva*, I have tried to fashion a number of criteria by which this could be measured. As will be obvious, the range of inclusiveness of these four criteria sucessively decreases. The first deals with each nature´s relation to Buddhism as a whole, while the second relates the TSB *in toto* to Buddhism with the focus on Mahā yāna Buddhism. The third concerns the integration, *within* the system, of TSB with other Yogācāra ideas and the fourth refers to the internal structure of TSB itself with emphasis on coherence. The four criteria are as follows:

a) The measure of elaboration of each nature. I propose that if the description of a nature implicitly or explicitly contains more references to Buddhist conceptions than another, the former is more developed. This is based on the common experience that it takes time for new ideas to be elaborated into the common parlance of a religion. Since each of the three natures constituting the TSB may be

[11] His views on models may be gathered from Olsson 1972, p. 13 f. and Lévi-Strauss 1967, p. 271 f.
[12] Olsson, *loc. cit.*

in itself a developed form of older ideas I delimit this first criterion to each single nature.

b) The measure of integration with pan-Buddhist dogma in general and Mahāyānistic dogma in particular. I suggest that if a description of TSB is an obvious attempt to reconcile it with other dogmas, in comparison to a description where this attempt can not be found, the former is more developed. This criterion is based on the same assumption as in a) with the exception that it refers to TSB as a whole. TSB is more than the sum of the three natures, it is a complex of three concepts and their internal relations some of which, though maybe implicit, sometimes are necessary for the internal logical coherence.

c) The measure of integration with other Yogācāra tenets. If a description of the TSB is an implicit or explicit part of an attempt of systematic and coherent integration of Yogācāra thought, this description is more developed than a description which fails to convey this. The assumption which lies behind this criterion is again a general experience. The notion of any *school* of thought implies that attempts have been made by its originators and proponents to establish a coherent system, which is an expression of their view of reality and the values which are part of it.

d) The measure of logical coherence and eleboration of the internal formal structure of the TSB. Any description of the TSB in which the relations between the three natures are more elaborated and coherent is considered more developed than a description in which this is not the case. The presumption which guided the shape of this criterion is the common observation that most succesful notions of any system of thought tend to become more inclusive and universal in order to enhance the explanatory capacity of these notions. Hence, this is also a more formal criterion.

1.5 Terminology

In order to elucidate the central concepts involved in the notion of the three natures, I believe that the philosophical background and the historical development of these concepts must be delineated.

A recurrent theme in Buddhist thought is the notion of dependent co-origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*), which is the substance of the awakening of the Buddha Gautama.[13] Any analysis of the ontology of Buddhism must account for the philosophical presuppositions embedded in this notion. The central core of the notion of dependent co-origination is the conception of a reality in constant flux, the ever-changing process of which phenomena causally depend upon other phenomena.[14] The earliest Buddhist scriptures express these ideas in a variety of ways:

"The ideas of a man arise and disappear through a cause, through a condition.

[13] As inspired by Nagao 1991, p. 212.

[14] Cf. the exposition by Mookerjee 1980 which, though written from the point of view of the logical school of Dignāga and Dharnakīrti, nevertheless illustrates the various views on causation of the most prominent philosophical schools in India in the first centuries of the common era.

By means of training some ideas arise, by means of training other ideas disappear."[15]

"Conditioned by the eye and the forms, visual consciousness arises. The combination of the three is contact (stimulation). Through stimulation (there is) feeling. Through feeling (there is) craving. From the complete fading away and cessation of this craving (there is cessation of becoming) becoming will end. Through the end of becoming, birth will end. Through the end of birth, old age and death, grief, lamentation, suffering, depression and despair will cease. In this way the cessation of this whole complex of suffering is effected. This is the end of suffering."[16]

"Just as a certain seed, sown in the field, sprouts because of the earth´s juice and moisture, these two, so the factors and the elements and these six sense modalities are produced through a cause and cease through the dissolution of the cause."[17]

Hence, the ontology of early Buddhism defines the components of reality as dependently co-originated phenomena. These phenomena, called *dharma*[18] in singular, were considered by the early philosophical schools of Buddhism to be the ultimate, non-reducable components of reality.[19] The connotation of the term implies that every *dharma* is an individual entity which does not inhere in another. Thus, apart from the qualities, there is no substance and there is no matter apart from the single sense-data, or indeed any "Soul" beyond separate moments of cognition. That is to say, to claim that fire *has* heat is an inadequate expression of the fact that fire *is* heat, among other things. Moreover, *dharmas* have no temporal duration, hence every moment is an unique *dharma*. Yet they interact with one another according to the principle of dependent co-origination.[20] From this brief sketch of the connotations of the word *dharma*, it is obvious that the concept most closely corresponding to the word *dharma* is that of "phenomenon" in the terminology of philosophical phenomenology. This concept is used to denote that which presents

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[15] *Sahetu sappaccayā purisassa saññā uppajjanti pi nirujjhanti pi. Sikkhā ekā saññā uppajjanti, sikkhā ekā saññā nirujjhanti.* Digha Nikaya I. 180 f. Quoted from Johansson 1973, p. 52

[16] *Cakkhuṃ ca paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuviññānaṃ; tiṇṇaṃ sangati phasso; phassapaccayā vedanā; vedanāpaccayā taṇhā; tassā-y-eva taṇhāya asesavirāganirodhā bhavanirodhā; bhavanirodhā jātinirodho; jātinirodhā jarāmaraṇaṃ sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupāyāsā nirujjhanti. Evam etassa kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa nirodho hoti. Ayaṃ dukkhassa atthagamo.* Samyutta Nikāya IV. 86. Quoted from Johansson 1973, p. 57-59

[17] *Yathā aññataraṃ bījaṃ khette vuttaṃ virūhati pathavīrasañ cāgamma sinehañ ca tad ubhayaṃ, evam khandhā ca dhātuyo cha ca āyatanā ime hetuṃ paṭicca sambhūtā hetubhangā nirujjhare.* Saṃyutta Nikāya I. 134. Quoted from Johansson 1973, pp. 60-61

[18] The Adk I. 2 says: "*dharma* signifie: qui porte (*dhāraṇa*) un caractère propre (*svalakṣaṇa*)". Quoted from la Vallée Poussin 1980, tome I, p. 4.

[19] Stcherbatsky (1979, p. 39 ff.) and Nagao (1991, p. 163 ff.). Note the Sarvāstivāda and the Sautrāntika schools.

[20] These connotations of the word "dharma" are mainly based upon Stcherbatsky 1979, p. 74. Although the Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntikas agree that *dharmas* are momentary, the former school maintained that the phenomenon endured for the three periods of time - past, present and future. The polemics between these schools is illustrated in Adk. II. 46 and V. 24-26.

itself directly to the consciousness. Phenomenologists often maintain that no knowledge may be gained of that which causes the phenomenon.[21]

By the time of the emergence of the Mahāyānistic ideas, philosophical analysis had brought the understanding of causality to its utmost limits. The notion of emptiness (*śūnyatā*, Pāli *suññatā*) was not unknown to early Buddhism, but the term was used in an altogether different way. It might either refer to the highest level of concentration, which may be defined as a fixed, undifferentiated global awareness, or to freedom of obsessions in which case it is a synonym of *nibbāna*.[22] It may be argued that Nāgārjuna was the first to relate the notion of dependent co-origination directly to the notion of emptiness,[23] but the conception of phenomena being devoid of own being (*svabhāva*), since they are dependently co-originated, is a frequent theme in all Prajñāpāramitā literature.[24] This may be seen in the reinterpretation of this standpoint by the Sns VII. 1 and 3:

> "/—/ Pourtant, le Seigneur a affirmé que toutes les choses sont sans nature propre, non-nées, non-détruites, calmes depuis l´origine et essentiellement nirvânées. Quelle est son intention cachée en parlant ainsi ?"[25]

> "Lorseque j´enseigne que toutes les choses sont sans nature propre je me réfère à la triple Irréalité (*litt.* absence de nature propre): Irréalité de caractère, Irréalité de naissance, Irréalité absolue."[26]

Nāgārjuna´s view on these matters is evident from Mmk XXIV. 18:

> "Dependent Arising (*pratītyasamutpāda*) is what we call Emptiness: it is a metaphorical designation and it is the Middle Path."[27]

The term *svabhāva* which may be literally translated as "own-being" is a very elusive concept. It is frequently used to denote the manner of being of something, or being itself. It may thus be used in two broad senses examples of which are the following sentences: "The son of a barren woman has got no *svabhāva*." and " The *svabhāva* of an illusion is imaginary". In the first case the term is used intransitively to determine whether something exists or not and in the second case the transitive function is emphasised, i.e. the manner of being. For Nāgārjuna, which is well known, nothing really has got any *svabhāva* , since nothing exists independently whereas the Yogācārins, though using the term in the same way, maintain the existence at least of mind. Hence, the term *svabhāva* may be used in both of the senses indicated though the underlying systems of thought may differ. The two main usages of this term could therefore be expressed as follows[28]:

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[21] Cf. Barbosa da Silva 1982, p. 31 ff.
[22] Cf. Johansson 1973, p. 105.
[23] Cf. Nagao 1991, p. 212.
[24] Cf. Nagao 1991, p. 210 f.; Rawlinson 1977, p. 20; Conze 1953, p. 119 ff. and Conze 1960, p. 34 f.
[25] Sns VII. 1. Quoted from Lamotte 1935a, p. 193
[26] Sns VII. 3. Quoted from *ibid.*
[27] Quoted from Lindtner 1982b, p. 207. Cf. also verses 16-17 and 19.
[28] This has been discussed by Schayer 1931, p. 55 f. n. 41; Stcherbatsky 1934, p. 10 f.; deJong 1950, 323 f.; May 1959, p. 124 n. 328 and Nagao 1991, p. 209 f.

a) To denote the existence or non-existence of something.

b) To denote the manner in which something, which is established as existing, may exist.

The names of the three natures and their inverted counterparts do not seem to have been selected from a single consistent point of view, as will be seen, but rather from at least two general points of view the first of which is ontological and the second epistemological.

Thus, the dependent nature is invariously held to be the sole existent entity within the Yogācāra system, be it defined as fundamental causation or as ideas or both. The imagined and the consummated natures are not alternative categories on the same level, as the dependent nature, but modes which the dependent may assume. Hence, the latter is often described as the constant flow of awareness which is maintained as really existing. This stream of perceptual images may bifurcate into a subjective and an objective part, which accounts for the every-day experience which is illusive. When this way of beholding is eliminated, pure awareness is left. Therefore the DN is construed from an ontological point of view while the other two are epistemological modes of the former.[29]

The inverted counterparts of the three natures are in fact the three natures applied on reality from the point of view that all phenomena are empty. The main question to which these three are the answer to is "in what way is x empty?" The main structure of this complex is identical with that of the three natures, viz. there is something which exists and it may exist in two ways.

The word *parikalpita* is the past participle form of the stem *kalpa* "construct" which is made from the verbal root √*kḷp* to which is added the adverbial prefix *pari* and it means "imagined" in Buddhist parlance. *Parinișpanna* which means "consummated" is made up by *pari* and the past participle *nișpanna. Paratantra,* lastly, is formed by the two words *para* meaning "other" and *tantra* which may be rendered by "dependent on".

Lakṣaṇa-, utpatti- and paramārtha-niḥsvabhāvatā are all composed by the term *niḥsvabhāvatā* ,which could be literally rendered by "no-own-being-ness", which from the contexts in which these three inverted natures are found is equivalent to "emptiness". Hence, the IN is empty with regard to "identity" (*lakṣaṇa*), the DN with regard to "arising" (*utpatti*) and the CN with regard to the ultimate (*paramārtha*) ,since it is emptiness itself.

Some of the key terms for the understanding of Yogācāra thought have thereby been displayed: "dependent co-origination" (*pratītyasamutpāda*), "phenomenon" (*dharma*), "own being" / "nature" (*svabhāva*) and the three natures and their inverted counterparts.

1.6 Research-history and present situation

In previous unpublished and published papers, I have dealt extensively with the Yogācārian concept of *trisvabhāva* (TSB) though I have not been able to draw any *coherent* picture of it or its temporal development. I will now venture to propose an

[29] Cf. Nagao 1991, p. 62

alternative understanding of the concept based upon the results arrived at in my previous work and the theoretical standpoint adopted by David M. Eckel.[30] To be able to illustrate the main shape of my approach, I will give a few examples of the traditional understanding of the concept.

The first group of scholars seem to have set TSB somewhat out of context, treating it as an isolated phenomenon and superimposing the Madhyamakan *satyadvaya*[31] concept upon it. Thus D.T. Suzuki:

> "The Paratantra and the Parikalpita are mutually dependent. The Parinishpanna is to go beyond both these forms of knowledge. This is Paramā rtha, the highest transcendental wisdom, while the Saṁvṛiti form of truth prevails in the world of Parikalpita and Paratantra."[32]

Herbert Guenther agrees on the formal interpretation but promotes *paratantra* to the *paramārtha* status:

> "Both the "ideally absolute" and the "relative" are said to be real in an ultimate sense, while the"notional-conceptional" is stated not to be so."[33]

A.K. Chatterjee is even more explicit about the relation of TSB to *satyadvaya* and uses Suzuki´s dichotomy:

> "There are thus three, and not merely two, Truths /---/ The paratantra and the parikalpita together constitute our empirical experience (samvṛti), while consciousness as non-conceptual (pariniṣpanna) is the Absolute (param-ārtha)."[34]

A surprising instance of this extra-contextual treatment of TSB is found in F.Tola and C. Dragonetti's edition and translation of TSN:

> "...since two of these natures, the "dependent" one (paratantra) and the "imaginary" one (parikalpita), constitute the empirical reality, and the third one, the "absolute" nature (pariniṣpanna), is the absolute reality, the Absolute."[35]

The second group of scholars view TSB, while dismissing its pseudo-relation to

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[30] Cf. my licentiate thesis "Materials and tools for the study of some aspects of Yogācāra thought" Lund 1986 (unpublished paper a copy of which is availible at the department of the history of religions at the university of Lund) and Boquist 1992. Eckel´s standpoint is expressed in Eckel 1985, p. 25 ff.

[31] This superimposition is sometimes seen in texts like Las and Mvb as well as in Kambala´s *Ā lokamālā* (cf. Lindtner 1985, p. 118). However, either system´s conception of the relation between the "two truths" and the "three natures" is incompatible with the other system´s as is evident from e.g. Eckel 1985, p. 38 ff. The employment of the theory of the "two truths" *as an analytical concept* in the interpretation of the TSB is therefore bound to confuse the issue.

[32] Suzuki 1930, p. 164

[33] Guenther 1973, p. 96

[34] Chatterjee 1975, p. 148. Cf. also the evaluation of this work by Wayman 1965.

[35] Tola & Dragonetti 1983, pp.228-229

satyadvaya, as a system of concepts in itself or as a subsystem of concepts integrated in Yogācāra philosophy as a whole while relating it to other systems of thought. We find Louis de la Vallée Poussin saying:

> "Les textes de Prajñā, que le Madhyamaka accepte tels quels, ingénument, doivent être interprétés. Le Yogācāra les interpréte ingénieusment, a la faveur d'une théorie qui donne son nom au système, la théorie des trois natures (svabhāva) ou 'caractères' (lakṣaṇa) et des trois vides ou absences de nature propre (niḥsvabhāvatā)."[36]

N. Aramaki sets TSB in relation to all of Buddhism by assigning paratantra the role of a unifying concept of the saṃsāric:

> "...interest in satisfying the traditional quests for salvation through deepening the knowledge of *saṃsāric* or material world and, accordingly, of the epistemological structure of experience, etc.,etc. // There must have been conscious efforts to systematize then existent concepts, Mahāyānistic as well as Hīnayānistic, by establishing their harmonious relations with the central concept which would later be defined as *paratantrasvabhāva*". [37]

Erich Frauwallner depicts the development of TSB in his usual very exact and scholarly manner and sets it in relation to phases of the development of Mahāyāna thought and subsystems of thought. One example may suffice:

> "...eine Lehre, die für die Yogācāra-Schule während der ganzen Dauer ihres Bestehens kennzeichned war, nähmlich die Lehre vom dreifachen Wesen oder der dreifachen Beschaffenheit der Dinge, und damit verknüpft die Lehre von ihrer dreifachen Wesenlosigkeit. Mit die Lehre vom Wesen der Wirklichkeit, wie wir sie in der Bodhisattvabhūmiḥ kennengelernt haben, war eine der grundlegenden Lehren des Systems geschaffen. Sie hatte aber noch nicht die Form gefunden, in der sie dauernd in Geltung bleiben sollte. Das geschah erst mit der Lehre von der dreifachen Beschaffenheit."[38]

Stephen Kaplan wants to unfold the confluence of Yogācāra Buddhism and holographic psychology by examining their understanding of perceptual experience and comes to the conclusion that the perceptual images which we experience are mental constructions which appear but do not exist anywhere. I will not dispute the validity of his conclusion since the relevant observation is the fact that he compares TSB as a system of epistemological concepts with another system of concepts which seems to have expanded into an epistemological theory,[39]

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36 la Vallée Poussin 1932-33, p. 48

37 Aramaki 1967, p. 30

38 Frauwallner 1969, pp. 264-407. Quotation taken from p. 280. I agree with Frauwallner upon the interpretation of TSB as found in particular texts, though I claim that TSB seen in a diachronical perspective exhibits a number of both substantial and formal peculiarities which need consideration.

39 Cf. notes 9,15, 16, and 17 in Kaplan 1982.

showing that they both attempt to give responses to the question of human experience.[40]

Gadjin Nagao's conception of the TSB presupposes that the Buddhist world-view to be elucidated is that of the Mahāyāna Buddhism which claims the ontological identity between *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa*. His methodological standpoint amounts to the postulation of this world-view before examining TSB to determine what world-view TSB actually expresses and the treatment of the similes in a synchronic manner, thereby disregarding the development of TSB and its similes. After implicitly displaying his methodological standpoints he proceeds to present his conception of TSB by saying that the world is always one and the same. This "neutral" world is *paratantrasvabhāva* which is equivalent to *pratītyasamutpāda*. Seen as such, as *pratītyasamutpāda*, it is *pariniṣpannasvabhāva*. Seen as something else, as the result of the constructions of the intellect being the construction of the unreal (*abhūtaparikalpa*) it is *parikalpitasvabhāva*.. *Paratantrasvabhāva* can thus be seen as either *parikalpitasvabhāva* which he equates with *saṃsāra* or as *pariniṣpannasvabhāva* being *nirvāṇa*.

Furthermore it is being said that the imagined and consummated natures are possible only on the basis (MSg IX. 1: *āśraya*) of the relative nature, an assumption which Nagao extends to include the notion of a convertibility between the natures (*paryāya* / *paryāyeṇa* MSg II. 17). Finally he unites the soteriological and metaphysical aspects of TSB by claiming *paratantrasvabhāva's* role as a medium or mediator between *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa*.[41]

The third and final group, the views of which David Eckel is the chief exponent[42] views TSB not only as a system of concepts integrated into Yogācāra philosophy as a whole comparing it with other systems of Buddhist thought, but understands that TSB is *one* response to the problem of the ontological status of the "absolute" among others of other schools, all of which share the common pan-Buddhist "philosophical presuppositions".[43] In other words it is a conflict between systems arising from the differing solutions to the dilemma arising from these "philosophical presuppositions". Before attempting to disentangle these complex matters, we shall see some of these patterns of thought examplified. Jay Hirabayashi and Shotaro Iida ask themselves:

> "...What is the status of the *paratantrasvabhāva* in the minds of Yogācāra and Mādhyamika thinkers ?"[44].

The point on which the two systems collided, around which their controversy pivoted, is obvious from the following quotation:

> "Having set forth the three aspects of reality /—/ the doctrine tries to avoid the two extreme and erroneous (for the Yogācāra) views, of, on the one hand,

[40] *Op. cit.* p. 211-224
[41] Nagao 1991, p. 61 ff.
[42] 1985, pp. 25-75. This article provided me with the basic premise of my interpretation of TSB.
[43] Cf. Potter 1991.
[44] Hirabayashi & Iida 1977, p. 341 f.

clinging to naive realism, and on the other, the utter denial of the phenomenal world which might also be called the super-nihilistic view. However, if someone asserts positively the reality of the paratantrasvabhāva from the point of view of ultimate reality, then according to the Mādhyamika school, that cannot be a Buddhist doctrine."[45]

Iida, by himself and at a later point of time says:

"No scholar would object to the assertion that the technical term *prati tyasamutpāda* (Pāli. *paṭiccasamuppāda*) is one unique feature of Buddhism /.../ The status of this as the pivotal point from which the divergent Buddhist doctrines throughout schools and ages arose, can be succinctly seen from the following statement:
Yo paṭiccasamuppādaṃ passati so dhammaṃ passati
Yo dhammaṃ passati so paṭiccasamuppādaṃ passati
He who sees *Dependent-co-origination*, sees *dhamma*,
He, who sees *dhamma*, sees *Dependent-co-origination*.
/—/ The doctrine of *tri-svabhāva* tries to give an ideal solution to this paradoxical situation by posing *paratantrasvabhāva* which is the basis of the occurrences."[46]

Lastly, we shall deal with the views of David Eckel on the relation of TSB to related Buddhist systems and to the "absolute" and on what fundamentally and formally TSB is designed to explain. His presentation of the problem is the theoretical standpoint adopted by me and for argument´s sake, we will consider his line of reasoning at some length. To begin with he qualifies the statement of Hirabayashi / Iida that the Yogācārins found the extreme views of naive realism and super-nihilism erroneous by correctly claiming that all of Buddhist thought adhered to this view:

"As anyone who has studied Buddhist literature will know, the sense of balance or 'middleness' is a motif that runs through virtually every area of Buddhist thought /—/ In philosophical literature the balance is expressed as the avoidance of the two "extremes" the extreme of "nihilism" (uccheda-vāda) and the extreme of "eternalism" (śāśvata-vāda) /—/ another pair of concepts: "denial" (apavāda) and "reification" (samāropa) /.../ A "denial" (apavāda) is to great a negation and "reification" (samāropa) too great an affirmation. The Yogācārins and Mādhyamikas agree, in a formal sense, that an account of what is real should avoid both "denial" and "reification", but in substance they find it hard to agree on just what constitutes "denial" or "reification""[47]

Now, why would they feel constrained by such a structure leading their arguments to the brink of paradox? Eckel answers by referring to the "presuppositions" of Indian philosophy as analyzed by Karl Potter:[48]

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[45] *Op. cit.* p. 342 f.
[46] Iida 1980, p. 260 f. The Pāli verse refers to *Majjhimanikāya*. I. p.191
[47] Eckel 1985, pp. 30-31
[48] Cf. Potter 1991, p. 47 f. and 117 f.

"where assumptions are made that govern not just the answers philosophers give, but the shape of their questions. Potter argues that the Indian preoccupation with paths of salvation forces the Indian systems to satisfy two separate and contrasting requirements. They have to account for "freedom-to", which is the possibility that there is a path leading to the goal a person seeks, and they have to account for "freedom-from", which is the possibility that a person can freely choose either to enter or not to enter such a path /—/ Any account of human action has to confront at some point the dilemma of freedom and determinism: the causal process must be sufficiently "regular" to allow a person to act with a purpose, yet it cannot be so "regular" that a person cannot freely enter into it and change its course. /—/ Potter explains "freedom to" as an escape from skepticism - the suspicion that there is nothing that can be done to bring about the result a person seeks. "Freedom-from" is an escape from "fatalism", which is the suspicion that, while there may be a path to the result, a person cannot freely opt for that path or freely choose to set the chain of causes in motion. In the terms "skepticism" and "fatalism" we have a formula Buddhist thinkers would find quite familiar. What is "nihilism" (uccheda-vāda) but a form of "skepticism", in which whatever occurs in the present moment is "destroyed" (ucchinna) and has no effect on the future. And what is "eternalism" (śāśvata-vāda) but a form of "fatalism", in which the present is seen as enduring in such a way that it dominates the future?" [49]

How do these schools account for the absolute avoiding the extremes of nihilism and eternalism? In the Mādhyamika case the Middle Path is both dependent co-origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*) and emptiness (*śūnyatā*). It thus involves both the affirmation of a causal sequence, a regularity and hence an escape from the extreme of nihilism as well as an affirmation of emptiness, that nothing exists in its own right and consequently an escape from the extreme of eternalism. In the Yogācāra case, Eckel takes his point d'appui in MVb[50] wherein the three categories, duality (*dvayam*), the imagination of the unreal (*abhūtaparikalpa*) and emptiness (*śūnyatā*)

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[49] Eckel 1985, p. 31-33

[50] The fact that Eckel uses MVb as a source of his interpretation of TSB might seem a bit confusing. *First* it might seem at first glance that Eckel in fact agrees with Suzuki, Chatterjee and Tola /Dragonetti on the consummated nature being within the realm of the "ultimate truth" (*paramārthasatya*) which he in fact does not, since the dichotomy between conventional truth (*saṃvṛtisatya*) and ultimate truth (*paramārthasatya*) is a Mādhyamika device to account for the veracity of statements about reality concieved as empty on the one hand and statements about reality being "dependently co-originated" on the other.
Secondly, the very structure of TSB in MVb is quite different from the common expositions of TSB. It is sufficient now to say that the structure of TSB in MVb can logically be reconstructed from the fundamental or archetypical structure of TSB and its inverted counterpart, the three "emptinesses". This will become obvious later when the fundamental or archtypical structure of TSB and its inverted counterpart emerges, and the history of how this structure is being filled with different contents, which sometimes seem to contradict themselves, is traced.
Thirdly, using MVb as one source of knowledge about TSB Eckel is of course correct in his interpretation of TSB *as seen from MVb*. If, however, the task is to depict the temporal development of TSB, all sources must be taken into consideration.

are related to each other. In this tripartite structure to which (in the MVb) duality corresponds to the imagined nature, the imagination of the unreal to the dependent nature and emptiness to the absolute nature, Eckel says:

> "The key, bridging concept is that of imagination (abhūtaparikalpa). This is the point where the stream of cognition occurs, so it guarantees, for good or ill, that the process of change and growth has reality. It also is identical in essence to pure Emptiness, so it guarantees that the goal is present and accessible."[51]

In the fact that the imagination of the unreal exists, there is an escape from nihilism, and in the fact when the duality in it has been removed and the emptiness in it is realized, there is an escape from eternalism.

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[51] Eckel 1985, p. 37

The Exposition of Trisvabhāva in Yogācāra texts

2 The Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra (Sns)

Although the Sanskrit original of the Sns is lost, Lamotte has reconstructed parts of it into Sanskrit from the Tibetan translation. Apart from the latter there are five Chinese translations, two of which are partial.[52] It is clearly divided into three consecutive parts: chapters I-IV, V-VII and VIII-X. The first part is more or less a Prajñāpāramitā, the second a doctrinal exposition of central Yogācāra tenets and the third, finally, displays a Yogācāra scholasticism.[53]

The Sns, which is extensively quoted in Bbh and Msg, marks the transition from Prajñāpāramitā to Yogācāra and is supposed to have been compiled in the course of the second century C.E. and fixed in its actual state by the beginning of the third.[54]

Relevant passages containing propositions on the nature of reality, conforming to TSB and its inverted counterpart - the three "emptinesses" - are found[55] as indicated below. TSB expressed with °*lakṣaṇa* is fairly evenly distributed among the two main chapters with a higher percentage verses by chapter (67%) in ch. VI than ch. VII (21%). Suffixed with °*svabhāva*, it is only found in ch. VII (6%) and once each in chs. IX and X. The occurrences of the emptinesses are confined to ch. VII (39%) and once in ch. IX.

2.1 The distribution of the three natures in the Sns

[IN is the Imagined nature, DN is the Dependent nature, CN is the Consummated nature, EI is Emptiness regarding identity, EA is Emptiness regarding arising and EU is Emptiness regarding the ultimate.]

Ed.	Ch.	Verse	IN	DN	CN	EI	EA	EU	Notes
60	VI	3	x	x	x				TSB suffixed by *lakṣaṇa* in
-"-	-"-	4	x						chapter VI.
-"-	-"-	5		x					
61	-"-	6			x				
-"-	-"-	7	x	x	x				The "eye-cataract"-simile
61-62	-"-	8-9	x	x	x				The "crystal"-simile
63	-"-	10	x	x	x				
63-64	-"-	11	x	x	x				
67	VII	3				x	x	x	
67-68	-"-	4	x			x			
68	-"-	5		x			x		
68-69	-"-	6		x	x		x	x	A double EU
69	-"-	7				x	x	x	-"-

[52] Cf. Lamotte 1935a p. 8-13. Large parts of this work is also found in Lamotte 1934, p. 289 f. It was reviewed by Demiéville 1936, p. 645 f.
[53] Cf. Lamotte 1935a, pp. 18-24; May 1971, p. 276.
[54] Cf. Lamotte *op. cit.* p. 25; May *loc. cit.*,and Nakamura 1989, pp. 255-56, esp. p. 255 n. 15.
[55] When referring to Sns, the Sanskrit used is that of Lamotte´s reconstructions. Translations into French are also his. The Tibetan ed., Sanskrit reconstrutions and French translations are found in Lamotte 1935a.

69-70	-"-	8				x			
70	-"-	9						x	
70-71	-"-	10	x	x	x				TSB suffixed by *svabhāva*
71-72	-"-	11					x		
72	-"-	12				x	x	x	
72-73	-"-	13	x	x		x	x	x	IN suffixed by *svabhāva*; DN also by *lakṣaṇa.*
77-78	-"-	20	x	x	x				TSB suffixed by *lakṣaṇa*
80	-"-	24				x	x	x	
80-83	-"-	25-27	x	x	x	x	x	x	TSB suffixed by *lakṣaṇa.* A double EU
138-41	IX	18	x	x	x	x	x	x	TSB suffixed by *svabhāva*
153-60	X	7	x						IN suffixed by *svabhāva.*

2.2 Analytical survey

Chapter VI:

3. Phenomena (*dharma*) have three natures (*lakṣaṇa*), namely the imagined nature (*parikalpitalakṣaṇa*), the dependent nature (*paratantralakṣaṇa*) and the consummated nature (*pariniṣpannalakṣaṇa*)

4. The imagined nature is the attribution of own-being (*svabhāva*) to phenomena by means of language which enables us to talk about them.

5. The dependent nature is the dependent co-origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*) of phenomena.

6. The consummated nature is the "suchness" (*tathatā*) of phenomena and the bodhisattva's knowledge (*avabodha*) of it from the practice (*bhāvanā*) of which comes enlightenment (*saṃyaksambodha*).

7. It can be compared to ophtalmia in which the imagined nature is to be seen as the dimmed view affecting a person, the dependent nature as that which causes these dimmed images and the consummated nature as the unillusory objects seen when the disease has been cured.

8-9. It can be compared to a transparent crystal which assumes the colour of whatever object in its proximity. Verbal designations (*vyavahāra*) which are imaginary are to be seen as the colours affecting the crystal. The wrong assumption of a coloured crystal is to be seen as the erroneous attribution of the imagined nature on the dependent nature, which is to be seen as the transparent crystal. The crystal seen as truly transparent represents the dependent nature as it really is.

10. The imagined nature consists of names attached to marks and the dependent nature is the attribution of the imagined nature on itself, while the consummated nature is the cessation of this attribution.

11-12. The bodhisattvas who know the imagined nature in the dependent nature know phenomena without nature (*alakṣaṇa*). Those who know the dependent nature know defiled (*saṃkleśa*) phenomena and those who know the consummated nature know purified (*vyavadāna*) phenomena. Discovering phenomena without nature, they expel defiled phenomena and obtain purified phenomena

Chapter VII:

1-3. All phenomena are declared empty (*niḥsvabhāva*) by reference to the threefold emptiness (*niḥsvabhāvatā*), which is emptiness regarding identity (*lakṣaṇa*), arising (*utpatti*) and the ultimate (*paramārtha*).

4. The emptiness regarding identity is the imagined nature, since it is established by names (*nāma*) and conventional symbols (*saṃketa*) and not by itself .

5. The emptiness regarding arising is the dependent nature, since it is arisen from the force of other conditions (*parapratyaya*) and not by itself (*na svatas*).

6. The emptiness regarding the ultimate is the dependently originated phenomena (*dharmāḥ pratītyasamutpannāḥ*) which are empty by virtue of the emptiness regarding arising and also by virtue of the emptiness regarding the ultimate. The pure object (*viśuddhālambana*) in phenomena is the ultimate and since it is not the dependent nature it is called the emptiness regarding the ultimate. The consummated nature is also called emptiness regarding the ultimate, because of the selflessness (*dharmanairātmya*) of phenomena. Since the ultimate is manifested by the emptiness of all phenomena, it is called emptiness regarding the ultimate.

7. The emptiness regarding identity is like a flower in the air (*khapuṣpa*), and the emptiness regarding arising and the ultimate in one of its aspects is like magic (*mā yā*). In this first aspect it is also like the omnipresent space manifested merely by the absence of matter. In its second aspect, it is omnipresent and manifested by the selflessness of phenomena.

8. Referring to the emptiness regarding identity, all things are unborn and essentially extinguished, since that which does not exist by virtue of its own nature does not originate and thus there is no longer anything to extinguish.

9. Referring to the emptiness regarding the ultimate manifested by the selflessness of phenomena, all things are unborn and essentially extinguished since it is eternally subsistent. In so far as it is the essence of phenomena (*dharmadharmatā*) it is unconditioned and exempt from all defilements. Being unconditioned it is unborn and undestroyed; being exempt from all defilements it is essentially extinguished.

10. The threefold emptiness is displayed because beings (*sattva*) superimpose the imagined nature on the dependent and the consummated nature in verbal designations. As they attach themselves to the imagined nature they give birth to the future dependent nature and continue to transmigrate.

11. The law (*dharma*) of emptiness regarding arising is taught to those who do not bring the series to maturity (*aparipakvasaṃtāna*) and do not accumulate the equipments of merit and knowledge. As they listen to the law they understand that dependently originated dispositions (*pratītyasaṃutpannaḥ saṃskāra*) are impermanent etc., and so they develop disgust for them and bring the series to maturity and accumulate the equipments of merit and knowledge.

12. Although they may accumulate the equipments of merit and knowledge, they do not exactly recognize the emptiness regarding identity and the ultimate in the emptiness regarding arising. It is for those that the law on the emptiness regarding identity and the ultimate is declared.

13. Hearing this, they do not attach themselves to the imagined nature, wrongly attributed to the dependent nature. They gain knowledge unimpregnated by verbal

designations, by penetrating the emptiness regarding identity, and the ultimate in the emptiness regarding arising. Through this knowledge they destroy the series and make the dependent nature cease.

20. Some beings stick to the letter when interpreting the formula stating the emptiness of all phenomena and believe that all phenomena are non-existent and without nature. In as much as they consider the dependent and consummated natures as non-natures, they deny the imagined nature as well since it takes the two former ones to make the latter possible.

25-27. The attribution by names and conventional symbols of own-nature and specifications to objects of intellectual operations (*saṃskāranimitta*), which takes place talking of material *skandha* (*rūpaskandha*), the truth of suffering (*duḥkhasatya*) or of perfect concentration (*samyaksamādhi*), constitutes the imagined nature. It is with respect to this that the emptiness regarding identity is proclaimed. The objects of intellectual operations, which are the basis of the imagined nature, constitute the dependent nature. With respect to this, the emptiness regarding identity and the ultimate in one of its aspects is proclaimed. The objects of intellectual operations which are the basis of the imagined nature, do not correspond to anything consummated. The consummated nature is constituted by the absence of an own-nature, the selflessness of phenomena, suchness and the purified support. The emptiness regarding the ultimate in its second aspect is proclaimed with respect to this. The way of reasoning about the material *skandha* can also be applied on the twelve bases, the twelve preconditions of dependent co-origination, the four fuels and the six or eighteen elements, on other truths, such as the application of mindfulness (*smṛtyupathāna*) /—/ each member of enlightenment (*bodhyaṅga*) and branch of the path (*mārgāṅga*).

The disposition of the analysis of the three natures in the Sns will differ between chapters VI and chapter VII, IX and X for reasons which are obvious from a glance at the distribution of the three natures in the Sns. In chapter VI I will treat each nature separately with the exception of the "eye-cataract"- and the "crystal"-simile which integrate the TSB in a manner which precludes a piecemal investigation. In chapter VII the three emptinesses (*niḥsvabhāvatā*) are linked to the three natures in such a complex way that the entanglement of these six persepectives on reality is more or less unfeasible. Therefore I will discuss the three natures and their inverted counterparts as they occur in the chapter. The two instances of the TSB in chapter IX and X will be examined separately.

2.3 The imagined nature in Sns chapter VI

The initial statement on the three natures in Sns is VI. 3 which merely states that phenomena have three natures[56] (*trīṇi /—/ dharmalakṣaṇāni*): the imagined nature, the dependent nature and the consummated nature.

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[56] In the TSB-context the word *lakṣaṇa* is virtually equivalent to the more commonly used word *svabhāva*. Cf. Nagao 1991. p. 242, note 1.

> "Les choses ont trois caractères. Quels sont ces trois ? Le caractère imaginaire, le caractère dépendant et le caractère absolu."[57]

In VI. 4 we are confronted with quite a substantial definition of the IN in which it is closely related to verbal activities:

> "Qu´est le caractère imaginaire ? Ce sont des noms et conventions attribuant aux choses une nature propre et des spécifications permettant de les mentionner dans le langage courant."[58]

Thus the IN is defined as consisting of names (*nāma*) and conventional symbols (*saṃketa*).[59] By using these verbal tools, own-nature (*svabhāva*) and distinctions (*viśeṣa*) are attributed to phenomena (*dharma*). The word *svabhāva* is of course used in its sense of "existence" in this context, since its other sense, "mode of being", is not applicable here. The purport of this statement would hence be that by the use of names and conventional symbols anything can be said to exist in such a way that this entity is clearly discernible from other phenomena, since it is specific.

As these phenomena are considered as distinct objects, it is possible to indicate them in verbal designations (*prajñapti*), to speak about them in common language (*vyavahāra*)[60].

Since VI. 7-9 deals with the similes mentioned above, I will consider Sns VI 10 which says:

> "Le caractère imaginaire repose sur les noms attachés aux aux notions. Le caractère dépendant repose sur l´attribution de caractères imaginaires au caractère dépendant. Le caractère absolu repose sur la non-attribution de caractères imaginaires au caractère dépendant."[61]

Thus, the imagined nature is said to consist in names attached to notions or signs

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[57] Quoted from Lamotte, 1935a p. 188.
VI. 3: *trīṇi guṇākara dharmalakṣaṇāni / katamāni trīṇi / yad uta parikalpitalakṣaṇaṃ paratantralakṣaṇaṃ pariniṣpannalakṣaṇaṃ ca //*

[58] Quoted from Lamotte, *loc. cit.*
VI.4: *tatra katamad guṇākara dharmāṇāṃ parikalpitalakṣaṇaṃ / yad uta yāvad anuvyavahā raprajñaptyarthaṃ dharmāṇāṃ svabhāvena vā viśeṣeṇa vā nāmasaṃketavyavasthāpanam //*

[59] The concept of "name" and "conventional symbol" are found as *nāma* and *saṃketa* in e.g. Las pp. 29, 92; II. 191, 195; X. 138-39; Cf. also Msa XI. 39 and Msg II. 18.

The term *saṃketa* is e.g. investigated in the context of the usage of the concept of *saṃvṛti* (convention) in both Yogācāra and Mādhyamika terminology in Nagao 1991, p. 13 ff. (esp. p. 15) and it also appears in Nago 1991, p. 189 ff. in a context where the author discusses the afore mentioned schools´ interpretation of the term *śūnyatā* (emptiness).

[60] Cf. Sns VI4 and 9 and the discussion of the term "*vyavahāra*" and its relation to the term "*saṃvṛtti*" in Nagao 1991, pp. 15-18 and 1991d, p. 45-46. It is also found in Sns II. 3, VI. 9, VII. 10, IX. 14; Msg II. 16 and Tsn 22-23.

[61] VI.10: *tatra guṇākara nimittasaṃbaddhanāmāni niśritya parikalpitalakṣaṇaṃ prajñāyate / paratantralakṣaṇe parikalpitalakṣaṇābhiniveśaṃ niśritya paratantralakṣaṇaṃ prajñāyate / paratantralakṣaṇe parikalpitalakṣaṇābhiniveśaṃ niśritya pariniṣpannalakṣaṇaṃ prajñāyate //*

(*nimitta*). This is essentially a restatement of VI. 4 with the addition of *nimitta*.[62] *Nimitta* as "notion" or "sign" is part of the same semantic field as "name" and "conventional symbols".

The last instance of the IN in Sns chapter VI is verse 11:

> "Les bodhisattva qui connaissent exactement les caractères imaginaires [attribués faussement] au caractère dépendant des choses, connaissent exactement les choses sans caractère. Ceux qui connaissent exactement le caractère dépendant, connaisent exactement les choses de souillure. Ceux qui connaissent exactement le caractère absolu, connaissent exactement les choses de purification. Reconnaissant dans le caractère dépendant des choses sans caractère, ils expulsent les choses de souillure. Expulsant les choses de souillure, ils obtiennent les choses de purification. Ainsi donc, les bodhisattva, connaissant exactement les caractères imaginaire, dépendant et absolu des choses, connaissent exactement les caractères d´ «Absence-de-caractère», de «Souillure» et de «Purification». Connaissent exactement les choses sans caractère, ils expulsent les choses de souillure, expulsant les choses de souillure ils obtiennent les choses de purification. C´est dans cette mesure que les bodhisattva sont versés dans les caractères des choses, et c´est dans cette mesure que le Tathāgata les désigne sous ce nom."[63]

As is obvious from VI. 11, the three natures are connected with the concepts of "absence of nature" (*alakṣaṇa*), "defilement" (*saṃkleśa*) and "purification" (*vyavadāna*) as parts of a process the goal of which is to attain the consummated nature: discovering (*prajñāya*) in *paratantra* things devoid of nature (*alakṣaṇadharma*), the Bodhisattvas expel the defiled things. Expelling (*prahāya*) the defiled things, they obtain (*adhigacchanti*) the purified things.

Thus, the IN is defined as things without nature. From VI. 4 we know that the activity of the IN was to attribute existence (*svabhāva*) and specifications to things by means of language. This is quite unnecessary unless "things" as we know them are unreal or in the words of VI. 11 - devoid of nature.

Hence, the extended world as we perceive it in ignorance is unreal. It is a mere illusion whose seeming reality is due to the workings of language.

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[62] For a discussion of the five *dharmas*, among which is numbered *nimitta*, relation to the three *svabhāvas* cf. e.g. Eckel 1985, p. 48 n. 4 and p. 49 n. 2. *Nimitta* in the context of the IN is found e.g. in Las p. 29 and 92; II. 139, 182, 191 and 195; Msa XI. 38 and Msg II. 16.

[63] VI. 11: *tatra guṇākara bodhisattvā dharmāṇāṃ paratantralakṣaṇe parikalpitalakṣaṇaṃ yathābhūtaṃ prajñāyālakṣaṇadharmān yathābhūtaṃ prajānanti / tatra guṇākara bodhisattvāḥ paratantralakṣaṇaṃ yathābhūtaṃ prajñāya saṃkleśalakṣaṇadharmān yathābhūtaṃ prajānanti // tatra guṇākara bodhisattvāḥ pariniṣpannalakṣaṇaṃ yathābhūtaṃ prajñāya vyavadānalakṣaṇadharmān yathābhūtaṃ prajānanti // tatra guṇākara bodhisattvāḥ paratantralakṣaṇe 'lakṣaṇadharmān yathābhūtaṃ prajñāya saṃkleśalakṣaṇadharmān prajahati // saṃkleśalakṣaṇadharmān prahāya vyavadānalakṣaṇadharmān adhigacchanti // yasmād eva guṇākara bodhisattvāḥ parikalpitalakṣaṇaṃ paratantralakṣaṇaṃ pariniṣpannalakṣaṇaṃ ca yathābhūtaṃ prajñāya alakṣaṇaṃ saṃkleśalakṣaṇadharmān vyavadānalakṣaṇadharmān yathābhūtaṃ prajānanti / alakṣaṇadharmān yathābhūtaṃ prajñāya saṃkleśalakṣaṇadharmān prajahati / saṃkleśalakṣaṇadharmān prahāya vyavadānalakṣaṇadharmān adhigacchanti / tāvatā dharmalakṣaṇakuśalabodhisattvā bhavanti tathāgato 'pi dharmalakṣaṇakuśalān bodhisattvān parajñāpya tāvatā prajñāpayati //*

2.4 The dependent nature in Sns chapter VI

The dependent nature is first described in Sns VI. 5:

> "Qu´est le caractère dépendant ? C´est la production des choses en raison des causes, s´exprimant comme il suit: «Ceci étant, cela est; ceci naissant, cela naît» en ce sens que «les Opérants sont en raison de l´ignorance», et qu´enfin «telle est l´origine de toute cette grande masse de souffrance»."[64]

The main property of the DN is evidently the dependent co-origination of phenomena connected both to an external ontological causality and an internal existential causality. This means that the DN is reality as a neutral substrate, which may become defiled and manifest itself in an imagined manner, or become purified and become the consummated nature. Nothing seems as yet to suggest any link to mental processes of the kind to be seen in later texts.

Leaving the similes in Sns VI. 7-9 for later consideration we may examine what Sns VI. 10 says about the DN:

> "/—/ Le caractère dépendant repose sur l´attribution de caractères imaginaires au caractère dépendant. /—/".[65]

The dependent nature is thus active on itself as some kind of process which may attribute imagined nature on itself. Formally, the IN is unmistakably seen as nothing *per se*. Rather, the DN may actively imagine and become the IN. There is accordingly an implicit conjunction to the cognitive process of imagining which, as we have seen, is deemed unreal.

Lastly, in chapter VI of the Sns, the DN is treated in VI. 11:

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[64] VI.5: *katamad guṇākara dharmāṇāṃ paratantralakṣaṇaṃ / dharmāṇāṃ pratītyasamutpāda eva / yad uta asmin satīdaṃ bhavaty asyotpādād idam utpadyate yad idam avidyāpratyayāḥ saṃskārā ityādi yāvad evam asya kevalasya mahato duḥkhaskandhasyotpādobhāvatīti //*
We here have four formulæ: "*asmin satīdam bhavatī*" ; 2): "*asyotpādād idam utpadyate*" ; 3): "*avidyāpratyayāḥ saṃskārā*"; 4): "*yāvad evam asya kevalasya mahato duḥkhaskandhasyotpattibhavatīti*". Cf. *Mahāvagga* I.1.1-2 and *Pratītyasamutpādādivibhaṅga-nirdeśasūtra*.

We may note that the first two formulæ (cf. Lamotte 1935a, p. 189 n. 5) concern ontological causality, or perhaps "outer" causality (*bāhyapratītyasamutpāda*) (cf. Lindtner 1982a, p. 12 n. 5), whilst the third connected with the fourth, concerns the original twelve preconditions of dependent co-origination, a psychological-existential causality intended to illustrate the causes of suffering and its cure, (Cf. Robinson & Johnson 1982, p. 17) being an "inner" causality (*ādhyā-tmikapratītyasamutpāda*). Partial translations of early Buddhist texts dealing with dependent co-origination are found in Frauwallner 1969, pp. 27-60 and an analysis of the concept is found in Frauwallner 1984, p. 157 ff. The Mādhyamika conception of dependent co-origination is discussed in Lindtner 1982b, p. 170 f.

This leads us to assume that the dependent character of phenomena is the totality of reality, subjectively as an existential analysis and objectively as an ontological analysis. As such, this nature of entities is not an epistemological alternative to the other natures.Rather it is reality *per se*. The affinity of Sns to Trś in this respect can be seen in Trś 21.

[65] VI. 10: /—/ *paratantralakṣaṇe parikalpitalakṣaṇābhiniveśaṃ niśritya paratantralakṣaṇaṃ prajñā-yate /*

"/.../ Ceux qui connaissent exactement le caractère dépendant, connaisent exactement les choses de souillure. Ceux qui connaissent exactement le caractère absolu, connaissent exactement les choses de purification. Reconnaissant dans le caractère dépendant des choses sans caractère, ils expulsent les choses de souillure. Expulsant les choses de souillure, ils obtiennent les choses de purification. /—/".[66]

As was clear in the part on the IN in the Sns chapter VI, the DN is part of the process which starts with the perception of the IN in the DN and ends with the recognition of the CN in the DN. It is also evident that the DN is defined both as defilement (*saṃkleśa*) and that which, by the apprehension of nature-less (*alakṣaṇa*) phenomena, that is unreal and hence imagined phenomena, expels these very defiled phenomena.

This is of course necessary in a system the basic formal pattern of which postulates one actually existing nature which may appear as either imagined or consummated. The DN as the substrate of whatever reality there is, has to contain - or possibly be - defilement. At the same time, as the very activity which brings about all this, it has to act upon itself, as we saw in Sns VI. 10. The DN as dependent co-origination may recognize the imagined nature within itself and through this insight expel the very defilement which is its defining characteristic.

2.5 The consummated nature in Sns chapter VI

The CN is first discussed in Sns VI. 6:

"Qu´est le caractère absolu ? C´est la vraie Nature des choses, c´est la découverte, par les bodhisattva, de cette vraie Nature, à raison de leur énergie et de leur exacte réflexion; c´est enfin l´obtention de l´Illumination suprême grâce à la pratique de cette découverte."[67]

The CN is defined as the suchness (*tathatā*) of phenomena. That is, reality as it really is. We have already discerned the pattern, which clearly states that the absence of the imagined nature in the DN is equivalent to the consummated nature. This means that the CN is dependent co-origination in itself, void of any imagination projected upon it. The CN is more than this. It is the Bodhisattvas´ knowledge (*avabodha*) of suchness through their vigour (*vīrya*) and their exact thinking (*suyoniśomanasikā ra*). Hence, again the modes of the DN, the IN as well as the CN, are implicitly, although loosely connected with phenomena as they really are and the con-

[66] VI. 11: */—/tatra guṇākara bodhisattvāḥ paratantralakṣaṇaṃ yathābhūtaṃ prajñāya saṃkleśalakṣaṇadharmān yathābhūtaṃ prajānanti // tatra guṇākara bodhisattvāḥ pariniṣpannalakṣaṇaṃ yathābhūtaṃ prajñāya vyavadānalakṣaṇadharmān yathābhūtaṃ prajānanti // tatra guṇākara bodhisattvāḥ paratantralakṣaṇe 'lakṣaṇadharmān yathābhūtaṃ prajñāya saṃkleśalakṣaṇadharmān prajahati // saṃkleśalakṣaṇadharmān prahāya vyavadānalakṣaṇadharmā n adhigacchanti // /—/.*

[67] VI.6: *katamad guṇākara dharmāṇāṃ pariniṣpannalakṣaṇam / yad uta dharmāṇāṃ tathatā bodhisattvānāṃ vīryahetoḥ suyoniśomanasikārahetoś ca tadavabodhas tadavabodhabhāvanā samudāgamād api yāvad anuttarasamyaksaṃbodheḥ samudāgamaḥ //*

summation of the bodhisattva´s quest for knowledge. As a consummated nature it brings about the supreme (*anuttara*), complete enlightenment (*saṃyaksambodha*).

Returning to Sns VI. 10, we are once again reminded of the basic pattern of the TSB:

> "/—/ Le caractère absolu repose sur la non-attribution de caractères imaginaires au caractère dépendant. /.../".[68]

The CN is consequently the non-attribution (*abhiniveśābhāva*) of the imagined nature on the dependent nature. This speaks for itself. Lastly VI. 11 will be revisited:

> "/—/ Ainsi donc, les bodhisattva, connaissant exactement les caractères imaginaire, dépendant et absolu des choses, connaissent exactement les caractères d´«Absence-de-caractère», de «Souillure» et de «Purification». Connaissent exactement les choses sans caractère, ils expulsent les choses de souillure; expulsant les choses de souillure ils obtiennent les choses de purification./—/".[69]

Again the CN is displayed as the purified DN. The bodhisattva who has expelled the defilement from the DN, by means of an insight into the unreal imagined phenomena within it, obtains the purified phenomena.

2.6 The eye-cataract- and the crystal-simile

The following simile which may be called "the eye-cataract-simile", is found in Sns VI. 7. In Étienne Lamotte´s translation it runs:

> "Le caractère imaginaire est semblable à la vue ophtalmique qui affect un homme (*taimirika puruṣapudgalanayanasya timiradoṣaḥ*). Le caractère dépendant est semblable aux images de la vue ophtalmique qui apparaissent (*avabhāsate*) à ce malade-des-yeux (*timiranimittam*): mèche de cheveux, mouches, graines de sésame, objet bleu, jaune, rouge ou blanc.- Le caractère absolu est semblable aux objets vrais (*abhrāntaviṣayaḥ*), domaine propre de l´œil (*nayanasya svabhāvagocaro*) lorseque l´homme a une œil parfaitement clair et que l´ophtalmie a disparu." [70]

[68] VI. 10: /—/ *paratantralakṣaṇe parikalpitalakṣaṇābhiniveśabhāvaṃ niśritya pariniṣpannalakṣaṇaṃ prajñāyate* //

[69] VI. 11: /.../ *yasmād eva guṇākara bodhisattvāḥ parikalpitalakṣaṇaṃ paratantralakṣaṇaṃ pariniṣpannalakṣaṇaṃ ca yathābhūtaṃ prajñāya alakṣaṇaṃ saṃkleśalakṣaṇaṃ vyavadānalakṣaṇaṃ yathābhūtaṃ prajānanti / alakṣaṇadharmān yathābhūtaṃ prajñāya saṃkleśalakṣaṇadharmān prajahati / saṃkleśalakṣaṇadharmān prahāya vyavadānalakṣaṇadharmān adhigacchanti* / /—/

[70] VI.7: *tadyathā guṇākara taimirikapuruṣapudgalanayanasya timiradoṣaḥ / evaṃ parikalpitalakṣaṇaṃ draṣṭavyam / tadyathā guṇākara tasyaiva yat timiranimittaṃ keśoṇḍukaṃ vā bhramarā vā tilakaṇā vā nīlanimittaṃ vā pītanimittaṃ vā lohitanimittaṃ vā avadātanimittaṃ vā avabhāsate / evaṃ eva paratantralakṣaṇaṃdraṣṭavyam / tadyathā guṇākara tasyaiva puruṣapudgalasya nayane pariśuddhe apagatanayanatimiradoṣe tasyaiva nayanasya svabhā vagocaro'bhrāntaviṣayaḥ / evaṃ pariniṣpannalakṣaṇaṃ draṣṭavyam* //

The picture-part of this simile is very common and it is found e.g. in Vś 2 where it supports the notion on the ideational nature of reality (*vijñaptimātratā*) and also in the literature of the Mādhyamikas where it illustrates the qualitative difference between the two levels of truth.[71]

Rather preliminary we may conclude this simile by saying that the imagined nature of phenomena is the eye-disease which affects the perception. The dependent nature is that which, due to this disease, appears before the eyes, [72] and the absolute nature that which is seen when the disease is cured.

Now, used as an analogy to the definitions of the natures given in Sns VI. 4-6, this simile does not seem quite adequate: The simile says that there is a disease, that unreal things are seen due to this disease and that things as they really are, are seen when the disease is cured. The propositions on the nature of reality given in Sns VI. 4-6 say that the imagined nature is the workings of the intellect, the dependent nature is *pratītyasamutpāda*, the totality of reality, and the absolute nature is the "suchness" of things.

The simile regarded as an analogy to these propositions is quite adequate with respect to the imagined and absolute natures, but seemingly not as far as the dependent nature is concerned. The propositions in VI. 4-6 convey the unambigous impression that the dependent nature is the underlying neutral substrate of which the other natures are cognitional aspects, whilst the simile apparently does not display the DN as an underlying substrate. Interpreted through the conceptual pattern given by the propositions in Sns VI.4-6, the dependent appears to be merely be a transformation of the imagined nature.

It is possible, however, to reinterpret the simile so that the DN be that which causes the dimmed images like hairballs, grains of sesame, coloured objects etc. to appear (*avabhāsate*)[73]. Since this reading of the Sns VI. 7 is warranted by the Tibetan edition by Lamotte, there is no point in adopting his ambiguous translation as far as the DN is concerned.

As far as the message of the simile is concerned it is obviously meant to illustrate a universal existential situation by means of an individual pathological one. The habitual conviction of the unenlightened of reality´s nature stands in the same striking contrast to the factual state of matters as the distorted perceptual images beheld by the ophtalmic do to the function of the healthy eye.

The metaphorical component of the picture-part of the simile constituted by the *insight into the disease* corresponds to the diagnostical device which every

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[71] Mādhyamika works are noted in Lamotte 1935a, p. 189, n. 7. In Lindtner 1981, p. 169 f. We may note that Bhavya makes use of a similar simile to illustrate *saṃvṛtisatya*. References to Bhavya´s *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* is found in *ibid.* n. 34 ff. Candrakīrti´s *Madhyamakāvatāra* IV. 29 is quoted by reference to the eye-cataract simile in Prajñākaramati´s commentary (*Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā*) on Śāntadeva´s *Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra* IX. 2. For more information, cf. Lindtner 1981, p. 177 and n. 63. Cf. also Herbert Guenther 1973, p. 92 ff.; Iida 1980, p. 259 ff. and Hirabayashi / Iida 1977, *passim.*

[72] It should be noted, tentatively, that these properties of the imagined and the dependent character, that is the actual activity and the form it takes, seem reversed in relation to e.g. Tsn 2 and 27.

[73] Noteworthy is, the fact that *avabhāsate* can mean "shine" as well as "cause to appear", the last of which Lamotte has chosen (Lamotte *ibid.* p. 189 f.) Note the possibility of translating*timiranimittam* as "having *timira* as cause".

Buddhist meets in the teachings of the Buddha generally and in the twelve-linked causal nexus particularly. Now, a diagnosis is usually linked to a treatment aiming at the cure of the disease and this cure is of course the patterns of action for liberation which are elaborated in Buddhism.

The crystal-simile

This simile is found in Sns VI. 8-9 and runs as follows in Lamotte´s translation:

> "C´est comme dans le cas du cristal transparent (*svacchaspaṭika*). En contact avec du bleu, il prend l´apparance d´un joyau de saphir ou de «grand-blue» et, comme on le prend à tort (*mithyāgrāhā*) pour du saphir ou de «grand-bleu», il trompe tous les êtres (*ca sattvān vimohayati*). En contact avec du rouge, du vert ou du jaune, il prend respectivement l´apparence du rubis, de l´émeraude ou de l´or, et, comme on le prend à tort pour un joyau de ce genre, il trompe tous les êtres".[74]

Since Sns VI.8 is not only referred to but also unintelligible unless seen through the conceptual pattern given in the next part which connects the simile in VI.8 more explicitly with the propositions on the nature of reality in Sns VI. 3-6, Sns VI. 9 will be taken into account before attempting an analysis:

> "On peut comparer les imprégnations du langage courant, essentiellement fantaisiste affectant le caractère dépendant, à la proximite; des couleurs affectant le cristal transparent. Attribuer à tort au caractère dépendant des caractères imaginaires équivaut à attribuer à tort au cristal transparent la nature d´un joyau de saphir, de «grand-bleu», de rubis, d´émeraude et d´or. On peut comparer le caractère dépendant au cristal transparent. Enfin, le caractère absolu est la non-réalité, la non-existence perpétuelles des caractères imaginairs attribués au caractère dépendant; tout comme le caractère absolu du cristal est la non-réalité, la non-existence perpétuelles des caractères du saphir et autres joyaux, attribués au cristal".[75]

Colours of different kinds affect the crystal (*svacchasphaṭika*) making it apparently

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[74] VI.8: *tadyathā guṇākara svacchasphaṭiko yadā nīlasaṃyukto bhavati tadā indranīlamahānī lamaṇiratnavad avabhāsate / indranīlamahānīlamaṇiratnamithyāgrāhāc ca sattvān vimohayati / yadā lohitasamyukto bhavati tadā padmarāgamaṇiratnavad avabhāsate / padmarāga-maṇiratnamithyāgrāhāc ca sattvān vimohayati / yadā haritasaṃyukto bhavati tadā marakata-maṇiratnavad avabhāsate / marakatamaṇiratnamithyāgrāhāc ca sattvān vimohayati / yadā pī tasaṃyukto bhavati tadā suvarṇavad avabhāsate / suvarṇamithyagrāhāc ca sattvān vimohayati //*
[75] VI.9: *tadyathā guṇākara svacchasphaṭike raṅgasaṃprayogaḥ /* evaṃ *paratantralakṣaṇe parikalpitalakṣaṇasya vyavahāravāsanā draṣṭavyāḥ / tadyathā svacchasphaṭika indranīlamahānī lapadmarāgasuvarṇamaṇiratnamithyāgrāhaḥ / evaṃ paratantralakṣaṇe parikalpitalakṣaṇamithyā grāho draṣṭavyaḥ / tadyathā guṇākara sa eva svacchasphaṭikaḥ / evaṃ paratantralakṣaṇaṃ draṣṭavyaṃ tadyathā tasminn eva svacchasphaṭika indranīlamahānīlapadmarāgasuvarṇalakṣaṇānā ṃ nityanityakālaṃ śāśvataśāśvatakālam apariniṣpannatvaṃ niḥsvabhāvatā caivaṃ / tasmin paratantralakṣaṇe parikalpitalakṣaṇasya nityanityakālaṃ śāśvataśāśvatakālam apariniṣpannatvaṃ niḥsvabhāvatā ca pariniṣpannalakṣaṇaṃ draṣṭavyam //*

seem to be something essentially different. The choice of crystal as the core of the simile is quite compatible with the definitions given in VI. 4-6, since the crystal remains the same, unsullied by the proximity of colours, though it has become something fundamentally different to the ignorant eye. This adjacancy of colours is analogous to *vyavahāravāsanā*[76] which is equivalent to the imagined nature. My assumption in connection with my examination of Sns VI. 4 that the imagined nature is basically "the language which is practical but unreal", is thus confirmed.

The *act* of falsely taking the crystal for a gem of another kind, is analogous to falsely attributing the properties of the imagined nature to the dependent nature. That is, all statements pertaining to our intersubjective reality are false *by definition*, since the attribution of the imagined nature is *vyavahāra*.

The dependent nature is analogous to the transparent crystal which may lead us to the assumption that this transparency is a metaphorical expression of that which transcends all intellectual categories in the sense that whatever is false is not false in itself. Rather, it is false as an attribution of that which constitutes our everyday reality to an underlying substrate, able to assume whatever appearance the workings of our intellect may project upon it.

The complete absence (lit. the non-reality / naturelessness: *niḥsvabhāvatā*), the perpetual non-existence (*nityanityakāla śāśvataśāśvatakālam apariniṣpannatvam*)[77] of the natures of the gems in the crystal is analogous to the complete absence of the imagined attributed to the dependent nature which is, in the case of Sns VI. 6 as well as in the simile, the absolute nature.

We may note that the imagined and the absolute natures are *epistemic modes*, the former consisting in the workings of the intellect and the latter expressed as the negation of the former, of the dependent nature.

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[76] References to Brahmanical works are found in Lamotte 1935a, p. 190, n. 9. One of the key concepts in Sns VI. 9 is *vāsanā* (impregnations) and we shall therefore analyse it to some extent. The properties of *vāsanā* are much the same as those of *vāsanā* in later scriptures, thus we may notice that Sns VI. 9 says:

1) *vāsanā* is concerned with common language (*vyavahāra*), cf.Tsn 23 and Sns VI. 4. This can also be seen in Trś 18-19 where it is being said that action (*karma*) along with the impressions of the twofold grasping (*grāhadvayavāsanā*) engender another ripening (*vipāka*) of seeds (*bīja*) where the former is exhausted so that another transformation of consciousness (*vijñānapariṇāma*) comes about.

2) *vāsanā* is imagined as can be seen in the formation of the semantic field of the IN - we have *nāma* (name), *saṃketa* (conventional symbol), *prajñapti* (indication) and *vyavahāra* (common language), all of which concern language or "the language which is practical but unreal" - in Sns VI. 4.

3) As will be shown, there is a close connection between TSB and the *ālayavijñāna* -complex (perhaps *vijñānapariṇāma* is more adequate) in Trś 18 - 20 and in this context we may see that the third transformation of consciousness (*pravṛttivijñāna*) both is affected by the ripened seeds which becomes the very contents of consciousness or rather are the consciousness, or since this system advocates the notion of *vijñaptimātratā*, becomes the universe and as a reaction to this produces *karma* which in the context of *vijñānapariṇāma* is *vāsanā* which finally can be seen as the essence of *parikalpitalakṣaṇa*.

[77] Could *apariniṣpannatva* be interpreted as "unabsoluteness" in the sense of "non-existence" ? Note the rendering of this word, i.e. "unestablished" in the prose commentary *Tarkajvālā* (Tj) interspersed in the translation of the *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā* (Mhk) VIII. 102 in Qvarnström 1989, p. 95.

2.7 The three natures in Sns chapter VII

Chapter VII[78] is introduced by a reinterpretation of the Prajñāpāramitā doctrine of the emptiness of phenomena. The doctrine proper is condensed in VII. 1:

> "/—/ Toutes les choses sont sans nature propre, non-neés, non-détruites, calmes depuis l´origine et essentiellement nirvanées. Quelle est son intention cachée en parlant ainsi ? /—/"[79]

The old doctrine of the emptiness of phenomena is hence said to have been expressed with a hidden intention (*saṃdhāya*). This is of course a means of reinterpreting this old doctrine in order to make it conform to the TSB. Thus VII. 3:

> "Lorseque j´enseigne que toutes les choses sont sans nature propre, je me réfère à la triple Irréalité (*litt.* absence de nature propre): Irréalité de caractère, Irréalité de naissance, Irréalité absolu"[80]

The hidden intention of the Buddha when expressing the emptiness of all phenomena was thus the reference to the three emptinesses (*niḥsvabhāvatā*): the emptiness regarding identity (*lakṣaṇaniḥsvabhāvatā*) corresponding to the IN, the emptiness regarding arising (*utpattiniḥsvabhāvatā*) corresponding to the DN and the emptinesss regarding the ultimate (*paramārthaniḥsvabhāvatā*) which corresponds to the CN.[81] As will be evident, the three natures of the TSB are the DN and its imagined and consummated modes. This analysis of reality is made with respect to the DN as that which is dependently co-originated (*pratītyasamutpanna*). With respect to the old doctrine of the emptiness of all phenomena, however, the cognitional modes of the DN are seen in the light of the DN as being unoriginated (*anutpanna*). Phenomena (*dharma*) are empty (*śūnya*) of own being (*svabhāva*) since they depend on other phenomena for their being and hence they do not exist by virtue of themselves - they are devoid of own being.

In Sns VII. 4 we find a definition of the emptiness regarding identity (EI):

> "Qu´est l'Irréalité de caractère des choses ? C´est le caractère imaginaire. Pourquoi ? Etant établi par des noms et conventions, et non pas en soi, ce caractère est appelé Irréalité de caractère."[82]

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[78] In chapter VII of the Sns, Lamotte only partially reproduces the Sanskrit text from the Tibetan. I will however quote these reconstructions whenever deemed necessary. Readers with command of the Tibetan language may consult Lamotte´s Tibetan edition in Lamotte 1935a, p. 188 f.

[79] VII. 1: // *niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvadharmā anutpannāḥ sarvadharmā aniruddhā ādiśāntāḥ prakṛtiparinirvṛtāḥ* // Quoted from Lamotte 1935a, p. 193 n. 2. Cf. *ibid.* for information on similar or identical formulas.

[80] VII.3: *niḥsvabhāvatā, trividhā, lakṣaṇaniḥsvabhāvatā, utpattiniḥsvabhāvatā, paramā rthaniḥsvabhāvatā*

[81] Cf. p. 46 n. 3 and p. 48 n. 4 in Eckel 1985 as to his translations "emptiness with regard to identity", "emptiness with regard to arising" and "emptiness with regard to the ultimate".

[82] VII.4: *tatra paramārthasamudgata dharamāṇāṃ lakṣaṇaniḥsvabhāvatā katamā / yad uta parikalpitalakṣaṇam / tat kasya hetoḥ / yasmād idaṃ nāmasaṃketavyavasthitalakṣaṇaṃ svalakṣaṇena avyavasthitaṃ tasmāl lakṣaṇaniḥsvabhāvateti //*

The EI is hence defined as the IN. The reason for this, says VII. 4, is that it is empty of own being since it is established (*vyavasthita*) by names (*nāma*) and conventional symbols (*saṃketa*) and not by itself. The purport of this is clear in the light of the definition of the IN in VI. 4. The IN was said to be the verbal activity which attributed existence and properties to phenomena, thus enabling us to talk about them in the language which is practical but unreal.

Now, since the IN is established by language and not by itself, it consequently lacks own being (*svabhāva*) and as such it is emptiness (*niḥsvabhāvatā*) devoid of identity. Hence, with respect to the assumption that all phenomena are empty of own being, the IN is designated "emptiness regarding identity".

Corresponding to the narrative structure in Sns VII. 4, the DN is said to be the EA in Sns VII. 5:

> "Qu´est l'Irréalité de naissance des choses ? C´est la caractère dépendant de ces choses. Pourquoi ? Naissant par la force de causes étrangères, et non pas par soi, ce caractère est appelé Irréalité de naissance."[83]

The emptiness regarding arising is the dependent nature, since it is not originated by virtue of itself but by the force of other conditions. Again a regular nature (*svabhā va*) is redefined by reference to the assumption that phenomena, which do not exist by themselves are empty of own being. The DN, being defined as phenomena which are dependently co-originated, is a nature on this level of analysis but an emptiness on a higher level for the very same reason. On the former level phenomena are dependently co-originated and therefore reality is ever-changing. On the latter level phenomena are still inter-dependent and hence not independent and therefore devoid of own being. The difference lies in the depth of the analysis. A higher ontological claim on phenomena for the recognition of their existence transforms the eternal flux into an all-pervading emptiness.

In accordance with the description of the previous "emptinesses", Sns VII. 6 connects the emptiness regarding the ultimate to the notion of nature. In VII. 6, however, the EU is said to be both the DN and CN:

> "Qu´est l'Irréalité absolue des choses ? Les choses produites par les causes et qui sont irréelles du fait de l'Irréalité de naissance, sont aussi irréelles du fait de l'Irréalité absolue. Pourquoi ? Ce qui, dans les choses, est l´Objet pur, je déclare que c´est l´Absolu. Or le caractère dépendant n´est pas cet Objet pur. Donc il est appelé l'Irréalité absolue. - En outre, le caractère absolu des choses, lui aussi, est appelé l'Irréalité absolue. Pourquoi ? La Non-substantialité des choses est aussi appelée leur l'Irréalité absolue. C´est là l´Absolu; et comme l´Absolu est manifesté par l´irréalité de toutes les choses, il est appelé Irréalité absolue"[84]

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[83] VII.5: *dharmāṇāṃ paramārthasamudgata utpattiniḥsvabhāvatā katamā / yad uta dharmāṇāṃ paratantralaksaṇam / tat kasya hetoḥ / yasmād idaṃ parapratyayabalād utpannaṃ na svatas tasmā d utpattiniḥsvabhāvateti //*

[84] VII.6: *dharmāṇāṃ paramārthasamudgata paramārthaniḥsvabhāvatā katamā / ye dharmāḥ prati tyasamutpannā utpattiniḥsvabhāvatayā niḥsvabhāvās te paramārthaniḥsvabhāvatayāpi niḥsvabhāvā ḥ // tat kasya hetoḥ / dharmeṣu paramārthasamudgata yad viśuddhālambanaṃ tat paramārtha iti*

From a glance back at VI. 5 it is evident that the DN is defined as dependently co-originated phenomena and that is how the expression "*ye dharmāḥ prati tyasamutpannā*" in VII. 6 is to be interpreted. The EU is accordingly the DN. The DN is said to empty (*niḥsvabhāva*) due to the emptiness regarding arising, which was noticed in VII. 5, but also empty due to the EU. The reason for this is the notion of the "pure object" (*viśuddhālambana*) which resides among the phenomena. This pure object is claimed to be the ultimate (*paramārtha*). Now, the DN is not this object and hence the DN is designated as the emptiness regarding the absolute. In other words, the DN as dependently originated is the opposite of any consummated reality, it is empty of the ultimate.

However, the EU is also the consummated nature.[85] This is due to the notion of "selflessness of phenomena" (*dharmanairātmya*)[86]. This selflessness is also the ultimate and since the ultimate is manifested by the emptiness of all phenomena it is designated emptiness regarding the ultimate. Thus, the CN as the selflessness of phenomena is equivalent to their emptiness as a manifestation of the ultimate. The notion of person (*pudgala*) and phenomenon (*dharma*) is linked to the IN in e.g. Mvb III. 4-5 and Vś / Vśvṛ 10. Since the CN is defined as the absence of the IN in the DN, it is obvious that the CN as an inversion of the IN also inverts a main property of the IN such as the superimposition of the notion of "person" and "phenomena" which is therefore transposed into the *selflessness* of person and phenomena.

The net-result from the analysis of the EU is hence that it is the DN due to the pure object residing in it and that it is the CN due to the notion of "the emptiness of phenomena"

Next comes Sns VII. 7 which depicts the three emptinesses metaphorically. It should be noted that the double EU is expressed here as well as in VII. 6.

> "C'est à une fleur de l'air qu'il faut comparer l'Irréalité de caractère; à une magie, l'Irréalité de naissance; de même aussi l'Irréalité absolue sous un de ses aspects. C'est à l'espace manifesté seulement par l'absence de matière et omniprésent, qu'il faut comparer l'Irréalité absolue qui, sous un autre aspect, est manifestée par la Non-substantiabilité des choses et omniprésente."[87]

The EI is compared to a flower in the air (*khapuṣpa*) which is a very common

mayā parideśitam / tat paratantralakṣaṇaṃ viśuddhālambanaṃ na bhavati tasmāt paramā rthaniḥsvabhāvateti // punar aparaṃ paramārthasamudgata yad dharmāṇāṃ pariniṣpannalakṣaṇaṃ tad api paramārthaniḥsvabhāvateti // tat kasya hetoḥ / dharmāṇāṃ paramārthasamudgata yad dharmanairātmyaṃ teṣāṃ niḥsvabhāvateti / tat paramārtha iti / paramārthaḥ sarvadharmāṇāṃ niḥsvabhāvatayā prabhāvitatvāt paramārthaniḥsvabhāvateti //

85 In order to distinguish between these two aspects of the emptiness regarding the ultimate, I will designate the EU, which is the pure object of the DN, as EU^{I} and the EU, which is linked to the CN as selflessness of entities, as EU^{II}

86 Cf. this concept in e.g. Sns VII. 7, 9, 10; Mvb III. 4-5 and Vś & Vśvṛ 10. On this concept, consult e.g. also Nagao 1991, p. 170; Schmithausen 1987, p. 191f, 204, 297 n. 221, 360 n. 532a, 495-96 n. 1323 and Williams 1989, p. 46 f.

87 VII.7: *khapuṣpa*, *draṣṭavyā*, *māyā*, *ākāśa*, *rūpaniḥsvabhāvatāmātreṇa*, *prabhāvita*, *sarvatraga*, *dharmanairātmya*

metaphor of that which is completely unreal.[88] The EA is quite expectedly compared to magic (*māyā*) being the inverted counterpart of the DN which is invariably a simile used to illustrate the DN in e.g. Msa XI.15-20 and Tsn 27-30. In accordance with VII. 6, the EU is twofold, the first variant being compared to magic too. As in VII. 6 the DN is empty due to the EU^{I}, since the DN is not the pure object. In its other aspect, due to the notion of the "selflessness of phenomena", the EU^{II} is compared to the all-pervading (*sarvatraga*)[89] space (*ākāśa*) manifested only by the absence of matter (*rūpaniḥsvabhāvatāmātreṇa*).[90]

Sns VII. 8 treats of the EI and is mainly a variant of VII. 3:

> "En me référant à cette triple Irréalité, j´enseigne que toutes les choses sont sans nature propre. En me référant à l'Irréalité de caractère, j´enseigne que toutes les choses sont non-nées, non-détruites, calmes depuis l´origine et essentiellement nirvânées. Pourquoi ? Ce qui n´existe pas en vertu de son caractère propre, ne naît pas; /—/"[91]

Thus, VII. 8 is a mere restatement of VII. 3. [92] That which is established by names and conventional signs only and not by itself is utterly non-existent and fundamentally "nirvânée" as Lamotte would have it.

Sns VII. 9 exhibits the same line of reasoning with respect to the EU^{II}.

> "En me référant à l'Irreálité absolu, manifestée par la Non-substantialité des choses, j´enseigne que toutes les choses sont non-nées - - -. Pourquoi ? Parce que l'Irreálité absolue, manifestée par la Non-substantialité des choses, est toujours et éternellement subsistante. En tant que nature des choses, elle est inconditionnée et tousjours exempte de passion. Toujours et éternellement subsistante comme Nture des choses, elle est inconditionnée; étant inconditionnée, elle est non-née et non-détruite; étant exempte de toute passion, elle est calme depuis l´origine et essentiellemant nirvânée /—/ "[93]

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[88] Cf. Frauwallner 1969, p. 292 n. 1: "Die beliebteste indische Beispiel für etwas volkommen Unwirkliches ist eine Ätherblume, d. h. eine Blume, die im leeren Raum aus dem Nichts hervorwächst." This metaphor is found in e.g. Mhk VIII. 30, 83, 102 (?).

[89] Cf. Mhk VIII. 90

[90] Cf. e.g. Mhk & Tj VIII. 65-67 in the polemical context of Bhavya´s refutation of the Vedānta view on space as an entity *per se*. Cf. also the Sautrantika position as expressed by Vasubandhu in the Adkbh II. 55d. The Sarvāstivāda position is found in Adk I. 5 where *ākāśa* is held to be an unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*) phenomenon. Cf. also la Vallée Poussin 1971, tome I, p. 8 n. 3 for the Madhyamaka position on this matter. A similar passage is found e.g. in Nāgārjuna´s Ratnāvali I. 99ab: "Space is a mere designation because it is a mere absence of form" (*rūpasyābhāvamātravād ākāśaṃ nāmamātrakam /*). Quoted from Qvarnström 1989, p. 126.

[91] Cf. Trś 23-24: *trividhasya svabhāvasya trividhāṃ niḥsvabhāvatām / saṃdhāya sarvadharmāṇā ṃ deśitā niḥsvabhāvatā //* 23. The emptiness of all entities has been taught referring to the threefold emptiness of the three natures. *prathamo lakṣaṇenaiva niḥsvabhāvo 'paraḥ punaḥ / na svayaṃbhāva etasya ity aparā niḥsvabhāvatā //* 24. "The first is natureless by its very definition. The following, again, because of its non-independence. The following, thus , because of its emptiness."

[92] Cf. Msabh ad Msa XI. 50

[93] Sns VII. 9:*paramārthaniḥsvabhāvatāṃ dharmanairātmyena prabhāvitāṃ saṃdhāya. nityakā laṃ śāśvatakālam. vyavasthitaiva. dharmadharmatā. asaṃskṛta. sarvatra vigatakleśa.*

In other words: since the EU^{II} is manifested by the selflessness of phenomena, they are unborn, undestroyed, originally calm and essentially extinguished. It is always (*nityakāla*) and eternally (*śāśvatakāla*)[94] persistent To the extent that it is the essence of phenomena (*dharmadharmatā*) it is unconditionend (*asaṃskṛta*) and exempt from defilements (*vigatakleśa*). Being the essence of phenomena, it is unconditioned and hence unborn and undestroyed. In so far as it is exempt from all defilements, it is originally calm and essentially extinguished.

Now, being the CN it is both selflessness of phenomena as well as devoid of defilements as can be seen in VI. 11.

Next comes VII. 10 which claims that the teaching of the threefold emptiness is made because people superimpose the IN on the DN and the CN:

> "Si j´expose la triple Irréalité, ce n´est pas parce que les êtres, dans le monde des êtres, considèrent la nature imaginaire comme une nature distincte, ou les natures dépendante et absolue comme des natures distinctes. Au contraire. Si j´expose la triple Irréalité , c´est parce que les êtres superimposent la nature imaginaire sur les natures dépendante et absolue. Dans l´experience vulgaire, ils attribuent des caractères imaginaires aux natures dèpendante et absolue. Dans la mesure où ils s´appuient sur ctte expérience, leur pensée est impregnée par cette expérince, par les «liens» de l´expérince, ou par les »résidus mentaux» issus de l´expérince; ainsi, ils s´attachent obstinément (*abhiniviś*) aux caractères imaginaires [qu´ils attribuent faussement] aux natures dépendante et absolue. Pour cette raison, ils donnent naissance à la future nature dépendante. Ainsi donc, souillés par les souillures de la passion, de l´acte et de la naissance, ils errent et transmigrent longtemps chez les damnés, les animaux, les esprits, les dieux, les démons ou les hommes, car ils n´échappent pas à la transmigration"[95]

In order to disentagle the complex structure and contents of this passage, I will commence by depicting the main characteristics of each nature:

The IN (*parikalpitasvabhāva*) is superimposed (*āropya*) on the dependent and consummated natures in verbal designations (*vyavahāra*)[96] by beings (*sattva*) and their thinking is impregnated by it and its bonds or by the mental residues arisen from it.

The DN (*paratantrasvabhāva*) is not a distinct nature (*bhinnasvabhāva*). The imagined nature is superimposed (*āropya*) on the dependent and consummated natures. For this reason, the DN is tainted by the pollutions of defilement (*kleśasaṃkleśa*)[97], activities (*karmasaṃkleśa*) and arising (*utpattisaṃkleśa*)[98] and

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[94] Cf. Sns VI: 9

[95] VII.10: *sattvadhātu, sattva, parikalpitasvabhāva, bhinnasvabhāva, paratantrasvabhāva, pariniṣpannasvabhāva, prajñāp., āropya, anuvyavahāraṃ prajñāp., vyavahāraprajñaptyā parivā sitacitta, vyavahāraprajñaptyanubandha, vyavahāraprajñaptyanuśaya, abhiniviś., hetu-pratyaya, ā yatyām, samutpādayanti, tannidānāt, kleśasaṃkleśa, karmasaṃkleśa, utpattisaṃkleśa, dīrgharā tram, nāraka, tiryak, preta, deva, asura, manuṣya, ādhāvamāna, saṃsāranti*

[96] Cf. Sns VI. 4 and 9 and the discussion of the term *vyavahāra* and its relation to the term *saṃvṛti* in Nagao 1991, pp. 15-18 and 45-46.

[97] The rendering of the terms *kleśa* (defilement), *saṃkleśa* (pollution), and *upakleśa* (impurity) is discussed in Schmithausen 1987, pp. 246-47 n. 21

[98] Cf. Nāgārjuna´s reduction of the twelve-linked chain of dependent co-origination to the three

therefore beings give birth to the future dependent nature and transmigrate in the six realms of existence.[99]

The CN (*parinispannasvabhāva*) is not a distinct nature. The imagined nature is superimposed on the consummated nature.

Hence, the main theme is the destructive effect of superimposing the IN on the DN and the CN which causes the mind (*citta*) to be impregnated by the verbal designations and their effects. The resultant clinging to the IN pollutes the DN and iterates transmigrations indefinitely. In view of the definitions of the internal formal structure of the TSB in chapter VI, the statement that the IN is superimposed on the DN *and* the CN is incoherent.

Sns VII. 11-13 forms a coherent part related to the importance of pursuing the career of a bodhisattva. VII. 11 commences by stressing the import of sowing the beneficial roots (*mūla*) which is made possible from hearing the law on the emptiness regarding arising being preached. VII. 12 continues by claiming that even if these roots have been sown, the EI and the EU may not have been perceived in the EA. The law on the emptiness regarding identity and the emptiness regarding the ultimate have been preached for those failing to perceive this. VII. 13 concludes by saying that by the realization of this preaching the DN is ceased and the goal is attained:

> "En outre, certains êtres, dès le début, ne plantent pas les racines de bien /—/ c´est pour eux que je prêche la Loi sur l'Irréalité de naissance. Entendant cette Loi, ils comprennent que les Opérants, issus des causes, sont d´une nature impermanente, instable, indigne de confiance et essentiellement changeante /—/."[100]

> "Pourtant, bien qu´ils plantent les racines de bien jusqu´à accumuler les équipements du mérite ef du savoir, ils ne reconnaisent pas exactement, dans l'Irréalité de naissance, ni l'Irréalité de caractère ni la double Irréalité absolue. /—/ C´est pour eux que le Tathāgata prêche la Loi sur l'Irréalité de caractère et l'Irréalité absolue /—/."[101]

> "Entendant cette Loi, ils n´attachent plus obstinément aux caractères imaginaires [attribués faussement] à la nature dépendante. Dans l'Irréalité de naissance, ils adhèrent à l'Irréalité de carctère et à l'Irréalité absolue; ils les examinent et les pénètrent exactement. Leur savoir n´est plus imprégné ni par l´expérience, ni par les liens de l´experience, ni par les résidus mentaux de

consequitive phases *kleśa, karmaḥ* and *duḥkha* or *janman* ,which correspond well to that in Sns VII. 10. See Lindtner 1982b, p. 170-71 and *ibid.* n. 164. In Sthiramati´s commentary on Trś 11cd-12a, we find the notion of confusion (*mūḍhaya*) which is one of the *kleśas* enumerated by Vasubandhu in his Yogācāric Abhidharma in Trś 9-14. Confusion gives rise to pollution which is of three kinds: *kleśa, karmaḥ* and *janman* which give rise to all other defilements in repetitive rebirths from time without beginning. Cf. also Vms p. 215

[99] Consult e.g. the Adk III. 4 as to the [five] realms of existence. Cf. also Msg II. 14 which enumerates the same five.

[100] Sns VII. 11: *prathamata eva. anavaropitakuśalamūla. /—/ ārabhya. dharmaṃ deśayāmi. prati-tyasaṃutpannaḥ saṃskārāḥ. anityatva. adhruvatva. avuśvasanīyatva. pariṇāmadharmatva.*

[101] Quoted from Lamotte 1935a, p. 196-97.

l'experience. Muni ici-bas de la force du savoir, coupant la série pour l'au-delà, ils font cesser le caractère dépendant. Ainsi donc, parfaitement désabusés, parfaitement renoncés et parfaitement détachés à l'égard des Opérants, ils échappent aux souillures de la passion, de l'acte et de la naissance."[102]

In other words, linked to the EI is the notion that the Tathāgata declares the law for those who do not exactly recognize the emptiness regarding identity.

Hearing this law, however, they no longer attach themselves obstinately to the imagined nature (*parikalpitasvabhāva*), [falsely attributed] to the dependent nature. In the emptiness regarding arising they adhere to the emptiness regarding identity and the emptiness regarding the ultimate; they examine them and penetrate them exactly.

As for the EA, the law on emptiness regarding arising is declared for the beings who do not sow the beneficial[103] roots and bring the series (*saṃtāna*)[104] to maturity or abound in confidence (*adhimukti*)[105]. Hearing it, they understand that dependently originated dispositions (*pratītyasamutpannaḥ saṃskārāḥ*) are impermanent (*anityatva*), unstable (*adhruvatva*), untrustworthy (*aviśvasanīyatva*) and essentially transformative (*pariṇāmadharmatva*).[106]

With respect to both the EA and the EU, these beings may not have exact recognition of the emptiness regarding identity and the ultimate in the EA. If they listen to the law on the emptiness regarding identity and the ultimate, however, they will adhere to them in the emptiness regarding arising and penetrate them exactly.

Thus, from listening to the Buddha and hearing the law on the EA, beings will realize that dependently originated phenomena and related processes are essentially impermanent and hence repugnant. Knowing that the EI and the EU are modes of the EA they will no longer attach themselves to the IN falsely attributed to the DN. Thus they may gain thorough knowledge of the EI and the EU in the EA and consequently no longer become tainted by the effects of the IN. This will result in

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[102] Quoted from Lamotte 1935a, p. 197-98. *paratantrasvabhāva. parikalpitasvabhāva. lakṣaṇa. abhiniveśa. adhimuc-. pravici-. yathābhūtam avabudh. vyavahāraprajñapti. aparivāsitajñāna. vyavahāraprajñaptyanubandha. vyavahārānuśaya. paratantralakṣaṇa. ihatrotpannajñānabala. amutra samucchinnasaṃtāna. nirodhayanti. samyagnirviṇṇa. samyagvirakta. samyagvimukta. kleśasaṃkleśa. karmasaṃkleśa. utpattisaṃkleśa. parimucyante.*

[103] As for beneficial *dharmas*, i.e. those that promote enlightenment, cf. e.g. Msa XI. 37, PSP ch. 4 and Trś 9 for the classification of *caittas* into five groups among which one is the beneficial *dharmas*; MSg II. 15 discusses *kuśaladharma* and in Trś 8, 9 and 11 the apprehension of the six-fold sense object is said to be either beneficial, unbeneficial or neither. Trś 8 thus *dvitīyaḥ pariṇā-mo 'yam tṛtīyaḥ ṣadvidhasya yā / viṣayasopalabdhiḥ sa kuśalākuśalādvayā //*. In Trś 30 the "consummated" is said to be beneficial (*sa evānāsravo dhātur acintyaḥ kuśalo dhruvaḥ*).

[104] As for the term *saṃtāna*, cf. Trśbh ad Trś 4. The concept is discussed by Schmithausen 1967, p. 129 f. Note the references given in *ibid.* p. 109 f. Cf. also Adk III. 19 f. on *saṃtāna* in the context of transmigration and the twelve-membered chain of dependent co-origination. Cf. also Lamotte 1988, p. 607 on the question of Sautrantika and the notion of "series".

[105] As for *adhimukti*, cf. MSg II: 14 (*adhimuktibala*) and III: 2 (*ekādhimuktika*). References are found in Lamotte 1973, tome 2. p. 20* and 29*. In Trśbh ad Trś 10, confidence (*adhimokṣa*), regarded as one of the *viniyata* (specific) among the *caitta-dharmas*, is said to be that which is firm belief with regard to an object of which there is certainty.

[106] An echo of Sns VII: 11 is heard in MSg III:2.

a destruction of the series (*saṃtāna*) of causation and thence an annihilation of the DN. This is the reverse of the process depicted in VII. 10 and it will lead to the escape from the pollutions of defilement, act and arising.

Sns VII. 20 deals with the view of opponents of TSB:

> "D´autres êtres ne sont pas pervenus à accumuler les grands équipements du mérite et du savoir. /—/ Entendant sette loi, ils ne comprennent pas exactement ma profonde formule à intention cachée. Ils adhèrent à cette prédication; mais [pour interpréter] la sens de la formule: «Toutes les choses sont seulement sans nature propre, non-nées, non-détruites, calmes depius l´origine et essentiellement nirvânées», ils s´en tiennent obstinément à la lettre. Ainsi donc, ils portent sur toutes choses une vue d´inexistence et d´absence de caractères. Dans ces vues d´inexistence et d´absence de caractères, ils dépouillent toutes les choses de tous leurs caractères. Ils nient le caractère imaginaires des choses; ils nient aussi le caractère dépendant et le caractère absolu des choses. Pouquoi ? Il faut qu´il y ait un caractère dépendant et un caractère absolu pur que le caractère imaginaire puisse exister (*litt*: être connu). Or ceux-ci considérent le caractère dépendant et le caractère absolu comme des non-caractères. Donc, ils nient également le caractère imaginaire. Aussi dit-on qu´ils nient en bloc les trois caractères. /---/ ."[107]

The view presented here is that of those who interpret the *prajñāpāramitā* formula of the emptiness of all phenomena literally, (*yathābhūtam*) unaware of the deep hidden intention. These Buddhists adhere to the view of non-existence (*abhā vadṛṣṭi*) and the view of no nature (*alakṣaṇadṛṣṭi*) by which the own nature of anything is denied (*sarvaṃ sarvalakṣaṇair apavadanti*).[108] Thus, by this literal interpretation no independent existence whatsoever is accepted. Consequently they do not accept the TSB. The reason for this, says VII. 20, is that they reject the notion of the DN and the CN. Since the IN as a mode of the DN is dependent on the latter, the IN is logically an equally void concept. Hence, the three natures (*trividhaṃ lakṣaṇam*) altogether (*yugapat*) are denied. Some observations can be made:

First, as the expression *apavadanti* implies, these opponents of the TSB are considered to make an unwarranted denial (*apavāda*) by denying any real phenomena.

Second, they seem to confuse the two main denotations of the concept of *svabhā va*. The formula referred to by the Sns, claims the ultimate inexistence of phenomena since they are dependently co-originated. The meaning of the concept in the context of the TSB is rather that of something´s mode of existence. Hence, the opponent takes the first meaning of this concept as found in the formula and applies it erroneously on the TSB.

[107] *sattva. yavāt asammudgātapuṇyajñānamahāsaṃbhārān. /—/ gambhīraṃ saṃdhāyavacanam. yathābhūtaṃ na jānanti. adhimuc-. sarvadharmā niḥsvabhāvā eva. anutpannā eva. aniruddhā eva. ā diśāntā eva. prakṛtiparinirvṛtā eva. yathārutam evābhiniviśanti. tannidānāt. abhāvadṛṣṭi. alakṣaṇadṛṣṭi. sarvaṃ sarvalakṣaṇair apavadanti. parikalpitalakṣaṇa. partantralakṣaṇa. pariniṣpannalakṣaṇa.prajñāyate. trividhaṃ lakṣaṇam. yugapat. /—/*

[108] Cf. Mvb III. 7cd-8a and Msa XIV. 34.

Third, from what has been said it follows that the Sns would not accept that the notion of *svabhāva* precludes the notion of *niḥsvabhāva*.. These conceptions belong to different levels of analysis which should not be confused. With respect to the assumption that phenomena are dependently co-originated, they may assume three natures. With respect to the assumption that, for this very same reason, phenomena lack own being they may be viewed as empty in three ways.

Fourth, the position of the opponent resembles the Madhymakan position. A Madyamakan projection of the TSB onto the system of two truths (*satyadvaya*) would result in the existence of the IN, DN and CN conventionally (*vyavahāreṇa*) but not ultimately (*paramārthena*) since the emptiness of all phenomena are established.[109] As can be seen from VII. 20, the main target is depicted as the DN whose existence is denied since all things are empty. Hence, the other natures, being modes of the DN are denied as well.

The last instance of the TSB in chapter VII of the Sns is VII. 25-27 which exhibit virtually the same structure. Each nature is described and connected to its corresponding emptiness. They differ in the way they display the attributive activity of the IN: VII. 25 talks of the material group (*rūpaskandha*), basis of cognition (*ā yatana*) and faculties (*dhātu*) among other things; VII. 26 refers to the truth of suffering (*duḥkhasatya*) and other truths and VII. 27 mentions perfect concentration (*samyaksamādhi*). As they are identical in all important aspects, I will let VII. 25 which is quoted from Lamotte 1935a, pp. 203-4 represent all three passages:

> "Voici comme je comprend le sens de la formule du Seigneur. L'attribution par noms et conventions d'une nature propre et de spécifications aux objets des opérations intellectuelles (objets qui sont et le domaine où s'exercent les imaginations, et la base du caractère imaginaire), cette attribution /—/ constitute le caractère imaginaire. A cet égard, le Seigneur proclame l'Irréalité de caractère des choses. - Les objets des opérations intellectuelles (objets qui sont et le domaine où s'exercent les imaginations, et la base du caractère imaginaire) constituent le caractère dépendant. A cet égard, le Seigneur proclame l'Irréalité de naissance des choses et une partie de leur Irréalité absolue. Voici comme je comprend le sens de la formule du Seigneur. Dans les objets des opérations intellectuelles (objets qui sont et le domaine où s'exercent les imaginations, et la base du caractère imaginaire), ce caractère imaginaire ne répond à rien d'absolu (*apariniṣpanna*): c'est l'Absence de nature propre (*svabhāvaniḥsvabhāvatā*), la Non-substantiabilité, la vraie Nature, l'Objet pur qui constituent la caractère absolu. A cet égard, le Seigneur proclame le seconde partie de l'Irréalité absolue des choses. /—/."[110]

Thus the EI is the IN. The main properties of the IN are those displayed in Sns VI. 4: it is the attribution of existence - own nature (*svabhāvalakṣaṇa*) - and specifications (*viśeṣalakṣaṇa*) to objects of intellectual operations (*saṃskā ranimitta*). This attribution is made by the use of language. Names (*nāma*) and conventional symbols (*saṃketa*) are used in this activity. Hence, this activity which

[109] Cf. Eckel 1985, p. 38 f and Murti 1980, pp. 100, 104-8, 215-20 and 245.
[110] Quoted from Lévi 1935a, pp. 303-4.

takes place in the domain of imagination is the very basis of the IN (*parikalpitalakṣaṇāśraya*). The IN functions as the continuous activity of giving existence to the dharmas of the volitional *skandha*.[111] Since these are dependently originated, they have no independent being and therefore they have no identity - they are empty with regard to identity.

The DN which is empty with regard to arising (EA) and the first aspect of the emptiness regarding the ultimate (EU^{I}) is depicted as the the very objects of intellectual operations, i.e. the dependetly co-originated *dharmas* which constitute the *skandha* of volition. This activity is the basis of the IN. Again, the initial definitions of the three natures in VI. 4-6 correspond closely to the restatements found in VII. 25-27.

The CN too, is empty but with regard to the ultimate in its other aspect (EU^{II}). It is first portrayed in consonance with the fundamental logical pattern of the TSB according to which the CN is the DN minus the IN. The IN does not conform to anything consummated (*apariniṣpanna*).[112] The EU^{II} is said to be empty of own nature (*svabhāvaniḥsvabhāvatā*) and selflessness of phenomena (*dharmanirātmya*) which corresponds well with Sns VII. 6-7. It is suchness (*tathatā*) as well which is part of the definition of the CN in VI. 6. Lastly, it is depicted as the purified object or support (*viśuddhālambana*) being, in the words of VI. 11, that which is obtained when the defiled phenomena of the DN are expelled. Strictly speaking, this notion is connected to the first aspect of the EU as can be seen in Sns VII. 6.

2.8 The three natures in Sns chapter IX and X

The part of the Sns which consists of chapters VIII-X mainly concern the mystic, the path to *nirvāṇa* and the acts of the Buddha. The main context is that of the questions of the celebrated bodhisattvas Maitreya, Avalokiteśvara and Mañjusrī and the answers of the Buddha by definitions and enumerations in the style of *abhidharmic* treatises.[113]

Chapter IX treats of the stages (*bhūmi*) and perfections (*pāramitā*) but does not add much new. IX. 18 runs:

> "/—/ Par la sagesse, les bodhisattva, évitant les deux extrêmes, surimposition et négation, s´engagent dans le «chemin du milieu»; par cette sagesse, ils pénètrent exactement le sens de «porte de délivrance», à savoir les trois portes de la déliverance: la vacuité, le sans-caractère et la non-prise-en-considération. - Ils pénètrent exactement le sens de Nature propre, à savoir les trois natures propres, imaginaire, dépendant et absolue. - Ils pénètrent exactement

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[111] Cf. the Dhammasangaṇi 62 of the Abhidhammapiṭaka: "What on that occasion is the skandha of synergies ? /—/ These, or whatever other incorporeal causally induced states there are on that occasion, exclusive of the skandhas of feeling, perception, and consciousness - these are the skandha of synergies" Quoted from Rhys Davids 1974, p. 25 f. As opposed to the 50 *dharmas* of the *skandha* of volition in the Dhammasangaṇi, the Adk I. 15 mentions 58. Cf. also Adk. I. 14, 20 and 22 and *passim* and the notes on p. 27 f. in la Vallée Poussin 1980, tome I as well as Stcherbatsky 1979, p. 20 f.
[112] Cf. Sns VI. 9.
[113] Cf. Lamotte 1935a, p. 23 f.

le sens de l'Irréalité, à savoir les trois irréalités de caractère, de naissance et l'Irréalité absolue. - Ils pénètrent exactement le sens conventionel et absolu, à savoir les cinq places de la science. - Ils pénètrent exactement le sens de la vérité absolue, à savoir les sept Vacuités."[114]

Hence, the TSB in this context is a mere restatement of the enumerations made in VI. 3 and VII. 3. This is also the case with Sns X. 7 which merely mentions the IN once and the CN twice in its endless lists, which is why I prefer to leave it out.

2.9 Conclusions

As was stated in I. 4, I will try to apply four main criteria in order to find out the degree of developement of the TSB:

a) The measure of elaboration of each nature.

The IN is mainly depicted as the verbal activity which attributes existence and specific properties to phenomena which makes it possible to use language in our relation to them. The IN is illustrated as fictional and illusive by the similes in the Sns. It is also empty with regard to identity since it does not exist by virtue of itself.

The DN is displayed as dependently co-originated phenomena such as the *dharmas* of the volitional *skandha*. As such, it is the necessary substrate of the IN. It is compared with magic. It contains defilements and, implicitly, purified phenomena. Being dependently co-originated and hence not born by itself, it is empty with regard to origination, and since it is not the pure object, it is empty with regard to the ultimate in its first aspect. When discriminated by the IN it is described as *saṃsāra*.

The CN is described as the true nature of phenomena, the apprehension of this and the enlightenment resulting from this apprehension. It is the purified phenomena. Being the selflessness of phenomena, it is empty with regard to the ultimate in its second aspect. It is the very absence of an own being.

b) The measure of integration with pan-Buddhist dogma in general and Mahāyā nistic dogma in particular.

The Sns tries to reconcile the notion of the emptiness of all phenomena with the TSB by applying the former on the latter and creating three new "emptiness"-counterparts of the TSB. As can be seen in VII. 20, there is a hint at the conception of the extremes of denial and reification. This conception, however, is only implicit. Apart from this, we may note the notions of dependent co-origination, the twelve-linked chain of dependent co-origination, the deceptive nature of language, suchness, defilement and purification, the selflessness of phenomena and the notions found in the *Prajñāpāramitā*-literature.

c) The measure of integration with other Yogācāra tenets.

Of those concepts which came to be considered genuinely Yogācāric, there are

[114] Quoted from Lamotte 1935a, p. 250.

no traces in the context of TSB in the Sns. *Ālayavijñāna*[115] is found in Sns V. 3-4, *Vijñaptimātratā*[116] in Sns VIII. 7 and the notion of the three bodies of the Buddha in chapters VIII-X.[117] As for the DN, there are some hints to its mainly cognitive nature. The IN-mode of the DN is said to be verbal attribution of existence and specified properties and the DN is also considered to be the *dharmas* of the volitional *dharma*. However, I do not consider this a sufficient indication of integration with *vijñaptimātratā*. Hence, the TSB may not be considered as integrated with these conceptions.

d) The measure of logical coherence and elaboration of the internal structure of the TSB.

The fundamental pattern of the TSB may be expressed as follows: The CN is the DN minus the IN. The same pattern is displayed in the similes in VI. 7-9 and in VI. 11 in the context of defilement and purification as well as in VII. 11-13, which maintains that the EI and the EU are within the EA.

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[115] This concept is discussed in e.g. la Vallée Poussin 1935, p. 145 f; Schmithausen 1969, p. 822 f; 1987, p. 12 f, 22 f., 46 f., 71 f., 88 f. and *passim*

[116] Schmithausen has thoroughly investigated the passage in Sns and elsewhere in 1973, p. 161 f.; 1984, p. 433 f. and 1987, p. 88 f.

[117] It is not found as an integrated concept, i.e. as *trikāya*, but as scattered instances of *dharmakā ya* (Sns VIII. 15, IX. 4, X. 1-2, 9-10), *nirmāṇakāya* (Sns X. 4, 9-10) and *vimuktikāya* (Sns X. 2). Note the latter in Trś 30. Cf. also Msg X. 1-3 *et passim* where the *nirmāṇakāya*, *saṃbhogakāya* and *dharmakāya* are discussed. Note *kāmasaṃbhoga* in Sns X. 4 ! The concept of the "three bodies of the Buddha" is discussed by Lamotte 1973, tome II notes et références, p. 49* f.; la Vallée Poussin 1906, p. 943 f.; 1928-29, p. 702-703 and 762 f.; 1932, p. 399 f. and 1935, p. 257 n. 1-3.

3 The Laṅkāvatārasūtra (Las)

Although the *terminus ante quem* for the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* (Las)[118] is indicated by the earliest Chinese translation 443 C.E, [119] it is quite difficult to establish the date more exactly for several reasons. First, being referred to in the works of Nāgā rjuna[120] they also refer to him.[121] Accounting for these facts, Lindtner presupposes an earlier original Las and later additions. The problem is how to establish exactly what parts are original on the basis of criteria other than reference to main Yogācā ra dogmas. Second, since two passages in the Las bear a striking resemblance to Trś,[122] it could be assumed that Vasubandhu was influenced by it, given the validity of the common supposition that *sūtras* preceded *śāstras*. Questions arise then, why Sthiramati, being acquainted with the Las, [123] did not quote these passages in his commentary on the Trś and why the name of the Las never appears in the works of either Maitreya, Asaṅga or Vasubandhu. [124] However, phrases like *yat punar etad* (or *idam*) *uktaṃ bhagavatā* which precede these passages may indicate that they, among quite a few in the Las, are quotations of other texts.[125] This would mean that these major Yogācāra tenets were even older than Las or that Trś is the very source of these passages.

Since detailed discussions of these matters lie outside the scope of my thesis, I shall confine myself to stipulate the existence of an original Las prior in time to the main body of Yogācāra works consisting mainly of the verses of the *Sagāthakam*.

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[118] Sanskrit editions: *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* edited by Bunyu Nanjo, 1923 and *Saddharmalaṅkāvatā rasūtram* edited by Dr. P.L. Vaidya 1963. Tibetan editions: Cone (748) ca 71a7 - 239a3, Derge (107) ca 56a1 - 191b7, Lhasa (110) ca 81a7 - 298a3 and Peking (775) ṅu c0b7 - 208b2. Chinese editions: T. XVI 670 (4 chapters) pp. 479 - 514 (translated by Guṇabhadra), T. XVI 671 (10 chapters) pp. 514 - 587 (translated by Bodhiruci) and T. XVI 672 (7 chapters) pp. 587 - 640 (translated by Sikṣānanda)

[119] Cf. Suzuki 1932, p. xlii ff. Noteworhty is the absence of chapter X, the *Sagāthakamin* verse, in the first (Sung) translation and its presence in the later Chinese translations 513 (Wei) and 700-704 (T'ang). This does not mean, however, that it was not included in the Las at that time since it is incorporated in both the Sanskrit and the Wei Chinese editions. Moreover, these also contain duplicates of many verses of the *Sagāthakam* in their prose sections, probably to make the verses more intelligible. Perhaps there was a larger Las with all these verses incoropored in the prose sections which later made up an independent chapter meant for memorizing or perhaps there was a Las with the verses alone which was later put together with the present text. In any case, do these parts belong to the same period and if they do, what caused the disappearance of the prose parts which accompanied the verses which now are left in the *Sagāthakam*?

[120] Cf. Chr. Lindtner 1982b, p. 122 n. 149 and p. 180 n. 170 and also 1992, p. 245 *et passim.*

[121] Cf. J. Takasaki 1984, p 550.

[122] Compare Las p. 66. 29 ff to Trś 20 and 69. 6 ff. to Trś 28. Cf. Takasaki 1984 p. 553 f and Lindtner 1992, p. 273.

[123] He refers to Las in his subcommentary on Msa XI. 40.

[124] S. Yamaguchi (1973, p. 311 ff) is, however, said to have identified Las X. 135-37 with verses in the Vyākhyāyukti attributed to Vasubandhu (Cf. 1984 p. 546 and p. 566 n. 5). Schmithausen (1987, p. 263, n. 102) makes the same observation and adds that the Las almost certainly have drawn upon both Trś and Vs. Furthermore, he continues, the exposition of the *ālayavijñāna* does not convey any impression of originality. Cf. also p. 388, n. 631a, n. 2 in *op. cit.* which exhibits the same attitude.

Lindtner (1992, p. 274), on the other hand, points out that the Vyākhyāyukti which has a lot in common with other works by Vasubandhu and which is even mentioned in his Karmasiddhi 37, quotes parts of the Sns VII. 24 as well as Las X. 135-137 and 150-155.

[125] Takasaki *loc. cit.*

The vast majority of verses[126] quoted by Nāgārjuna and those in the Las quoted by Vasubandhu are actually located in the *Sagāthakam* , a fact which makes my stipulation more useful.[127]

3.1 The distribution of the three natures in the Las

Since the occurrence of TSB in the Las is very scattered, an analytical survey will not serve the purpose of a resumé of a coherent text. Instead, below will follow an overview where the instances of TSB in the Vaidya edition may be easily collated with the chapters and verses of the text. Since the Nanjo edition is often referred to in works on Las, the corresponding passages of this edition is indicated in parantheses after the page numbers in the column named "Vaidya ed.". As TSB may occur in different forms, I have tried to indicate this and also provide the reader with notes whenever considered relevant.

Ch.	Vaidya ed.	Verse	IN	DN	CN	Notes
II	18 (39)		-	-	-	Seven *svabhāvas* mentioned.
-"-	29 (67-68)		x	x	x	
-"-	52 (128-29		x	x		
-"-	53-55 (130)	180	-	-	-	Verse 180 of Vaidya ed. is 182 in
-"-	-"- (-"-)	181	x	x		Nanjo ed., 181 is 183 etc. up till
-"-	-"- (-"-)	182	x			at least II. 200
-"-	-"- (-"-)	183	x	x		
-"-	-"- (131)	184	x	x		
-"-	-"- (-"-)	185	x			
-"-	-"- (-"-)	186	x			
-"-	-"- (-"-)	187	x	x		
-"-	-"- (-"-)	188	x			

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126 Relying upon the references, allusions, "echos" and so forth to Las found by Chr. Lindtner in the works considered genuinely Nāgārjunian, no less than 95 % of all are found in the *Sagāthakam* due to double allocation whereas only 25 % of all the verses of the *Sagāthakam* is found in the prose part. As was indicated in a previous note, all of the 9 verses of the Las quoted by the *Vyākhyāyukti* are located in the *Sagāthakam*.

Cf. also Suzuki 1930, p. 21 f. who discusses the relation between the main prose text and the *Sagāthakam* "...which appears on the surface as one solid chain of *gāthās*, is nothing but a heap of rubbish and gems" (*op. cit.* p. 21). From the occurrence of some historical matter and the more developed and definite expressions of thought in the *Sagāthakam* he assumes that it is a later than the *sūtra* proper (*op. cit.* p. 22)

127 According to Vidyābhūṣaṇa 1981, p. XII., Las 2. 50 and 10. 115 are quoted by the Nyāyasūtra (NS) 4.2.26. From a quick glance at the Las, however, it is evident that the verses alluded are 10. 166 (p. 118) instead of 2. 50 and 2. 173 (p. 48) instead of 10. 115.Thus Las 10. 166: "*buddhyā vivicyamānānāṃ svabhāvo nāvadhārsyate / yasmāt tasmād anabhilāpyāste niḥsvabhāvāś ca deśitāḥ /* ", Las 2. 173: "*buddhyā vivicyamānānāṃ svabhāvo nāvadhārsyate / yasmād anabhilāpyās te niḥsvabhāvāś ca deśitāḥ /* " (Vaidya ed. reads *tasmād* for *yasmād*) and NS 4. 2. 26: "*buddhyā vivecanāt tu bhāvānāṃ yāthātmyānupalabdhiḥ / tantvapakarṣaṇe paṭasadbhāvānupalabdhivat tadanupalabdhiḥ //*". Cf. also Vidyābhūṣaṇa 1905, p. 831 f. As can be seen, the verse referred to by the NS is located both in the*Sagāthakam* and in chapter II which would be quite consistent with the assumption that an original Las, consisting mainly of the *Sagāthakam*, was quoted by Nāgārjuna as well as by the NS.

-"-	-"- (-"-)	189	x	x		
-"-	-"- (-"-)	190	x	x		
-"-	-"- (-"-)	191	x	x		
-"-	-"- (-"-)	192	x		x	
-"-	-"- (132)	193	x	x	(x)	CN indicated by *tathatā*
-"-	-"- (-"-)	194	x	x	x	as the three *svabhāvas*. Note *tathatā*.
-"-	-"- (-"-)	195	x	x		
-"-	-"- (-"-)	196	x	x	x	
-"-	-"- (-"-)	197	x	x	x	as the two *svabhāvas*.
-"-	-"- (-"-)	198	x	x		
-"-	-"- (-"-)	199	x	x		
-"-	-"- (-"-)	200			x	
III	61 (150)		x			as *abhūtaparikalpa*
-"-	66-67 (163-5)		x			
-"-	82 (202)	98	x	x		as the two *svabhāvas*
VI	91-92 (224-7)		x	x	x	as the five dharmas
-"-	92 (225-27)		x	x	x	
-"-	93 (229)		x	x	x	as the two svabhāvas
X	108-9 (267)	28	x	x		- " -
-"-	110-11 (271)	50		x		
-"-	116 (282)	138	x	x		referred to by lakṣaṇa. IN called
-"-	116-17 (283)	139			x	*vikalpita* in X. 138-39.
-"-	117 (284)	150	x	x		
-"-	-"- (-"-)	151	x	x		
-"-	119 (288)	174			x	
-"-	120 (291)	198	x			as *vikalpa*
-"-	121 (-"-)	204		x		
-"-	123 (296)	241	x	x	x	as the two *svabhāvas* and *niṣpanna*
-"-	-"- (297)	248	x			as *kalpitalakṣaṇa*
-"-	134 (316)	407	x	x		as *tantra* and *kalpita*
-"-	-"- (317)	413		x		as *paratantra*
-"-	-"- (-"-)	415	x	x	x	as the svabhāvas
-"-	134-35 (318)	417-18	x	x	x	-"-
-"-	137 (322)	455	x	x	x	
-"-	139 (326)	492	x			as *vikalpitalakṣaṇa* and *kalpita*
-"-	140 (328)	502	x			as *kalpita* and *vikalpa*
-"-	-"- (-"-)	503	x			as *vikalpa*
-"-	141 (330)	526	x			-"-
-"-	142 (331)	527	x	x		as *kalpita* and *paratantra*
-"-	-"- (-"-)	528	x			as *kalpita*.
-"-	-"- (-"-)	529	x	x		as *kalpita* and *paratantra*.
-"-	144 (335)	569	x	x		as *kalpita* and*tantra*. Five dharmas.
-"-	151 (348)	673	x	x	x	as *svabhāvatraya*.

The word *svabhāva* seems to be used in the two senses common to all Mahāyāna schools, that is in the sense of "being" and "mode of being". As can be seen in Las p. 18 the seven kinds of *svabhāva* enumerated are *modes of being*:

There are seven kinds of own-nature in reality: collection, being, identity, gross elements, cause, conditions and perfection[128]

3.2 The imagined nature in Las

I will try to outline the major characteristics of the IN as the Las presents it. On p. 29, marks (*nimitta*) are said to give rise to the IN because the DN manifests itself in the form of objects (*vastu*), marks and characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*).[129] The attachment to the these phenomena constitutes the IN and manifests itself as recognition of internal and external objects[130] (*adhyātmabāhyadharma*) and the assumption of individuality and generality (*svasāmānyalakṣaṇa*) in them.

On the same page we find Las II. 134, the *locus classicus* of the relation between the TSB and the five *dharmas* and as we can see, marks and names are obviously the outcome of the mind´s discriminating activity:

> Mark, name and discrimination are the characteristics of the [firstwo *svabhā vas*. Correct knowledge and suchness is the characteristic of the absolute own-being //[131]

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128 (p. 18)...*saptavidho bhāvasvabhāvo bhavati yad uta samudayasvabhāvo bhāvasvabhāvo lakṣaṇasvabhāvo mahābhūtasvabhāvo hetusvabhāvo pratyayasvabhāvo niṣpattisvabhāvaś ca saptamaḥ //*

129 The same idea about internal and external entities, that is, an assumed factual common-sense reality is somewhat differently expressed by Sns VI.4 as it speaks of attributing own-nature and specifications to phenomena.

130 See MSg II.15 "Si la nature dépendante (*paratantrasvabhāva*) est l'idée sans plus (*vijñaptimā tra*), support de la manifestation de l'objet (*arthābhāsāśraya*)..." (Quoted from Lamotte 1973, tome 2. p. 107

131 (p. 29): *nimittaṃ nāma saṃketa svabhāvadvayalakṣaṇam / samyagjñānaṃ hi tathatā pariniṣpannalakṣaṇam* / / 134. For a discussion of the five *dharmas*' relation to the three svabhāvas, see e.g. Eckel 1985, p. 48 n. 4 and p. 49 n. 2. In the Las *mark* and *name* belong to IN, *discrimination* to DN and *correct knowledge* and *suchness* to CN. As for IN see quotations from Sns VI.4 and 10 in n. 40 and 41. It is evident from these instances that IN in Sns is related to concepts within the same semantic field as is IN in Las. In the MSg II.3 IN is related to the self-manifestation in the appearance of an object (*arthābhāsa*), though there is no object, but perception-only (*vijñaptimātra*). Cf. Mvb and Mbvbh III. 13 as well. Could the Las have gotten the idea from it ? Cf. Takasaki 1984, p. 545 ff, esp. p 563.

DN in Sns VI.5 is related to *pratītyasamutpāda* whilst DN in Las is related to the discriminating activities of the mind. These two concepts will in time merge to become the dependent co-origination taking place in the mind as in Trś 20-21.

The relation between CN and *suchness* in Las is explicitly parallelled (whilst *correct knowledge* is more implicit) in Sns VI.6: "It is the suchness (*tathatā*) of things and the knowledge (*avabodha*) of the Bodhisattvas of it through their vigour (*vīrya*) and their exact thinking (*suyoniśomanasikā ra*) and finally, from the practice (*bhāvanā*) of that knowledge comes the supreme (*anuttara*) complete enlightenment (*samyaksambodha*)." From TSN 30 it is evident that CN is equated with *tathatā* and in Trś 25 (though in this verse the ontologically inverted counterpart of CN (*paramā-rthaniḥsvabhāvatā*) is treated) it is even more simply put: "It is the ultimativity of all entities and it is suchness too, since it remains always as such, and that is just perception-only" (*dharmāṇāṃ paramārthaś ca sa yatas tathatāpi saḥ / sarvakālaṃ tathābhāvāt saiva vijñaptimātratā / /*). Both in Trśbh ad Trś 22 which deals with the absoulte nature and in Trśbh ad Trś 25 which deals with the emptiness regarding arising it is said that the knowledge of the consummated is supramundane knowledge (*jñānaṃ lokottaram*), which also indicates an implicit relation between *correct knowledge* and CN.

Later, on page 52, there are 13 kinds of IN listed:

> words, meaning, characteristics, objects, own-being, cause, views, reasoning logic, origination, non-origination, dependent connection, bondage and liberation[132]

The first four seem to relate to the outcome of intellectual activity, a kind of "internal phenomenology", the next four to assumed properties of an external reality, and the last five to the well-known error of reification and denial.

The next part which is found on page 53 f., is also represented in the *Sagāthakam* , and seems to convey a less incoherent picture of TSB than previous parts of the Las. From the following discussion it will also be clear that there is a more close connection between the notion of mind-only (*cittamātra*) and TSB.

The exposition of the IN begins with II. 180[133] where it says that mind is bound up with the objects (*viṣaya*). The same theme is found in II. 182 where it is stated that the imagination of a variety (*citra*) of forms (*nimitta*) is unestablished and in II. 183 where we are told that such an imagination brings forth badness - a bad mental state (*dauṣṭhulya*).[134] Such an imagined variety of forms or objects is unwarranted since there is really neither variety nor form or non-form nor multiplicity for the enlightened, we learn from II. 186,187 and 198.

Another theme in this part is the relation between TSB and the two truths (*satyadvaya*) which differs from the Madhyamaka conception by claiming the absolute existence of the dependent nature.

The first verse in this part to deal with this problem is II. 181 which is quite difficult to interpret:

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132 (p. 52) *abhilāpavikalpo 'vidheyavikalpo lakṣaṇavikalpo 'rthavikalpaḥ svabhāvavikalpo hetuvikalpo dṛṣṭivikalpo yuktivikalpa utpādavikalpo 'nutpādavikalpaḥ saṃbandhavikalpo bandhavikalpaḥ /*

133 This part of Las, chapter X, verses 180-200, begins on p. 53 and ends on p. 54.

134 This evasive word is found in other primary or secondary Yogācāric contexts such as ADK III. 29 d in a context where *avidyā* is discussed: "Quand l'ascète écarte le désir [c'est-à-dire en supprime les traces et répare le mauvais état, *dauṣṭhulya*, de la pensée], alors la pensée est délivrée." Quoted from Lamotte 1971, tome 2, p. 91. It is also found in Trś 29: *acitto' nupalambho 'sau jñānaṃ lokottaram ca tat / āśrayasya parāvṛttir dvidhā dauṣṭhulyahānitaḥ / /* (It is without mind, without apprehension, it is the supramundane knowledge. It is shift of basis through the removal of the twofold badness) and in Trśbh ad Trś 29: "*sā punar āśrayaparāvṛttiḥ kasya prahāṇāt prāpyate / ata āha / dvidhā dauṣṭhulyahānitaḥ dvidheti kleśāvaraṇadauṣṭulyaṃ jñeyā varaṇadauṣṭhulyaṃ ca / dauṣṭhulyam āśrayasyākarmaṇyatā / tat punaḥ kleśajñeyāvaraṇayor bījaṃ / sa punar āśrayaparāvṛttiḥ śrāvakādigatadauṣṭhulyahānitaś ca prāpyate* ..." "(Mais cette Révolution du Récipient, on y arrive par l'élimination de quoï Il répond: Par l'élimination des deux sortes de Turbulence. Les deux sortes, c'est la Turbulence des Obstructions qui consistent en Passions et la Turbulence de l'Obstruction qui consiste en Connaisable. La Turbulence, c'est le manque de Maniabilité du Récipient, et c'est elle qui est le germe des deux Obstructions, de Passion et de Connaissable. Cette Révolution du Récipient, on l'obtient par l'élimination de la Turbulence propre aux Auditeurs..." Quoted from Lévi 1932. p. 122.

Dauṣṭhulya can also be found in Mvb II. 4-8 where different "obstructions" (*āvaraṇa*) just as in Trś and Trśbh are discussed, in Mvb IV.1 concerning "antidotes" (*pratipakṣa*) and in Mvb V. 11 concerning *anudharma.* Vasubandhu's commentary on these verses is found in Mvbbh II. 10,11; IV. 1,9; V 11, 12. It is also found in Psp 4.

The imagined nature exists (*asti*), the dependent nature cannot be apprehended. Because of illusion (*bhrānti*) the imagined nature is grasped whilst the dependent nature cannot be constructed [in that way].[135]

It could either mean that the IN is all that can ordinarily be known, being our everyday reality while the underlying cognitive stream eludes introspection, or that the IN exists conventionally, while the DN does not, since it must exist absolutely to conform to Yogācāra ontology.

Next to puzzle us is II. 185, which states that there are two truths and no reason for three. Whether this is an implicit and rather out-of-place criticism of the three natures or merely a statement of a well-known fact is rather difficult to establish. The important fact, however, is the acceptance of the IN conventionally.

The overall concern for avoiding the extremes of reification and denial is evident in II. 189 where the IN is said not to exist, to avoid reification while the DN is claimed to exist, in order to avoid denial:

"There is nothing imagined, but there is [something] dependent; for to conceive of reification (*samāropa*) or denial (*apavāda*) is to be destroyed"[136]

Still another theme in this part is the relation between the imagined and the dependent or the consummated nature. So in II. 184, 195 and 199, we learn that what is discriminated is the DN:

Depending on the dependent nature a multiplicity is indeed discriminated by the imagined nature. One would adhere (*samāśrayet*) to the doctrine of other philosophers (*tirthyavāda*) if [this discrimination were conceived of as] brought about in another way.[137]

The inverted perspective is used in II. 191 where the DN is deduced from the various cognitive manifestations that constitute the IN:

On account of the imagined nature the dependent nature is apprehended. From the correlation of name and form the imagined nature is born.[138]

This is further elaborated in II. 192 where it is stated that the IN is merely a manifestation of the cognitive stream which is the DN and so it can not be directly converted to the CN but only through the DN:

The imagined nature can never become the absolute nature since it cannot produce anything else [but itself]. Therefore it is known that the ultimate [intrinsic] nature (*svabhāva*) [of the absolute nature] is pure.[139]

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135 Cf. note 153

136 Quoted from Eckel 1985, p. 56. Cf. note 153

137 (p. 54) *kalpitaṃ hi vicitrābhaṃ paratantrair vikalpyate / anyathā kalpyamānaṃ hi tirthyavā daṃ samāśrayet //* 199

138 (p. 54) *parikalpitaṃ samāśritya paratantropalabhyate / nimittanāmasaṃbandhājjayate parikalpitam //* 191

139 (p. 54) *atyantaṃ cāpy aniṣpannaṃ kalpitaṃ na parodbhavam / tadā prajñāyate śuddhaṃ svabhā vaṃ pāramārthikam //* 192

Finally, there are the ideas of the non-existence of the IN from the point of view of the consummated nature in II. 196 and 197:

> [From the point of view that] the absolute nature exists, that which is, is free from the [qualifications] of existence and non-existence. Therefore, how can the two natures exist in that which is free from these qualifications ? [140]

and the correlation between names and marks/forms and the IN in II. 191 and 195:

> Name and form are within the dependent nature.But that which is caused by the imagined nature arises from the dependent nature.[141]

Passing on to chapter three, we find quite a confusing discussion of the IN and the concept of nature (*svabhāva*). As was pointed out earlier, a distinction must be made between the two main meanings of the word and in this instant it is quite obvious that the meaning referred to is the "nature of something":

> Furthermore, Mahāmati said: According to the Lord, there is indeed no own-being in whatever phenomena which are discriminated by whatever discrimination. It is only the imagined [nature].[142]

A few pages further on the reason for denying an own nature of discriminating thought is succinctly stated to be the ideal nature of reality:

> those who have understood the truth of solitude as it really is and are abiding in it, will see that illusion has no cause and thereby knowing that what is seen is nothing but the mind itself, they are kept away from seeing an external world under the aspect of being and non-being.[143]

The last exposition of TSB in chapter three occurs on page 82 where the IN and the other two natures are considered unborn -

> The mind liberated from visible [objects], the elimination of the two [imagined and dependent] natures, the shifting of [the store- consciousness'] basis - I state to be non-origination // 98 [144]

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[140] (p. 54) *niṣpanno vidyate bhāvo bhāvābhāvavivarjitaḥ / bhāvābhāvavinirmukto dvau svabhāvau kathaṃ nu tau* // 197

[141] (p. 54) *nimittaṃ paratantraṃ hi yan nāma tatprakalpitam / parikalpitanimittaṃ tu pāratantrayāt pravartate* // 195

[142] Cf. Trś 20 which seems to be an echo of Las: *yena yena vikalpena yad yad vastu vikalpyate / parikalpita evāsau svabhāvo na sa vidyate* // Las: (p. 61)...*punar api mahāmater āha yat punar etad uktaṃ bhagavatā yena yena vikalpena ye ye bhāvā vikalpyante na hi sa teṣāṃ svabhāvo bhavati / parikalpita evāsau* /

[143] (p. 67) ...*kiṃ tu mahāmate svayam evādhigatayāthātathyaviviktadharmavihāriṇo bhaviṣyanti / bhrānter nirnimittadarśanāt svacittadṛśyamātram avatorya bāhyadṛśya bhāvābhāvavinivṛttadṛṣṭyo*...

[144] (p. 82)...*cittaṃ dṛśyavinirmuktaṃ svabhāvadvayavarjitam / āśrayasya parāvṛttimanutpādaṃ vadāmy aham* // 3. 98. As for other Yogācāra expositions of the shifting of basis, cf. Sns VIII. 13; MVb+bh IV. 5,8,9, V. 16 (*āśraya* only); Msa and Msabh VI. 9, XI. 17 and Trś 29. See also Vms

- and hence empty and without an own nature as the whole section ranging between verses 86 and 117 on pages 81-83 explains. We are e.g. taught in verse 100 that all is empty not because all is void, but because everything is dependently originated and thus not by itself. No single phenomenon has own being (*svabhāva*), since it is dependent on another phenomenon's being. The chain of mutual dependence accounting for the seeming continuity of our every-day reality is in fact merely a conventional symbol (*saṃketa*) [145] as verse 104 tells us.

In chapter six of the Las the IN is discussed in a wider context of the five dharmas relation to TSB, thus:

> Again, Lord, are the three natures included in the five *dharmas* or are their characteristics established by themselves (*svalakṣaṇasiddhāḥ*) ?
> The Lord said: Mahāmati, the three natures, the eight consciousnesses and the two selflessnesses are included [in the five *dharmas*]. Here, name and mark are to be known as the imagined nature.[146]

Apart from once more learning that name and mark belong to the IN we can note the prominence of the five *dharmas* to the TSB which was lacking in p. 29 and also the inclusion of the entire psychic complex and the two selflessnesses - both the pan-Buddhist concept of the absence of an ego (*pudgalanairātmya*) and the Mahāyāna innovation of the insubstantiability of all phenomena (*dharmanairātmya*).

Finally we shall have a look at chapter X, the *Sagāthakam*, the composition of which I stipulated as prior to the works of Nāgārjuna in the introduction to this chapter.

The first theme to emerge is that of the IN's well-known relation to names. We are taught in X. 455 that the Lord always spoke thus in the *sūtra*. A novel relation between names and marks is presented in X. 138 where the emphasis is on names rather than on marks. The outcome of the cognitive stream which is the DN is marks, and the IN is the names in these marks, thus:

> The discrimination of illusory marks is the characteristic mark of the dependent [nature]. The names in these marks is the characteristic mark of the imagined [nature]. 10. 138 [147]

607-12, 661-67. Nāgārjuna's critique can be found e.g. in *Bodhicittavivaraṇa* 30-31 in e.g. Lindtner 1982b, p. 195. Cf. also Schmithausen's note 34 to his translation of the Nirvāṇa-portion in the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇi* of the *Yogācārabhūmi* in Schmithausen 1969 p. 90 f., esp. p. 98 where this "Neugestaltung der Grundlage" is discussed in the context of the Las.

145 The term *saṃketa* is e.g. investigated in the context of the usage of the concept of *saṃvṛti* (convention) in both Yogācāra and Mādhyamika terminology in Nagao 1991 pp. 13 ff. (esp. p. 15) and it also appears in *op. cit.* pp. 189 ff. in a context where the author discusses the afore mentioned schools' interpretation of the term *śūnyatā* (emptiness).

146 (p. 92) ...*kiṃ punar bhagavat pañcasu dharmeṣv antargatās trayaḥ svabhāvā uta svalakṣaṇasiddhāḥ* (?) *bhagavān āha atraiva mahāmate trayaḥ svabhāvā antargatāḥ aṣṭau ca vijñānā ni dve ca nairātmye / tatra nāma ca nimittaṃ ca parikalpitaḥ svabhāvo veditavyaḥ /*

147 (p. 116) *bhrāntir nimittaṃ saṃkalpaḥ paratantrasya lakṣaṇam / tasmin nimitte yan nāma tadvikalpitalakṣaṇam //* 10. 138

The second theme concerns the ontological status of the IN. Due to its very definition - as that which is the erroneous manifestation of the cognitive flow which, as we know, constitutes reality - it is merely imagination. This theme is demonstrated in X. 502 and examplified metaphorically in X. 503. Thus X. 502:

> Since the imagined nature is being imagined, it has no nature. Having understood that discrimination has no nature, how does it continue? 10.502 [148]

The third and understandably largest theme deals with the relation between the constituent parts of TSB. Most common is the ever occuring notion of the IN being imagined by the DN (X. 248, 407) and the cessation of this which leads to the CN (X. 151, 529 and 569). Another way of expressing this is found in X. 526-29 where the IN and DN are related to mind (*citta*), matter (*rūpa*), and impermanence (*anityatā*). Since all is mind, mind and matter are identical to discrimination, yet, the manner in which they are experienced, as separate phenomena, they are in a way different from each other - again the avoidance of the extremes of reification and denial so fundamental to Buddhism. In X. 527 the IN and DN are compared to impermanence and matter and deemed mutually dependent:[149] just as the IN is unreal and yet a manifestation of the DN and the DN only discernable by the IN, so is matter unreal since all is impermanence, but this impermanence is deducable only through analysis of the concept of matter:

> The imagined [nature] and the dependent [nature] are not mutually different in character. So is also indeed impermanence in matter [and matter] mutually conditioning.[150]

The last theme concerns the clinging to imagination which, of course, makes the IN continue. From X. 150, 198 and 492 we learn that people get confounded by adhering to the IN:

> By clinging to discrimination, it continues. [When there is] no cause for discrimination, [one is] indeed not joined to it.[151]

3.3 The dependent nature in Las

We are first introduced into the DN by the Las on page 29. The DN, which is imagination (*saṃkalpa*) as we already know from Las II. 132, is said to manifest itself in the form of objects (*vastu*), marks (*nimitta*) and characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*),

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[148] (p. 140) *kalpitaṃ kalpyamānaṃ hi yad idaṃ na tadātmakam / anātmakaḥ kathaṃ dṛṣṭvā vikalpaḥ saṃpravartate //* 10.502

[149] The same notion is found in e.g. Vms p. 530 f. with notes, MSg II. 17, Tsn 10-21, especially 18-21, Trś 22 and Mvb + Mvbbh III. 3.

[150] (p. 142) *kalpitaḥ paratantraś ca anyonyābhinnalakṣanāt /rūpe hy anityatā yadvadanyonya-janakāśca vai / /* 10. 527

[151] (p. 120) *vikalpābhiniveśena vikalpaḥ saṃpravartate / nirhetukaṃ vikalpe hi vikalpo 'pi na yujyate //* 10.198

i.e. as the IN. The main characteristic of the DN, however is its bifurcation into subject and object. The DN is in other words the stream of awareness which divides itself into a cognizer and something cognized. This division is the imagined nature:

> The dependent nature is that which arises from [the separation of the] receptacle [of the perception] and the support [of the percept] [152]

In verses 180-200 of chapter II (p. 52 ff.) no great variety of perspectives on the DN arises. In fact, the main topic is the relation between the DN and the IN. In II. 181 an apparent contradiction which was already noted in the part on the IN, is introduced by the words:

> The imagined nature exists, the dependent nature cannot be apprehended. Because of illusion (*bhrānti*) the imagined nature is grasped whilst the dependent nature cannot be constructed [in that way][153]

However, in the light of the rest of this part and especially II. 189 -

> "There is nothing imagined, but there is [something] dependent; for to conceive of reification (*samāropa*) or denial (*apavāda*) is to be destroyed" [154]

- verse 181 should be interpreted as establishing the reality of the DN. The DN, as stated by II. 181, cannot be constructed (*kalpyate*) since it is the raw material of the illusory appearances of the IN and a denial of DN would consequently imply a denial (*apavāda*)[155] This assumption is further strengthened by the statements in verses 190 and 191 which claim some form of existence of the IN *from the point of view of the* DN:

> If the imagined nature would not exist as the dependent nature (*paratantrasvabhāva*), then certainly a being would be without being and a being would also originate from non-being.[156]

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[152] (p. 29).../ *yad āśrayālambanāt pravartate tat paratantram* /... See e.g. MSg II.15: "Si la nature dépendante (*paratantrasvabhāva*) est l'idée sans plus (*vijñaptimātra*), support de la manifestation de l'objet (*arthābhāsāśraya*)..." (Quoted from Lamotte 1973, tome 2. p. 107. and Trś 18: "Consciousness, it is known, is all the seeds and the transformation proceeds in whatever way according to a mutual influence by which whatever discrimination arises." and 19: The impressions of actions along with the impressions of the twofold grasping (*grāhadvayavāsanā*) engender another ripening where the former has been exhausted.

[153] (p. 53) *parikalpitasvabhāvo 'sti paratantro na vidyate / kalpitaṃ grahyate bhrāntyā paratantraṃ na kalpyate* // 181

[154] Quoted from the translation of Chapter XXV of the *Prajñāpradīpa* in Eckel 1985, p. 56 wherein this verse is quoted from the Las II. 189: *nāsti vai kalpito bhāvaḥ paratantraś ca vidyate / samāropāpavādaṃ hi vikalpanto vinaśyati* // 189. Cf. also Las II. 181

[155] Cf. also note 1 in *loc cit.* and *op. cit. passim* for a discussion of these matters. Cf. also Lindtner's translation of the *Acintyastava* in Lindtner 1982b, p. 155, n. 44-46.

[156] (p. 54) *kalpitaṃ yady abhāvaṃ syāt paratantrasvabhāvataḥ / vinā bhāvena vai bhāvo bhāvaś ca abhāva saṃbhavaḥ* // 190

Thus, from the point of view that men actually imagine an illusory reality, the reality of the DN is established. However, that conclusion is arrived at by the reality of illusion and the fact that we can deduce the DN from the IN is stressed throughout this part of chapter II. Thus e.g. 198:

> The two natures are established (*pratiṣṭhita*) [by] the imagined nature. A multiplicity is seen in the imagined nature [but not by those in] the sphere of action of the noble.[157]

The doctrine of the two truths is applied in II. 185 and again we are reminded of the position of claiming the ultimate existence of the DN and the conventional existence of the IN if at all such an superimposition should be made:

> There is the conventional truth (*saṃvṛti*) and the ultimate truth (*paramārtha*) [but] there is no logical reason (*hetu*) for a third. It is said that from the elimination of the imagined nature [which exists] conventionally the realm of the noble [is reached].[158]

The emphasis on the fundamental position of the DN is continued in II. 183 and 184 where we learn that it is through the workings of the DN that the IN is discriminated. The main manifestations of the DN do originate in it (195), but assume their forms in the IN. Ignorance causes us to discriminate says 187:

> Just as a variety of forms is imagined by a person suffering from ophtalmia (*taimirika*), although in the ophtalmia there is neither form nor non-form, so is the dependent nature [imagined in the same way] by the unenlightened.[159]

While these examples show the main characteristics of the relationship between the IN and the DN, the instances of explicit expositions of the relation between the DN and the CN are much rarer. From 193, 196 and 197 it is clear that the DN becomes the CN in the meditative state where "suchness" is realised. That is, when the erroneous bifurcation of the mind into a subjective and an objective part has ceased and thus the intellectual operations involving language have terminated. But this process occurs by sheer necessity in the DN as e.g. 192 clearly shows:

> The imagined nature can never become the absolute nature since it cannot produce anything else [but itself]. Therefore it is known that the ultimate [intrinsic] nature (*svabhāva*) [of the absolute nature] is pure.[160]

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[157] (p. 54) *parikalpitasvabhāvo dvau svabhāvau dvau pratiṣṭhitau / kalpitam dṛśyate citraṃ viśuddhaṃ cāryagocaram //* 198

[158] (p. 53) *saṃvṛtiḥ paramārthaś ca tṛtīyaṃ nāsti hetukam / kalpitaṃ saṃvṛtir hy uktā tat chedād ā ryagocaram //* 185

[159] (p. 53) *yathā hi taimiraiś citraṃ kalpyate rūpadarśanam / timiraṃ na rūpaṃ na arūpaṃ paratantraṃ tathābudhaiḥ //* 187

[160] (p. 54) *atyantaṃ ca api aniṣpannaṃ kalpitaṃ na parodbhavam / tadā prajñāyate śuddhaṃ svabhāvaṃ pāramārthikam //* 192

The exposition of TSB in verse 98 of chapter three occurs on page 82 and was analysed in the examination of the IN in the Las. We may remember that it claimed that the entire TSB was unoriginated and hence empty and without an own nature since everything is dependently originated.

In chapter six, we find the central notion of the "shifting of basis" (*āśrayaparā vṛtti*), which already occured in Las 3. 98. This notion is connected with that of the CN, but is also treated here in connection with the DN.

It is said on p. 93 in connection with the elucidation of the five *dharmas*, that this shifting of basis, i.e. the process by which the mind is emptied of all its conceptual contents, occurs simultaneously with the ordinary processes of the mind and its various manifestations. The DN is thus again stated to be the very activity which is both responsible for the incessant imagination of our every-day reality, and at the same time the guarantee for the possibility of a shifting of basis, whereby the IN becomes the CN on the basis of the DN:

> Then, Mahāmati, that which is the notion of the discrimination of the mind and mental associates is [its] shifting of basis which occur simultaneously like the sun and its rays. Mahamati, the substrate of the discrimination [which supports] the nature which is a multiplicity of characteristics is called the dependent nature.[161]

In the last chapter of the Las, the exposition of the DN could be examined in three ways; Its cause, its nature and function and its relation to the IN and the CN. Since all is mind, the karmic device is, as we already know, is located in it and therefore the traditional diagnostic tool as expounded in the twelve-linked chain of dependent origination will have to account for the continuous transmigration of sentient beings in this idealistic context. Due to ignorance (*ajñāna*),[162] we cling to the world and feel desire (*tṛṣṇā*) for it and so the impressions (*vāsanā*) of actions (*karmaḥ*) become seeds (*bījā*) of new impressions and thereby the imagination which is the DN continues: Thus in Las X. 50 and 407 we find:

> Ignorance, desire and karma are the causes of the mind and the mental factors. As they evolve thus they are [found] by me to be dependent [163]

> By the seeds of impressions of an external [reality] discrimination goes on. The dependent nature is indeed grasped on account of it and what is grasped is the imagined nature [164]

The nature and function of the DN is depicted in X. 138, 150, 204, 413 and 455. We

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161 (p. 93)... *yaḥ punar mahāmate tadāśrayapravṛtto vikalpaś cittacaittasaṃśabdito yugapatkālodita āditya iva raśimasahito vicitralakṣaṇasvabhāvo vikalpādhārakaḥ sa mahāmate svabhāvaḥ paratantra iti ucyate /*

162 This first precondition of the *pratītyasamutpāda* is usually named *avidyā* in Sanskrit.

163 (p. 110) *ajñāna tṛṣṇā karmaṃ ca cittacaittā na mārakam /pravartate tato yasmāt paratantrayaṃ hi tanmatam //* 10. 50. Note that Suzuki (1932, p. 230) reads *cittacaittānaṃ kārakam* for *cittacaittā na mārakam*. Cf. Sns VII. 10 for a similar conception of the causes of the DN..

164 (p. 134) *bāhyavāsanabījena vikalpaḥ saṃpravartate /tantraṃ hi yena gṛhṇāti yad gṛhṇāti sa kalpitam //* 10. 407

learn that the very act of imagination brings forth names in illusory marks (138), the belief in independently existing external objects and corporeal phenomena (204), while itself remaining the neutral substrate of all discriminative thought (413). The DN is indeed dependent being (455) and hence at the same time devoid of an own nature and thus unoriginated (150).

The relation between the DN and the IN has already been examined at the end of the part on the IN.

3.4 The consummated nature in Las

The first instance of the CN expounded in the Las occurs on p. 29 and, as will be noticed repeatedly, the CN occurs in the process in which the cognitive stream which is the mind known as the DN no longer bifurcates into a subjective and an objective part, i.e. the IN. In other words, the CN is a state of mind characterized by the absence of discriminative thought. This notion is also connected to the theory of the womb of Buddhahood (*tathāgatagarbha*)[165] We are also informed in II. 134 that the CN is correct knowledge (*samyagjñāna*) and suchness (*tathatā*).[166]

> What is the consummated nature ? It is the absence of the discriminations [of the mind leading to] marks, names, objects and characteristics [and this is] the domain of the noble wisdom etc. This absolute own-being is the essence of the womb of the Buddhahood.[167]

In chapter II verses 180-200, the CN is depicted in different ways. Initially, in II. 180, the CN is implicitly stated to be a state of mind free from imaginations of whatever kind:

> The mind is bound up with the objects (*viṣaya*), and its cognition (*jñāna*) manifests itself in logical reasoning (*tarka*). And in its particular state of imagelessness, wisdom (*prajñā*) indeed evolves.[168]

Indeed, the opposite is as unestablished as the multiplicity of illusory phenomena created by magic, says II. 182.

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[165] As for bibliographical information on works on the theory of the womb of Buddhahood, cf. Powers 1992 p., Nakamura 1989 p. 229 ff. This theory was e.g. examined by Ruegg in Ruegg 1969 p. 73 ff., 122-23, 321 ff. *et passim*.

[166] See e.g. Sns VI.9: "It [the consummated nature] is the non-reality, the perpetual non-existence of the imagined nature in the dependent nature" (*...tasmin paratantralakṣaṇe parikalpitalakṣaṇasya nityanityakālaṃ śāśvataśāśvatakālam apariniṣpannatvaṃ niḥsvabhāvatā ca pariniṣpannalakṣaṇaṃ draṣṭavyam*) and Sns VI.10: "The consummated nature is known being based on the non-attachment (*abhiniveśābhāva*) of the imagined nature of the dependent nature" (*...paratantralakṣaṇe parikalpitalakṣaṇābhiniveśābhāvaṃ niśritya pariniṣpannalakṣaṇaṃ prajñā-yate*)

[167] (p. 29)*...tatra mahāmate pariniṣpannasvabhāvaḥ katamaḥ yad uta nimittanāmavastulakṣaṇa-vikalpavirahitaṃ tathatāryajñāna gatigamanapratyātmāryajñāna gatigocaraḥ / eṣa mahāmate pariniṣpanna svabhāvas tathāgatagarbhahṛdayam //*

[168] (p. 53)*...tatra idam ucyate: cittaṃ viṣayasaṃbandhaṃ jñānaṃ tarke pravartate / nirābhāse viśeṣe ca prajñā vai saṃpravartate //* 180

The formal relation between the CN and the other two natures is, as we have seen elsewhere, that of an *a priori* acceptance of the reality of mind alone which is the DN. The normal discriminative activities of the DN is the IN and the elimination of these activities brings forth the CN. This is explicitly stated in II. 185 and in II. 192. From the point of view of the CN the DN has been transformed and this change implies the elimination of the IN. The Las II. 193 and 196-98 go as far as to claim the non-existence of the IN and the DN seen from the perspective of the CN. The state of the CN is indeed a state wherein all conceptual constructions have ceased to exist and hence even the pedagogical device which is the nature of the TSB:

> There are ten kinds of imagined nature and six kinds of dependent nature. In the inner knowledge of suchness no such differentiation exists.[169]

> [From the point of view that] the absolute nature exists, that which is, is free from the [qualifications] of existence and non-existence. Therefore, how can the two natures exist in that which is free from these qualifications ? [170]

Las II. 200 concludes this part by stating that the elimination of the discriminative activity (*kalpanā*) and the logical reason (*hetu*), born out of philosophical views (*darśana*) brings about the CN. Only the truth about the three natures which are part of the five *dharmas* makes this possible:

> Truth consists [in knowing] the five dharmas and the three natures.
> When the yogin realises this [truth] he does not neglect suchness.[171]

In the context of discussing the ontological status of discriminated entities, i.e. the IN and arriving at the conclusion that they indeed have no being of their own (*na hi sa teṣāṃ svabhāvo bhavati*), the CN is described in chapter three of the Las. [172] Those who have understood the truth of solitude and are abiding in it will see that:

> illusion has no cause and thereby knowing that what is seen is nothing but the mind itself, they are kept away from seeing an external world under the aspect of being and non-being.[173]

Since illusion (*bhrānti*) has no cause, it cannot possibly exist as we perceive it. Indeed, as is continuously stated, only mind itself is seen (*svacittadṛśyamātra*) and hence there is no external (*bāhya*) material world of corporeal phenomena independent of the mind. In fact any reification or denial of any kind of reality, i.e. qualifying

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[169] (p. 54) *parikalpitaṃ daśavidhaṃ paratantraṃ ca ṣaḍvidham / pratyātma tathatā jñeyamato nāsti viśeṣaṇam //* 193

[170] (p. 54) *niṣpanno vidyate bhāvo bhāvābhāvavivarjitaḥ / bhāvābhāvavinirmukto dvau svabhāvau kathaṃ nu tau //* 197

[171] (p.54) *pañca dharmā bhavet tattvaṃ svabhāvā hi trayas tathā / etat vibhāvayed yogī tathatāṃ nāti vartate //* 194

[172] Cf. p. 66-67 of the Las.

[173] (p. 67)... *bhrānter nirnimitta darśanāt svacittadṛśyamātram avatorya bāhyadṛśyabhāvābhā vavinivṛttadṛṣṭa...*

it as being or non-being, is erroneous, be it an independent external one perceived by the subject or ideas.

The examination of the TSB as included in the five *dharmas* in chapter six does not expand our understanding of the concept apart from adding that the CN, which is right knowledge and suchness is also indestructible (*avināsa*)

In chapter ten of the Las it may be convenient to distinguish between three main themes in the exposition of the CN.

As for the nature of the CN we notice in X. 174, 418 and 455 [174] a number of various equivalents to the CN. So in 174 it is non-duality (*advayā*) and non-discrimination (*nirvikalpa*) - the opposites of the IN, in fact. Yet it is also portrayed positively as suchness (*tathatā*) as is also noticed in 455, empty (*śūnya*), ultimate limit (*bhūtakoṭi*), the essence of dharmas (*dharmatā*). In 455 it is depicted as the very essence of Buddhahood (*gotraṃ tāthāgatam*) and in X. 28 we learn that it belongs to the spiritual realm of the noble:

> I teach one nature which is removed from logical reasoning and ideas which belongs to the spiritual realm of the noble removed from the two natures.[175]

We may also notice that the CN is a state where the discriminative process has ceased. As may be seen above there is neither logical reasoning (*tarka*) nor ideas (*vijñapti*) in this state. The nature of the CN is a state of pure mind wherein all distinction of subject and object has terminated. Hence, neither the naïve conception of a material external reality or the more refined notion of "objective" ideas are present in this state. Thus Las X. 569:

> In a state of imagelessness there is nothing but [mind]: no dependent [nature], no imagined [nature] or even objects. There are no five *dharmas* and no twofold mind. [176]

The next theme to emerge is the relation between the CN and the other natures. From X. 198 and 248 the already noticed formula [DN - IN = CN] can be inferred: as there is no more clinging to discrimination, when its cause has disappeared, it ceases and similarly, in 248, as there is no presence of an imagining discrimination (*vikalpakalpanābhāva*), it will terminate. The same idea is found in X. 139 in which the conventional character of conditioned objects (*pratyayāvastusaṃketa*) is realized in the CN when the IN has disappeared from the DN. The point made in this verse is of course that of the illusory character of any conditioned phenomenon. All interdependent things lack own being per defintion and therefore dependent co-origination seen in reality is an inexact factual description. Indeed, it is only a conventional symbol:

> When the discrimination of marks and names no longer takes place in [the

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[174] Theses verses are found respectively on p. 119, 134-35 and 137.

[175] (p. 109) *svabhāvamekaṃ deśemi tarkavijñaptivarjitam /āryaṇāṃ gocaraṃ divyaṃ svabhā vadvaya varjitam //* 10. 28. As for svabhāvadvaya Cf. Las 10. 134

[176] (p. 144) *na paraṃ na ca vai tantraṃ kalpitaṃ vastum eva ca / pañca dharmā dvicittaṃ ca nirābhāse na santi cai //* 10. 569. *Na param* (nothing but...) referring to the preceding verses concerning an objectless mental state

dependent nature] there is only the conventional symbol of conditioned objects and that is the characteristic mark of the consummated [nature]. [177]

Lastly, I will direct our attention to the different means by which the CN is made possible.

In 10. 151 the notion of "shifting of the basis" is encountered and it is clear that this is a description of the process by which the DN is converted to the CN. I need not further repeat the implicit connection to the workings of the mind and its component parts partaking in the process of eliminating discrimination. In X. 529 the process is more formally depicted. From the full understanding of the IN, the DN will change from its imagined nature to its consummated nature. The IN becomes the CN by means of meditational practise:

> When the imagined [nature] is fully understood, the dependent [nature] is not born. When the dependent [nature] is understood, the imagined [nature] becomes suchness.[178]

The last instance of the CN to be examined in the Las shows a clear connection to the pan-Mahāyānistic doctrine of the stages of the bodhisattva's career:

> The [first] seven stages, originating from the mind, are the two natures. The remaining [two] and the Buddhastage are the consummated [nature]. [179]

From Las IV.4 (p. 87) it is evident that the Las supports the doctrine of the ten stages and that the seventh is the last in which an ordinary state of mind is still involved.[180]

3.5 Conclusions

a) The measure of elaboration of each nature.

The IN in Las is described as the attachment to objects, marks, names and characteristics which manifests itself as recognition of internal and external phenomena. It is also bound up with objects and a variety of forms which brings

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177 (p. 116) *nāmanimittasaṃkalpo yadā tasya na jāyate / pratyayāvastusaṃketaṃ parinispannalakṣaṇam //* 10. 139

178 (p. 142) *kalpitena sudṛṣṭena paratantro na jāyate / paratantreṇa dṛṣṭena kalpitas tathatā bhavet /* / 10. 529

179 (p. 123) *dve svabhāvo bhavet sapta bhūmayaś cittasaṃbhavāḥ / śeṣā bhaveyurniṣpannā bhū mayo buddhabhūmi ca //* 10.241

180 Thus Las 4.2 (p. 87): *cittaṃ hi bhūmayaḥ sapta nirābhāsā tv ihāṣṭmo / dve hi bhūmo vihāro'tra śeṣtā bhūmir mamātmikā //* 4.2. Cf. Dayal 1978 p. 271: "The *bhūmis* of the Mahāyāna are now supposed to be ten in number, but it is almost certain that they were only seven in the beginning. The vogue of the *Da. Bhū.* finally fixed the number of the *bhūmis*. But the *Bodhisattva-bhūmi* formally discusses seven *bhūmis* (fol. 136*b*), and the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* speaks of "seven *bhūmis*" without specifying them (p. 28)."

Different expositions of these stages are discussed in *op. cit.* p. 270-91. References to the number of the *bhūmis* and their relation to mind are thus at least found in three places in the Las: In II. 54 (p. 13) where seven stages connected to the mind are discussed, in IV. 2 (p. 87) where seven are said to be of the mind, the eight imageless and the tenth the Buddha-stage and lastly in X. 241 (p. 123) as seen above.

forth a bad mental state. The clinging to imagination makes the IN continue, though it does not exist.

The DN is exposed as imagination which may manifest itself as the IN. It is held to exist ultimately and it is dependent co-origination in Las X. 50 and 407. As such it is the cause of the mind and the mental factors. It is the very act that brings forth names and illusory marks. It is indeed dependent and as such devoid of own nature and hence unoriginated says Las X. 150.

The CN occurs as the process whereby the cognitive stream becomes pure awareness and thereby wisdom evolves. It is equivalent to correct knowledge and suchness and depicted as a state of mind free from imaginations. It is brought about by the elimination of discrimination and the logic born out of philosophical views. It is variously displayed as non-duality, non-discrimination, suchness, emptiness, ulimate limit, the essence of dharmas, the essence of Buddhahood and as that which belongs to the spiritual realm of the noble.

The net-result gained from these descriptions is the impression that the DN is far less displayed than the other natures.

b) The measure of integration with pan-Buddhist dogma in general and Mahāyā nistic dogma in particular.

Quite a degree of such an integration is found in the Las. In the context of the TSB there is the notion of the two truths, the extremes of reification and denial, the shifting of basis (*āśrayaparāvṛtti*), the five *dharmas*, the two selflessnesses, the *citta* and mental factors (*caitta*), the twelve-membered chain of dependent-co-origination and the womb of Buddhahood (*tathāgatagarbha*). Apart from this there are all those concepts denoting the absolute as listed above.

c) The measure of integration with other Yogācāra tenets.

There is the notion of mind-only (*cittamātra*) more or less explicit in the context of TSB such as II. 180, III. 98 and X. 565-69. The notion of store-consciousness is implied in the same context on p. 92 where the eight consciousnesses are mentioned and explicitly mentioned throughout the Las. The notion of the three bodies of the Buddha in the context of the TSB is explicitly found in Las p. 44 and implicitly elsewhere as a notion which, designating the absolute, is close to the CN.[181]

d) The measure of logical coherence and elaboration of the internal formal structure of the TSB.

The fundamental pattern of the TSB is seen as the DN minus the IN equals the CN. Other perspectives on this pattern are that the DN is apprehended on account of the IN (II. 191) or that the IN never can become the CN unless on the basis of the DN (II. 192). The IN is utterly dependent on the DN since it is merely a mode of it. Moreover, from the point of view of the CN, says II. 196-97, the IN and the DN does not exist. From X. 527 we also learn that the IN and the DN are not mutually different in nature. From the simile on p. 93 it can be inferred that the IN and the DN occur simultaneously, like the sun and its rays. Finally the IN and the DN are related to the first seven stages of the carreer of the Bodhisattva whilst the last three are linked to the CN.

[181] Las II. 4, p. 58, 78, 98, 103 and X. 384.

4 The Madhyāntavibhāga (Mvb)

As the title suggests, the Madhyāntavibhāga[182] (Mvb)[183] is the attempt of explaining the middle way and the extremes.[184] Quoting Bu-ston:[185]

> "The *Madhyānta-vibhaṅga*: *Anta* - *"extremity"*, means the extremities of realism and nihilism, or otherwise those of eternalism and materialism. *Madhya*-"the middle", is the middle way shunning both these extremities. The treatise, as it gives an analysis (*vibhaṅga*) of both these points, is called the *Madhyānta-vibhaṅga*..."

The Mvb can be divided into three categories. It is either found independently as in the Tibetan and Chinese tripitakas or with the commentary (*bhāṣya*) by Vasubandhu interspersed in between the verses (to which the text of Nagao's edition belongs) or with Sthiramati's subcommentary (*ṭīkā*), but in this case only fragmentarily.

As for the date and authorship of this work, Chinese and Tibetan traditions as well as most Western scholars agree on assigning the Mvb to Maitreya [-nātha],[186] who is assumed to have lived 270-350 C.E.[187] Mvb's relative chronological position within Yogācāra history is indicated by quotations from Mvb I. 9 in Msg I. 26 and Mvb's quotation of the Sns [188] which allocates it between the *sūtras* and the works of Asaṅga.

The manuscript utilized by Nagao divides this *śāstra* into five chapters, which correspond to the chapter-divisions in the Tibetan translations and to Sthiramati's *ṭīkā* in Sanskrit, but not to the Chinese translations which divide it into seven

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182 All quotations from *Madhyāntavibhāga* (Mvb) and *Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya* (Mvbbh) are taken from Nagao 1964.

183 Bibliographical information on matters of editions, Tibetan and Chinese translations and translations to modern European languages can e.g. be found in Nakamura 1989, p. 259, esp. notes 41-45, Nagao 1964, p. 1 f. and Powers 1991, p. 42 ff

184 The extremes are listed in V. 23-26

185 Tāranātha p. 395

186 On the discussion of whether Maitreya was a historical person or not, cf. e.g. Anacker 1984, p. 13-14 and notes 26-28 who also remarks that the works ascribed to Maitreya differ from those attributed to Asaṅga in their cryptic and compact style in contrast to the clarity and verbal abundance of the works of Asaṅga. Frauwallner's standpoint is similar: "Asaṅga kann aber nicht der Verfasser dieser Werke sein, denn die darin vorgetragenen Lehren zeigen eine klar ausgeprägte Eigenart und unterscheiden sie deutlich von den eigenen Werken Asaṅgas ". (Frauwallner 1969, p. 296). Cf. also Demiéville 1954, p. 381 n. 4 and Griffiths 1990, p. 87 and n. 12. Lévi assumes Asaṅga to be the author of the Msa as well as the Msabh: "Nous sommes donc fondés à considérer l'ouvrage entier, prose et verse, comme dû à un seul auteur, Asaṅga" (1911, introduction, p. *8). As for the traditional view on the works of Maitreya, see Nakamura *op. cit.* p. 256, 258 and notes 20, 21 and 40; Ruegg 1969, 39 ff., 50 ff; Schmithausen 1987, p. 11, p. 262 n. 100; Tucci 1930 p. 14 and *passim*; Tāranātha p. 159, note 51 *loc cit* and also supplementary note 22, p. 394-5; Bu-ston I. 53 f. referred to in *loc. cit.* References to editions, translations, scholarly examinations etc of the Msa is found in Powers 1991, p. 44 ff; Potter 1983, p. 66-70 and Nakamura *op. cit.* p. 256 n. 20-21 and p. 258 n. 40 and Frauwallner 1969, p. 415.

187 Cf. Tāranātha p. 156-59 and also supplementary note 22, p. 394-5; Bu-ston in *loc. cit.*; Nakamura 1989, p. 259; Powers 1991, p. 42 ff; Frauwallner 1969, p. 296 ff. and Tucci 1930 p. 14 and *passim.*

188 Which, however, occurs in Mvbbh ad Mvb II. 14 and not in the Mvb proper.

chapters.[189] It also exhibits some orthographical peculiarities of which the doubling of a consonant which comes after the letter "r", is noteworthy. Thus the words *karma* and *sarva* are written *karmma* and *sarvva* and this characteristic has been retained in Nagao´s edition.[190] All *kārikās* except the last one are written in the *Anuṣṭubh* metre[191] and are distributed in the treatise thus:

Salutation: 1 k., framework of the treatise: 1k., chapter I: 22 k., chapter II: 17 k., chapter III: 22 k., chapter IV: 4 k., chapter V: 29 k., exposition of the treatise´s name: 1 k. and "transference of merits": 1 k.[192]

The main doctrines of the Maitreya in general and the Mvb in particular seem to be a well-balanced mixture of older tenets moulded with original ideas. Sāramati´s notions of the ultimate being and his Buddhology make up an important component. To this is added older Yogācāra dogmas such as the TSB coloured by Maitreya´s own thinking. Lastly, as we have seen, he offers a new interpretation of the middle way to replace the Madhyamakan one.

The core of his teaching is the notion of the ultimate being expressed as the realm of dharmas (*dharmadhātu*), [193] or suchness (*tathatā*),[194] while emptiness (*śūnyatā*)[195] is discussed in relation to the notion of the middle way. This ultimate being is the only real phenomenon proper and is itself unexpressible (*anabhilāpya*) and without multiplicity (*aprapañcātmaka*).

The ideas of Sāramati consist mainly of the notion of pure, luminous (*prabhā svara*) mind (*citta*). It is pure by essence (*prakṛtiviśuddha*) so all defilements are adventitious (*āgantuka*). The phenomenal world comprises all phenomena (*dharma*) which depend on the ultimate being, which is the ground of phenomena (*dharmatā*).

To account for the fact of illusion, Maitreya introduces the concept of "the imagination of the unreal" (*abhūtaparikalpa*).[196] Ignorance and illusion require a mind and this mind constitutes the imagination of the unreal subject (*grāhaka*) and object (*grāhya*) expressed as duality (*dvaya*). This very act of cognition is the dependent being (*paratantrasvabhāva*), which is real while the cognitive images reflecting the bifurcation into duality make up the imagined nature (*parikalpitasvabhāva*), which is unreal. The imagination´s sole reality is the pure and unified awareness expressed as emptiness, suchness, or pure mind, which is within it and in which it resides. This absence of discriminative thinking is the consummated nature (*pariniṣpannasvabhāva*).

This state of mind is reached by a shift of basis (*āśrayaparāvṛtti*) as a result of which only non-discriminative thinking remains. By this shift only, the realm of

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[189] Cf. Nagao 1964, p. 8
[190] *Op. cit.* p. 5
[191] *Op. cit.* p.9
[192] *Op. cit.* p. 13
[193] Cf. Mvb I. 14 as one of the synonyms of emptiness, II. 14-16, IV. 15, V. 19, V. 21; Msa IX. 56-59, 66.
[194] Cf. Mvb I. 14; Msa IX. 22, 57, XIX. 44. Cf. also Lévi 1911, p. 69, n. 1.
[195] Cf. Mvb I.1-2, 13, 17, III. 7; Msa XIV. 34
[196] The central importance of the dependent nature as *abhūtaparikalpa* is also pointed out by Yeh 1968, p. 107.

dharmas (*dharmadhātu*) which is pure by nature, is experienced and liberation is hence accomplished.[197]

4.1 The distribution of the three natures in the Mvb

Ed.	Ch.	Verse	IN	DN	CN	Notes
17	I	1	x	x	x	As *dvaya, abhūtaparikalpa* and *śūnyatā*
18	-"-	3		x		As *vijñāna*
19	-"-	4		x		As *abhūtaparikalpa*
-"-	-"-	5	x	x	x	As *kalpita, paratantra* and *parinispanna*
20	I	6-7	x	x	x	As *nopalabdhi = upalabdhi*
37-38	III	3	x	x	x	As *svabhāvas trividha*
38	-"-	3-4	x	x	x	As *dharmapudgala, grāhyagrāhaka* and *bhāvābhāva*
-"-	-"-	5	x	x	x	As *asadartha, anityārtha* and *samalā mala*
39	-"-	6	x	x	x	As *abhāva, atadbhāva* and *prakṛti*
-"-	-"-	7	x	x	x	As *alakṣaṇa, vilakṣaṇa* and *svalakṣaṇa*
40	-"-	9	x	x	x	As *parijñāyā, prahāṇa* and *prāpti*
41-44	-"-	10-15	x		x	DN is *parinispatti = paramārtha, viśuddhigocara, saṃyagjñāna* and *tathatā,* IN as *vikalpa* in k. 13
44	-"-	16	x	x	x	As *parikalpa, vikalpa, dharmatārtha*
46	-"-	19		x		As *paratantryārtha*

4.2 Analytical survey

(Chapter I) Imagination exists, the duality in it does not exist but the emptiness in it does exist (1). Therefore everything is neither empty nor non-empty (2). Consciousness exists insofar as it mirrors subject and object but since there is no object, there is no subject (3). Thus the imagination of the unreal is established though it does not exist the way it appears and from its cessation there is liberation (4). The imagined nature corresponds to objects, the dependent to the imagination and the consummated to the absence of duality (5). From knowing that all is mind, objects are no longer apprehended and therefore there is no subject and hence apprehension and non-apprehension are identical (6-7).

(Chapter III) Basic reality is the three natures. The imagined nature is non-existent and it is always so. The dependent exists but not really because of the illusive imagined nature and the consummated exists as the dependent but not as imagined nature (1-3). Three kinds of extremes correspond to the three natures (4). Impermanence and suffering in three senses correspond respectively to the three natures (5-6). Emptiness in three senses correspond to the three natures (7). Selflessness (*nairātmya*) in three senses correspond to the three natures (7-8). The three natures correspond respectively to knowledge, cessation and direct realization

[197] Cf. Frauwallner 1969, p. 321 f.f.

(9-10). The conventional and ultimate truths are discussed. The utlimate is due to the consummated nature (10-15). The three natures in relation to form (*rūpa*) (16). The dependent nature is discussed (19).

4.3 The three natures in Mvb, chapters I and III

I will try to separate the commentaries from the original works in order to arrange my sources chronologically. In the case of Mvb, I shall use Vasubandhu´s Mvbbh only where it does not deviate from an obvious interpretation of the Mvb. In the cases where Vasubandhu manifestly superimposes his own ideas in his interpretation of the Mvb, I will try to clearly state this fact.

The crucial verse for the understanding of TSB in the Mvb is I.5, since it plainly indicates the concepts associated with the three natures:

> The imagined [nature], the dependent [nature] and the consummated [nature] are indicated by objects, the imagination of the unreal and the absence of duality.[198]

From this it is obvious that the properties of the constituent parts of TSB are to be extracted from the concepts "object" (*artha*), "the imagination of the unreal" (*abhū taparikalpa*) and "absence of duality" (*dvayābhāva*).

Before examining I. 5, we shall take a look at the initial statement on TSB where the internal logic of TSB *in the Mvb* is established. Thus Mvbh I.2:

> The Imagination of the unreal (*abhūtaparikalpa*) exists. The Duality in it does not exist. But the Emptiness in it does exist and in that [Emptiness] the [Imagination of the unreal] also exists.[199]

Eckel[200] as well as Kochumuttom,[201] distinguish three key-terms in these statements:

1. The imagination [of the unreal] [202]
2. Duality
3. Emptiness

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[198] Mvb I.5: *kalpitaḥ paratantraś ca pariniṣpanna eva ca / arthād abhūtakalpāc ca dvayābhāvāc ca deśitaḥ //* There is nothing new in Vasubandhus commentary:
Mvbbh ad Mvb I.5: Objects are the imagined nature. The imagination of the unreal is the dependent nature. The absence of grasper and grasped is the consummated nature.
(Mvbbh ad Mvb I.5: *arthaḥ parikalpitaḥ svabhāvaḥ / abhūtaparikalpaḥ paratantraḥ svabhāvaḥ / grāhyagrāhakābhāvaḥ pariniṣpannaḥ svabhāvaḥ /...*).

[199] Mvb I.2: *abhūtaparikalpo 'sti dvayan tatra na vidyate / śūnyatā vidyate tv atra tasyām api sa vidyate //*

[200] Eckel 1985, p. 35.

[201] Kochumuttom 1982, p. 30 f.

[202] The adjective "unreal" (*abhūta*) "...is used to qualify the notions or imagination that singles out as existent things that are "non-reals", that is, "empty".)" Nagao 1991, p. 53.

What has been stated is the fact that the imagination is an undeniably real experience (*abhūtaparikalpo 'sti*). In other words, it is constantly operative[203] Now, insofar as it is duality, that is, that the cognitive images reflect a bifurcation of the stream of awareness into subject and object, it does not exist. Insofar as it is emptiness is does exist (*śūnyatā vidyate tv atra*).

As for duality, it is emphatically denied. All discriminative thinking, any experience of anything objective, which of course presupposes a simultaneous subjective side of the experience, is utterly unreal.

Emptiness, however, is asserted. It resides by sheer necessity within the imagination and the imagination resides within emptiness. It is pure awareness shed of all duality.

Returning to I. 5 the pattern of ontological claims is now quite obvious and the overall context in which TSB is found in the Mvb is rather plain:

Mvb I.1:		Mvb I.5
The imagined nature	= objects	= duality
The dependent nature	= imagination	= imagination
The consummated nature	= absence of duality	= emptiness

The difference between the expositions of TSB in I.1 and I.5 is now more evident. In the latter there is more of a display of the formal relation between the natures as is indicated by the CN's definition as the absence of the IN. This is also by far the most common way of expressing the internal structure of TSB.[204] In the former we find a more substantial picture of TSB. The CN is defined positively as residing in the imagination and the imagination in it.

The implications on behalf of the enigmatic concept of "emptiness" will be much

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203 "At the same time, however, this "unreal imagination", in spite of emptiness, is constantly operative. Hence, unreal imagination again arises in emptiness" Nagao *loc. cit.*

204 The argument that these three categories could just as well be understood as two and that they are ontological claims, put forth by Eckel (Eckel 1985, p. 35), differs somewhat from my own understanding of TSB. First of all, the therapeutic strategy of Mvb determines the superficial structure of TSB in this text so that emptiness can be accounted for. In other Yogācārian texts emptiness is accounted for by introducing the *niḥsvabhāvatā* counterparts to the three *svabhāvas* (e.g. Sns ch. VII. 1-3 and Trś 23-24). This may account for the difference in the superficial structure of TSB in Mvb. The logical structure, as far as I can see, is triple since TSB must be understood on two levels, one ontological and one epistemological. This is also evident from f. ex Las 67-68, 130, Sns VI. 4-6, MVb I.5, Msabh ad Msa XI. 13, Msg II. 2-4, Trś 20-21 etc. The DN just is and must rightly be neutrally existing whilst the IN and the CN are epistemic modes of DN. My argument is in as perfect an accord with the following quotation of Eckel as deviating from his previous claim: "To use the image of consciousness, the Imagination (of *Madhyāntavibhāga* I..2) is a stream of awareness in which cognitive images follow one another in a continous series. The images themselves reflect a distinction between subject and object, cognizer and cognized. The Imagination itself is real, but the Duality that appears in it is not real. The Imagination's only reality is the pure non-dual awareness (Emptiness) that resides in it and in which it resides. It is not too far-fetched to see in the terminology of just these few verses an outline of the Yogācāra conception of the Middle Path. The key, bridging concept is that of imagination (*abhū taparikalpa*). This is the point where the stream of cognition occurs, so it guarantees, for good or ill, that the process of change and growth has reality. It also is identical in essence to pure Emptiness, so it guarantees that the goal is present and accessible" (Eckel 1985, p. 37)

clearer if we take Mvb I. 2, the definition (*lakṣaṇa*) of it found in a part of I. 13 and I. 21 into account:[205]

> "All phenomena, therefore, are neither exclusively empty nor exclusively non-empty. This is so because of the existence [of the "unreal imagination"], because of the non-existence [of the duality of the subject and object], and again because of the existence [of the emptiness of the "unreal imagination"], as well as the existence [of the "unreal imagination" as the locus of emptiness]. This whole schema is named the Middle Path" [206]

> "For Empti[ness] is defined as the absence (*abhāva*) of Duality, which is the presence of an absence (*abhāvasya bhāvaḥ*)" [207]

> "If it were not defiled, all beings would be liberated. If it were not pure, effort would be in vain"[208]

The logic of I. 1 indicates the direction of these ontological claims which is also clearly displayed by Nagao above. Again the three natures are connected and their internal structure made obvious. As is repeated in III. 4, an unpermitted reification of the IN as well as an unwarranted denial of the CN is to be avoided. This is possible and necessary from a structural point of view of the Yogācāra system. As an echo of the future axiom of Dèscartes´*cogito ergo sum,* the Mvb postulates the DN as a container of both bondage and liberation, of the imagined nature as well as the consummated. As far as I. 21 is concerned the theme is repeated. We are told that emptiness must be both defiled and pure.This is all in accordance with the idea that the imagination resides in it, which it has to do to be real. Emptiness thus, resides in the imagination to make liberation accessible. As is pointed out by both Eckel and Nagao, this came to be severely attacked by later Mādhyamikas, especially Bhā vaviveka.[209]

Passing on to Mvb I. 3 we encounter the notion of the impossibility of a mind devoid of contents. In other words, the concept of consciousness is meaningless without reference to its object:

> Consciousness exists insofar as it reflects objects, living beings, self and ideas. It has, however, no object and as that is absent, it does not exist either.[210]

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[205] Cf. Ruegg 1969, p. 319 f., where the notion of the absolute reality expressed e.g. as *śūnyatā* is discussed in connection to several Yogācāra texts. As for the Mvb, however, it is mainly mentioned in a context in which both the commentary and subcommentary is taken into account. Emptiness is defined, synonymed and classified in Mvb I. 12 f.f.

[206]Quoted from Nagao, *loc. cit.* Mvb I.2: (*na śūnyaṃ nāpi cāśūnyaṃ tasmāt sarvaṃ vidhīyate / sattvād asattvāt sattvāc ca madhyamā pratipac ca sā //*)

[207] Quoted from Eckel, *op. cit.* p.36. Mvb I. 13: (*dvayābhavo hy abhāvasya bhāvaḥ śūnyasya lakṣaṇaṃ* ...)

[208] Quoted from Eckel, *op. cit.* p.37-8. Mvb I. 21: *saṃkliṣṭā ced bhaven nāsau muktāḥ syuḥ sarvadehinaḥ / viśuddhā ced bhaven nāsau vyāyāmo niṣphalo bhavet //*

[209] Eckel, *op. cit.* p. 36; Nagao, *op. cit.* p. 54

[210] Mvb I. 3: *arthasattvātmavijñaptipratibhāsaṃ prajāyate / vijñānaṃ nāsti cāsyārhas tadabhāvāt tad apy asat //*

This idea is continued in the next verse where it is argued that the consciousness´ nature as the imagination of the unreal is established. What is perceived as objects and so forth are of course no externally existing objects but imagination only. However, the way the DN which is equivalent to the imagination,™ appears, as IN, it is not. But then again, to avoid the extreme of denial, it cannot be altogether absent. The illusive experience is still an experience however fundamentally unreal. The verse concludes by claiming that from the cessation of the illusive experience, that is from the cessation of the IN, liberation follows. Hence, we can clearly discern the repetition of the pattern resulting from the comparison between I.1 and I. 5 in I.4.

The narrative structure found in I.3 is repeated in I.6-7:

> Depending upon apprehension, non-apprehension arises and depending upon non-apprehension, non-apprehension arises.[211]

As has been shown as plausible, the TSB as well as the notion of avoiding the extremes of reification and denial should be used as a frame of reference as we proceed to interpret the Mvb. Doing this, this verse is quite intelligible: From knowing that all is mind, that is DN, no apprehension of objects, which is IN, arises and from the absence of such an apprehension, we know from I.3, that the apprehension of mere mind ceases, which is equivalent to the CN. It is obvious now that the argument put forth in I.6 is the same as in I.3 though in another guise. The symmetry of the argument is evident: The assertion of mind gives the denial of objects and the denial of objects gives the denial of mind.

Put that way, I. 6 would seem non-sensical unless apprehension and non-apprehension were identical which is exactly what I.7 claims. Now, this would seem even more ludicrous unless we take I.3 into account. There is no such thing as a valid apprehension of an *external* object since they are shown not to exist in an idealistic system. Yet there is an apprehension of an *internal* object since all is mind. Therefore, it would be to great a reification to claim the apprehension of objects and to much of a denial to claim the non-apprehension of illusion.

From chapter I in the Mvb, we were informed that the IN is unreal as duality, the DN unreal insofar as it appears as IN and real insofar as emptiness is inherent in it and lastly that the CN is real as emptiness.

This pattern is repeated in III. 3 and it is hence easy to identify the treefold claim which occurs in it and following verses. The order of the three natures is thereby clear: IN, DN, CN. Thus III.3:

> The threefold nature: it is non-existing and it is eternal, it is existing and yet not really, it is really existing and non-existing and thus are the three natures recognized. [212]

Relying upon I.1 and I.5 we know that the IN does not exist. Yet from I.7 it is evident that the apprehension of an object, however illusory, cannot be denied. Hence it both

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[211] Mvb I.6: *upalabdhiṃ samāśritya nopalabdhiḥ prajāyate / nopalabdhiṃ samāśritya nopalabdhiḥ prajāyate //*

[212] Mvb III.3: *svabhāvas trividhaḥ asac ca nityaṃ sac cāpy atattvataḥ / sadasattattvataś ceti svabhāvatraya iṣyate //*

exists and not. To put in the words of III. 3, it is non-existing (*asat*) and it is eternal (*nitya*). The DN is likewise existing (*sat*), as a container of emptiness and duality, of CN and IN, and again not really (*atattvatas*) since it usually appears as the IN. The duality in it, as I.1 states, does not exist. The same symmetry is found in the notion of the CN: It is really existing and not existing (*sadasattattvatas*). Glancing at I. 13, it could be interpreted as: the CN exists as the fundamental nature of the DN when the IN has ceased to be and by the same token it is the non-existence of the IN in the CN. The overriding importance of avoiding the extremes is once again displayed.

In the following six or seven verses some central Mahāyāna-Buddhist concepts are related to TSB. Some examples will suffice, thus III. 4-5b

> That which is the conception (*darśana*) of the extremes of reification and denial (*samāropāpavada*) here concerning phenomena and persons (*dharmapudgala*), the grasper and the grasped (*grāhyagrāhaka*) and being and non-being (*bhāvābhāva*) does not develope in [those who possess] knowledge (*jñāna*) [and that is] realitiy´s characteristic mark.[213]

By a quick glance at this verse we clearly notice the same order of the TSB as in the previous one. Thus the extremes of phenomena and person are related to the IN. The mainstream of the older Buddhism refuted the notion of a person and adhered to the conception of "no-self"(*anatta*). So did the Yogācārins as well as extending this refutation to the concept of "selflessness of person" (*pudgalanairātmya*). As faithful Mahāyānists they also advocated the notion of "selflessness of phenomena" (*dharmanairātmya*) since there were no reason for assuming the sole existence of *dharmas* nor the existence of *dharmas* by virtue of themselves.[214]

So in relation to the IN, which is the unreal appearance of objects, the extremes of person and phenomena are unwarranted. Neither are found to exist, only mind does. The same pertains to the DN in connection to which the extremes of the grasper and the grasped (*grāhyagrāhaka*) are to be avoided. These concepts are identical to the concept of duality, that is, the bifurcation of the cognitive strem into subject and object. None of these extremes are applicable to the DN which is in itself only a stream of awareness. The CN is related to being and non-being which was done in I. 13. It is neither being insofar as as it is the absence of the IN and it is not non-being either, since it is the presence of this absence of the IN. Since contradictory relationships are identical inasmuch as they are both selfcontradictory in a similar way the argument seems tortuously mindbending.

This pattern is repeated in verses to come: thus we find impermanence discussed

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[213] Mvb III.4: *samāropāpavadasya dharmapudgalayor iha / grāhyagrāhakayoś cāpi bhāvābhāve ca darśanaṃ //* Mvb III.5 ab: *yaj jñānān na pravarteta tad dhi tattvasya lakṣaṇaṁ /*

[214] Cf. ADK ch IX and Lamotte´s notes in Lamotte 1980, tome V, p. 227 f; Las p. 92; Msa XVIII 92-103; Vś+Vśvṛ 9-10 and notes in Lévi 1932, p. 50 and Hamilton 1938, p. 9-10. In the latter text Vasubandu performs an idealistic exegesis of the old texts dealing with the twelve bases (*āyatana*), that is, the division into six cognitive faculties and their corresponding objects (Cf. Stcherbatsky 1979, p. 7 f.). Properly understood, this leads to the insight that there is no substantial entity such as a "soul". Hence there is the selflesness of the person (*pudgalanairātmya*). By the use of the same arguments as used to support the notion of "ideation-only" the selflessness of entities (*dharmanairātmya*) is established.(Vś 10: *tathāpudgalanairātmya praveśo hi anyathā punaḥ / deśanā dharmanairātmyapraveśaḥ kalpitātmanā //*)

in Mvb III. 5 cd-6 ab, suffering in Mvb III. 6 cd, emptiness in Mvb III. 7 ab and selflessness in Mvb 7 cd-8 a. In 8b all these are related to the truth of suffering and the remaining three noble truths are discussed onwards until 9a. We shall pass quite lightly over these verses and content ourselves with a schematic overview over some samples:

5cd-6ab: Impermanence related to TSB[215]
IN: Non-existent objects (*asadartha*)
DN: Impermanent objects of arising and ceasing (*anityārtha utpā davyayalakṣaṇa*)
CN: pure and impure being (*samalāmalabhāva*)

6cd: Suffering related to TSB[216]
IN: clinging (*ādāna*)
DN: characteristics (*lakṣmākhya*)
CN: connection (*sambandha*)

7ab: Emptiness related to TSB[217]
IN: absence (*abhāva*)
DN: presence of its absence (*atadbhāva*)
CN: fundamental nature (*prakṛti*)

7cd-8a: Selflessness related to TSB[218]
IN: no characteristic (*alakṣaṇa*)
DN: apart from its (IN´s) characteristic (*tadvilakṣaṇa*)
CN: own characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*)

As we continue we can infer that the verbal activities displayed in 10b-d refer to the conventional truth since the ultimate is referred to by the designation "the one".

> The gross reality is designation, determination and practise whereas the ulimate is related to the one.[219]

We can easily identify this designation as the CN by consulting III. 11.[220] Coming to III.15-16, we are told that there is a view of a self (*ātmadarśana*), when reality is seen as stable and enduring phenomena, such as an experiencer (*bhoktṛ*), an agent (*kartṛ*), existing by virtue of themselves. These exist in the three natures as imaginations (*parikalpa*), objects of discrimination (*vikalpārtha*) and the essence of *dharmas* (*dharmatā*).[221] These are clearly synonyms of the TSB insofar as any

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215 This passage differs from the ed. according to the suggestion by Nagao in *op cit* p. 39 n. 1. Mvb III.5 cd-6 ab: *asadartho hy anityārtha utpāda vyayalakṣaṇaḥ // samalāmalabhāvena mū latattve yathākramaṃ /*
216 Mvb III.6 cd: *duḥkham ādānalakṣmākhyaṁ sambandhenāparaṁ mataṁ //*
217 Mvb III. 7 ab: *abhāvaś cāpy atadbhāvaḥ prakṛtiḥ śūnyatā matā /*
218 Mvb III. 7cd-8a: *alakṣaṇaṃ ca nairātmyaṃ tadvilakṣaṇam eva ca // svalakṣaṇaṃ ca nirdiṣṭaṁ /*
219 Mvb III.10bc: *...prajñapti-pratipattitas tathodbhāvanayodāram / paramārthan tu ekataḥ //*
220 Mvb III. 11cd...*nirvikārāviparyāsapariniṣpattito dvayam //*
221 Mvb III.16cd:... *parikalpavikalpārthadharmatārthena teṣu te //*

object is imaginarily born out of the discriminative process of the DN and depends ultimately on the realm of *dharmas* which, as is indicated by I. 13, is emptiness which is the CN.

4.4 Conclusions

a) The measure of elaboration of each nature.

The IN is depicted in several ways in the Mvb: as objects, duality, as defiled, as apprehension of illusory objects, it is non-existing and yet eternal, and it is related to the extremes of reification and denial concerning phenomena and persons (*dharmapudgala*). In the different contexts in III. 5cd-8a, it is displayed as non-existent objects, clinging, emptiness as the absence of being and that which has no characteristic.

As for the DN, it is expressed as the imagination of the unreal, as the container of emptiness, as consciousness (*vijñāna*), and as the absence of the apprehension of external objects. It is moreover seen as existing as the container of emptiness and yet not as duality and it is linked to the notion of the extremes of subject and object (*grāhyagrāhaka*) which should be avoided. In various contexts it is exhibited as impermanent objects of arising and ceasing, the characteristics of suffering, emptiness as the presence of the absence of anything and separated from the IN.

The CN is variously designated as the absence of duality, emptiness, emptiness as the presence of an absence of duality, non-apprehension of mind. In addition to this it is shown as really existing as the emptiness and yet not as duality. Moreover it is linked to the avoidance of the extremes of being and non-being in III. 4-5b. In particular contexts, it is said to be pure and impure being, connected to volitional suffering, the fundamental nature of emptiness, since it is defined as such and the own characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*) or essence of selflessness.[222]

b) The measure of integration with pan-Buddhist dogma in general and Mahāyā nistic dogma in particular.

The TSB is designated as "the middle path" by claiming the DN as the container of the absolute defined as emptiness. Further, it is linked to the notions of defilement and purification. Consciousness, which is the DN, is by implication a meaningless concept unless referred to by its object, which may be seen as a Sautrāntika opinion. The application of the avoidance of the extremes of reification and denial in dealing with the TSB is very strictly executed. The notion of the selflessness of person and phenomena is met as well as the concepts of "impermanence", "suffering", "emptiness" and "essence of dharmas" (*dharmatā*). The presence of the idea of the two truths may be deduced from III. 10-11.

c) The measure of integration with other Yogācāra tenets.

Although *ālayavijñāna* and *vijñaptimātratā* are mentioned only in the Mvbbh,[223] though in TSB-contexts, these ideas seem implicit in the text. From e.g. the

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[222] Cf. Sns VII. 6

[223] *Ālayavijñāna* in Mvbbh I. 9 and III. 22 and *vijñaptimātratā* in I. 6. *Vijñaptipratibhāsa* is found in Mvb and Mvbbh I. 3

expression *pratyayavijñāna* in I. 9 and the use of more or less equivalent concepts in other texts by Maitreya, it seems unlikely that the author would be ignorant of it.[224] As for *vijñaptimātratā*, the corresponding idea is expressed in I. 3 and expressed elsewhere as conceptions linked to the terms *vijñāna*, *upalabdhi* and *abhū taparikalpa*.[225]

As for *trikāya*, it is also found in the Mvbbh in the context of the stages of the bodhisattva.[226] This concept is not explicitly related to the TSB in Mvb.

d) The measure of logical coherence and elaboration of the internal structure of the TSB.

The TSB in Mvb displays a great deal of logical coherence, formal elaboration and a very neat symmetry. The fundamental pattern expressed as DN-IN=CN is, for sure, found in the TSB. However, since the IN, defined as objects is duality, the DN imagination and the CN emptiness, the structure of the TSB becomes more complex. The DN exists, the IN as duality in it does not. The CN as emptiness in the DN exists and the DN is also found in the emptiness.

The TSB is further elaborated by reference to the necessity of avoiding the extremes of reification and denial: phenomena are neither considered empty nor non-empty, since the former would constitute an unwarranted denial and the latter an unwarranted reification. The latter extreme would infringe upon the possibility of freedom from bondage and the latter would constitute an obstacle to the freedom to attain liberation.

Both the IN and the CN are contained in the DN which guarantees the possibility of purposive action towards an attainable goal. The same pattern is exhibited in III. 3 where a subtle balance between too much and to little existence is maintained. Hence, the pattern wherein there are three natures with regard to the assumption that phenomena are dependently co-originated and again three natures with regard to the notion that phenomena therefore are empty, is moulded into one condensed triple structure with which emptiness is integrated.

[224] Cf. Schmithausen 1987, p. 98 and ns. 688-90 on pp. 388-89 and Frauwallner 1952, p. 156.
[225] Cf. Schmithausen 1987, p. 384 n. 628a.
[226] The terms *dharmakāya*, *saṃbhogikakāya* and *nirmāṇakāya* are found in Mvbbh IV. 14 .

5 The Mahāyānasūtrālamkara (Msa)

The Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkara (Msa), in its original Sanskrit, has survived only as a part of a prose commentary, the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkarabhāṣya* (Msabh) by Vasubandhu, and may never have circulated as an independent text. In the Chinese translation, the Msa is likewise found embedded in the commentary whilst it is preserved independently of the Msabh in the Tibetan translation.[227]

Apart from the commentary which exists in a single Sanskrit manuscript as well as in Tibetan and Chinese translations, there are two subcommentaries. The Mahayanasūtrālaṃkaravṛttibhāṣya in prose, probably composed by Sthiramati in the mid-sixth century, expounds both the Msa and the Msabh and is extant in Tibetan translation only. The Mahayanasūtrālaṃkaraṭīkā attributed to *Asvabhāva is only found in Tibetan translation as well and may have been composed somewhat later.[228]

The authorship of the Msa is disputed, though both the colophon of the Tibetan translation of the Msa as well as Tibetan and Chinese traditions attribute it to Maitreya.[229]

In any case, relying on the general assumption by scholars in the field, I stipulate Maitreya (270-350 C.E.)[230] to be the author of the Msa. Msa's relative position within Y chronology I assume to be anterior to the Msg[231] and possibly posterior to the Mvb.[232]

The Sanskrit text of the Msa is divided into 21 chapters (*adhikāra*) comprising a total of 805 verses.[233] The disposition of the Msa is very close to that of the Bbh part of the Ybh apart from the insertion of a group of chapters between chapters IX and XVI in the Msa missing in the Bbh.[234]

The main doctrines of Maitreya have already been briefly presented in the chapter on Mvb. For this reason and due to the very scattered occurrences of expositions of the three natures,[235] a restatement of the philosophy of Maitreya is unnecessary and

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227 Cf. Griffiths 1990, p. 87 and ns. 12 f; Nakamura 1989, p. 258, and n. 40, p. 271 and Powers 1991, p. 28, 44 f, 61 f. On the authorship of the Msabh, attributed to Asaṅga or Vasubandhu, cf. Griffiths *op. cit.* p. 112 n. 15 and Schmithausen *op. cit.* p. 263, n. 101.

228 On these subcommentaries, cf. Griffiths, *op. cit.*, p. 31 f., 53, 112 ns. 16-21; Schmithausen p. 106, 412 ff, notes 758-60.

229 On Maitreya as a historical person, cf. note 186.

230 As for the date of Maitreya, cf. the introduction to the chapter on Mvb and n. 187.

231 Msa XX-XXI. 43-59 are quoted in Msg X. 10 - 26.

232 Explicit references are found to Mahāyānasūtras and general references to Āgamas. Cf. Lévi, 1911 introduction p. *14. Lévi observs (*op. cit*. introduction p. *15) that the Mvb is quoted by Msabh XIII. 44. In an attempt to identify the passage, I would propose Mvb IV. 1: (*dauṣṭhulyāt tarṣahetutvād vastuvād avimohataḥ / catuḥsatyāvatārāya smṛtyupasthānabhāvanā //*) Msabh XVIII. 44: (*/ caturbhiḥ smṛtyupasthānair yathākramaṃ duḥkhasamudayanirodha mārgasatyāvatā rāt svayaṃ pareṣāṃ ca āvatāraṇāt / yathā uktaṃ madhyāntavibhāge /*)

233 Cf. Lévi 1911, introduction p. *9; Griffiths 1990, p. 87, p. 112 n. 13.

234 Cf. Frauwallner 1969, p. 297; Lévi *op. cit.*, introduction, p. *10-11; Nakamura 1989, p. 258 f. and *loc. cit*. n. 40. As for metre, orthographical irregularities and irregularities in the usage of sandhi consult Lévi *op. cit.*, introduction, p. *11 ff.

235 The Msa as such is very uncoherent and even more so its exposition of the three natures. Thus Frauwallner: "Eine Übersetzung zusammenhängender Abschnitte kam nich in Betracht, da

an analytical survey is impracticable. Therefore confine myself to a presentation of the main topics of the text according to the contents of each chapter.[236]

5.1 An overview of the Msa

The Msa begins (ch I) by defending the Mahāyāna-Buddhism against its adversaries. The following eight chapters are devoted to depict the path to enlightenment. Taking refuge (ch II) in the three gems (Buddha, the order and the doctrine) marks the four reasons why the doctrine is superior: universality (*sarvatraga*), adhesion (*abhyupagama*), spiritual realization (*adhigama*) and supremacy (*abhibhūti*). By this one enters into the family (*gotra*) of the bodhisattvas (ch III) as distinct from the small vehicle. The thought of enlightenment (*bodhicitta*) (ch IV) leads to the discipline (*pratipatti*) of altrusim (ch. V).

To act to this end, however, requires the insight into the selflessness of persons, the identity of and, the refutation of extra-mental objects and the realization of mind-only (*cittamātra*) which is the realm of the phenomena (*dharmadhātu*), devoid of duality (ch. VI).

In the cultivation of the meditative trances, the bodhisattva acquires super-knowledge and magical gifts (ch. VII). These new forces are used by the bodhisattva (ch. VIII) to mature the six perfections by promoting the phenomena leading to enlightenment and pacifying those that are contraproductive to it. As this task is conclusively achieved, the mind, by a shift of basis (*āśrayaparāvṛtti*) is prepared for and attains enlightenment (ch. IX) which is equated with suchness (*tathatā*), sphere of purity (*anāsravadhātu*) and suchness of dharmas (*dharmatathatā*).

The attributes essential to a bodhisattva restated in the light of his doctrines are examined in ch. XI to XIV. In ch. X confidence (*adhimukti*) is examined whilst phenomena are the subject of investigation in the following (ch. XI). In this chapter, the bulk of the instances of the three natures are found. Next, the perfect teaching in various aspects is studied and in chapter XIII discipline is revisited. Here the two obstacles of knowable and defilement and the ways of overcoming them, are studied. In ch. XIV instructions and precepts for the defenitive conclusion of the bodhisattva´s career are listed.

The third part begins with ch. XV which treats of the act, stresses the importance for a dignified bodhisattva of not discriminating between the agent and the act. In such a spirit he shall accomplish the perfections (ch. XVI). The cult of the Buddha (ch. XVII) and the pity to be shown to suffering beings are expounded. The aspects of enlightenment (ch. XVIII) is discussed with reference to the qualities preparing for the ultimate goal. The instant (*kṣaṇika*) nature of the karmic forces (*saṃskāra*) as well as the selflessness (*nairātmya*) of person and phenomena are considered. Under the heading "virtue" (ch XIX) are listed the complementary qualities of the

Maitreyanātha selbst keine zusammenhängende Darstellung gibt und zu viel philosophisch Unbedeutendes eingeflochten ist" (1969, p. 303)

[236] Brief expositions of the main tenets are found e.g. in Frauwallner 1969, p. 303 ff. and in Lévi *op. cit.*, introduction, p. *16 ff. There is also a short select translation of chapters VI, IX, XI and XIII in Frauwallner *op. cit.* p. 309 ff. My exposition of the main contents of the Msa follows Lévi´s closely.

bodhisattva. The last chapter, which is double (ch XX-XXI) treats of the ascending steps through the ten stages (*bhūmi*) and concludes with a hymn (v. 43-61) to the bodhisattva who has become a Buddha.

5.2 The distribution of the three natures in the Msa

Ed.	Ch.	Verse	IN	DN	CN	Notes
22	VI	1	x	x	x	Suffixed by *lakṣaṇa* in Msabh
48	IX	78	x		x	Suffixed by *svabhāva* in Msabh
49	-"-	81	x			As *kalpa-*
58	XI	13	x	x	x	Related to *dvaya, bhrānti, ābhilapituṃ*
-"-	-"-	14			x	As *dharmadhātu* in Msabh
59	-"-	15	x	x		As *dvaya* and *abhūtaparikalpa*
-"-	-"-	16	x	x		As above. Note *paramārtha* and *saṃvṛti*
-"-	-"-	17	x	x		As 15. Note: DN is *asatkalpa*
-"-	-"-	18	x	x	x	Indicated by *nimitta* and *abhrānta*
-"-	-"-	19	x	x		Indicated by *tadākṛti* and *tadbhāva*
60	-"-	20	x	x		Note *viśeṣa* between *bhāva* and *abhāva*
-"-	-"-	21	x	x		Cf. XI. 15
-"-	-"-	22x	x			Note *aviśeṣa* between *bhāva* and *abhāva*
-"-	-"-	23	-	-	-	Refers to 20-22. Note *samāropāpavāda*
-"-	-"-	24	x	x		*Bhrānti* (IN) requires *bhrāntinimitta* (DN)
61	-"-	25-6	x	x		There is no *dvaya*, yet it is *upalabhyate*
-"-	-"-	27	x	x		Dharmas exist as imagination, yet not as duality.
-"-	-"-	28	x			*Prātipakṣikā dharmā* have no *lakṣaṇa*.
62	-"-	30	x			The *saṃskārā* and the *āyatanā* compared to illusions.
63	-"-	34-5	x			*Citta* appears in duality.
64	-"-	38-9	x			Suffixed by *lakṣaṇa*
-"-	-"-	40		x		-"-
-"-	-"-	41			x	-"-
67	-"-	50-51	-	-	-	On *niḥsvabhāvatā*
84	XIII	1	x	x	x	Relates to TSB acc. to Msabh
94	XIV	34	x	x	x	*Śūnyatā* related to TSB (Cf. Mvb III. 7ab)
95	-"-	35		x		As *abhūtaparikalpa*
149	XVIII	81	x	x	x	As *asat, vi- / parikalpa* and *vikalpapaśama*
169	XIX	51	x	x	x	As *dvayagrāha, dauṣṭhulyakāya, tathatā*
174	-"-	77	x	x	x	As *abhāva, prabhava, abodhabodhapratibodhāt*
175	-"-	79			x	As *niṣpanna*

5.3 The imagined nature in the Msa

I have already argued in favour of the attempt to disregard the commentaries on the texts of my study as far as possible so as to be able to depict the development of TSB without risking interpolation of the interpretations of later commentators. I shall venture to continue this endeavour as far as the Msa is concerned.

Since the first three instances of TSB are quite unintelligible without consulting the Msabh, I will merely cover them briefly. In VI. 1 the character of the ultimate (*paramārthalakṣaṇa*) in its sense of non-duality (*advayārtha*) is discussed in five aspects (*ākāra*). The first of these are related to TSB in such a way that it is said to be neither being (*na sat*) due to the IN and the DN, nor non-being (*na cāsat*) due to the CN. The second aspect is related to the three natures by claiming that the ultimate is neither identic (*tathā*) since the CN is not one and the same (*ekatvābhāva*) as the IN and the CN, nor otherwise (*na cānyathā*) since the CN is not different from the IN and the DN.[237]

In chapter IX, TSB is explicitly used by the Msabh to expound verses 78 and 81; IX. 78, in the close context of the skillful means of Buddhahood (*buddhatvopāya*) as stated by the Msabh, is interpreted as follows: non-existence (*avidyamānatā*) [of something] by virtue of the IN is supreme (*parama*) existence by virtue of the CN, and the complete non-apprehension (*anupalambha*) of the IN is the supreme apprehension by virtue of the CN.[238]

It is obvious that the usual pattern wherein the absence of the IN in the DN equals the CN, is applied on the Msa by the author of the Msabh.

In the same context, which is extended by the emphasis on non-apprehension, as a means, and self-centredness as an obstacle to enlightenment, IX. 81 more explicitely refers to the IN.[239] The message is that enlightenment is attained by the bodhisattvas, who regard all as imagination (*kalpanāmātra*) and do not indulge in it.[240]

In chapter XI, containing the majority of statements pertaining to the three natures, the first verse dealing with the TSB is XI. 13. The natures are easily identified by the familiar concepts of "duality" (*dvaya*), "illusion" (*bhrānti*) and "absence of conceptual diversity" (*aprapañca*) which of course respectively stand

[237] Msa VI.1: *na san na cāsan na tathā na cānyathā na jāyate vyeti na cāvahīyate / na vardhate nāpi viśudhyate punar viśudhyate tatparamārthalakṣaṇa //*. Msabh ad Msa VI. 6: *adavyārtho hi paramā rthaḥ / tamadvayārthaṃ pañcabhir ākaraiḥ saṃdarśayati / na satparikalpitaparatantralakṣaṇābhyā-ṃ na cāsat pariniṣpannalakṣaṇena / na tathā parikalpitaparatantrābhyāṃ pariniṣpannasyaikatvābhā vāt / na canyathā tābhyāmevānyatvābhāvāt / na jāyate na ca vyetyanabhisaṃskṛtatvād dharmadhā-toḥ / na hīyate na ca vardhate saṃkleśavyavadānapakṣayor nirodhotpāde tadavasthatvāt / na viśudhyati prakṛtyasaṃkliṣṭatvāt na ca na viśudhyati āgantukopakleśavigamāt / ity etat pañcavidhamadvayalakṣaṇa paramārthalakṣaṇaṃ veditavyaṃ /*

[238] Msa IX. 78: *yā ´vidyamānatā saiva paramā vidyamānatā / sarvathā ´nupalambhaś ca upalambhaḥ paro mataḥ //*. Msabh ad Msa IX. 78: *yā parikalpitena svabhāvo nāvidyamānatā saiva paramā vidyamānatā pariniṣpannena svabhāvena / yaś ca sarvathā ´nupalambhaḥ parikalpitasya svabhāvasya sa eva parama upalambhaḥ pariniṣpannasvabhāvasya //*

[239] Cf. e.g. Trś 27-28

[240] Msa IX. 81: *paśyatāṃ kalpanāmātraṃ sarvam etad yathoditaṃ / akalpabodhisattvānāṃ prāptā bodhir nirūpyate //*. Msabh ad Msa IX. 81: *kalpanāmātraṃ tv etat sarvam iti paśyatāṃ tasyāpi kalpanāmātrasyāvikalpanād akalpabodhisattvānām anutpattidharmakṣānti lābhāvasthāyā-marthataṃ prāpti eva bodhir iti ucyate /*

for the IN, DN and CN. Each nature is also said, in the same order, to be known (*jñeya*), rejected (*heya*) and then to be purified (*viśodhya*). Thus XI. 13:

> "Le Positif est tout ceci: ce qui est constamment à l´écart de la dualité, le Soubassement de l´Erreur, ce qui est absolument inexprimable, ce qui par essence n´a pas de multiplication, ce qui est à connaître, à rejeter, et aussi à nettoyer, et qui est naturellement immaculé. Quand on parle de le nettoyer des Souillures, c´est le même cas que l´espace, l´or, l´eau."[241]

The concept of duality, which we know from its abundant occurence as the main function of the IN in the Mvb, is also predominant in the Msa as is obvious from the overview of the distribution of the three natures in 5.1. This is expressed IX. 13, though from the point of view of the CN. Reality (*tattva*), it says, is definitely that which is free from (*rahita*) duality and this is the very case when the DN is devoid of the IN. The importance of knowing the IN is familiar: the plausible meditative pattern delineated in Sns VI. 11-12 conveys the same purport which amounts to a gradual development of object-free knowledge by respectively examining and rejecting the character-less and defiled phenomena in IN and DN.[242]

The next five verses[243] form a coherent part which relates reality to magic (*mā yā*) by using the concepts of "duality" and "imagination of the unreal" (*abhū taparikalpa*). The initial statement expressing the relation between the IN and the DN is found in IX. 15:

> "Comme un Trompe-l´œil, ainsi s´explique l´Imagination de se qui n´existe pas; comme l´effet d´un Trompe-l´œil s´explique l´erreur de dualité"[244]

Hence, the next central concept introduced is the imagination of the unreal. The relation between this concept and duality, as we know, is elaborated in chapter three of the Mvb, and its treatment of the issue is repeated here. By the use of the widespread "magic"-simile we learn that the magical illusion requires a medium in the same way as erroneous thought requires thought which is equivalent to the IN presupposing the DN. Being a logical outcome of the very formal structure of the TSB, the shape of this relation between the IN and the DN is not unexpectedly found in e.g. the Msg and the TSN [245]

In XI. 16 the IN as duality and the DN as imagination of the unreal are explicitly related to the two truths:

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[241] Quoted from Lévi 1911, p. 108.

[242] Cf. 2.3. Msa XI. 13 (*śārdūlavikrīḍita*-meter): *tattvaṃ yat satataṃ dvayena rahitaṃ bhrānteś ca saṃniśrayaḥ śakyaṃ naiva ca sarvathābhilapituṃ yac cāprapañcātmakaṃ / jñeyaṃ heyamatho viśodhyamamalaṃ yac ca prakṛtyā mataṃ*
yasyākāśasuvarṇavārisadṛśo kleśāviśuddhirmatā // 13 //

[243] As stated by the Msabh though is mentioned in Msa XI. 20

[244] Quoted from Lévi *loc. cit.* (*anuṣṭubh*-meter onwards until verse 29). Msa XI.15:
yathā māyā tathābhūtaparikalpo nirucyate / yathā māyākṛtaṃ tadvat dvayabhrāntir nirucyate // 15 //

[245] In Msg II. 27 the DN is compared to *māyā* and in Tsn 27 the IN is defined as *māyākṛta* . In Sns VII. 7 the CN in one of its aspects is compared to *māyā* and in Trś 12 *māyā* is enumerated as one of the *upakleśa*-s

"Dans ceci, il n´y a point existence de cela; il en est ainsi du Sens transcendant. En pourtant il y a Susception de cela; il est ainsi de la Verité Contingente"[246]

Applied on the simile in the previous verse, it is obvious that the forms perceived in the product of magic are illusory and thus non-existent. That is to say, duality does not exist in the imagination of the unreal - the IN does not exist in the DN. Yet there is no doubt that these imaginary images are perceived and hence existent in some way. The solution to these apparently contradictory statements is explicit and consistent with the system´s own presuppositions:[247] The IN does not exist in the DN ultimately (*paramārthatas*) since it is mere illusion but it does exist conventionally (saṃvṛti*tas*) since it is apprehended. The emphasis on the absence of duality in the imagination of the unreal may be explained by the fact that there is no other concievable way it could exist. By virtue of the same argument the DN does exist ultimately.

In XI. 17 the argument is continued. Granted, as it is in XI. 16, that illusion exists conventionally, its absence ultimately will be experienced in the shift of the basis:

"En l´absence de l´effet, on perçoit la manifestation de son Signe; de même, quand il y a Révolution du Fond, on perçoit la manifestation de l´Imagination inexistante"[248]

The simile is continued by reference to the fact that when the effect of the magic has ceased (*tadabhāve*), only its mark (*nimitta*) is seen. In other words: when the illusory image is absent, only the paraphernalia of the magic show is perceived. This image is thus used to illustrate the effects of the shift of the basis - there is only the imagination of the unreal (*asatkalpa*)[249] and altogether no duality. The IN is removed from the DN which will become the CN. The ultimate non-existence of the IN is thus demonstrated.

As Msa XI. 18 only states that there is freedom of action for those who no longer are deluded by illusion, we will direct our attention briefly to XI. 19, being the last verse formally related to the concept of magic.

The relation between the IN and the DN and the question of the ontological status of the IN, which has been dealt with by the Msa XI. 15-18, is concluded by Msa XI. 19. The main problem is thus restated:

"D´une part l´aspect y est; d´autre part l´existence n´y est pas. C´est pourquoi on attribue au Trompe-l´œil, etc. et l´être et le non-être."[250]

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[246] Quoted from Lévi *op. cit,*, p. 109. Msa XI.16: *yathā tasmin na tadbhāvaḥ paramārthas tatheṣyate / yathā tasyopalabdhis tu tathā saṃvṛtisatyatā // 16 //*

[247] Cf. e.g.Las II. 181, 185. As is pointed out by Eckel, whenever the Yogācāra attempts to apply the *satyadvaya* on the *trisvabhāva*, certain obvious anomalies are bound to arise from the point of view of the Madhyamaka and vice versa. The conflict between these schools is essentially a conflict of systems rather than of individual arguments, concludes Eckel. (1985, p. 38-9).

[248] Msa XI. 17: *tadabhāve yathā vyaktis tan nimittasya / tathāśrayaparāvṛttāv asatkalpasya labhyate // 17 //*

[249] The expression *asatkalpa* is of course interchangeable with *abhūtaparikalpa*. Cf. Msg II. 2 and Tsn 4.

[250] Msa XI. 19:*tadākṛtiś ca tatrāsti tadbhāvaś ca na vidyate / tasmād astitvanāstitvaṃ māyādiṣu vidhīyate // 19 //*

In other words: the reason why being and non-being have been attributed to magic is because the imagined nature's form exists in the dependent nature but its existence is not found there.

Next come five verses dealing with the importance of avoiding the extremes of reification (*samāropa*) and denial (*apavāda*). The structure of this part is such that XI. 19, though formally belonging to the preceding part, relating existence and non-existence to magic is referred to by XI. 20. This verse in turn interprets it through the conceptual pattern of reification and denial. In the same manner XI. 21, which relates form (*rūpa*) to existence and non-existence, is commented upon by XI. 22. Lastly, Msa XI. 23 claims that these assumptions are made to reject the extremes of reification and denial and to reject the way of the Small vehicle (*hīnayāna*).[251] Thus XI. 21:

> "Ainsi la dualité s'y trouve en apparance, mais non pas en réalité; C'est pourquoi on attribue à la Forme, etc. et l'être et le non-être."[252]

Msa XI. 20 and 22, which are virtually identical, repeat the argument implicit in the previous part. Since the IN is perceived, it would be too much of a denial to claim its non-existence, and too much of a reification to advocate its existence, since it is only the dual mode of the DN. Hence, as these verses conclude, there is a non-distinction (*aviśeṣa*) between existence and non-existence, with respect to the illusory images of the IN and their substrate, which is the imagination of the DN. The non-existence of the illusion is the existence of the imagination, and vice versa.

XI. 24 continues the exposition of the relationship between the IN and the DN from different perspectives.

> "Le Signe de l'Erreur et l'Erreur, c'est la Notification Formelle et la Notification Informelle; en l'absence de l'une, l'autre n'existerait pas."[253]

We are taught that the mark of illusion corresponds to the idea of form, while illusion *per se* corresponds to the informal idea. This is to say that the substrate of illusion, the DN, is the idea of a form, while the illusory image itself does not conform to any form at all, since there is none. It concludes by saying that the informal idea requires idea of form - the IN presupposes the DN. [254]

XI. 25-26, once again, by means of similes, concludes that duality does not exist although it is perceived. The IN thus requires some measure of being. The solution to this seeming inconsistency was presented in XI. 16, by applying the concept of the two truths, whereby its conventional existence is guaranteed.

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[251] Msa XI. 23: *samāropāpavādāntapratiṣedhārtham iṣyate / hīnayānena yānasya pratiṣedārtham eva ca // 23 //*

[252] Msa XI. 21: *tathā dvayābhatātrāsti tadbhāvaś ca na vidyate / tasmād astitva nāstitvaṃ rūpādiṣu vidhīyate // 21 //*

[253] Msa XI. 24: *bhrānter nimittaṃ bhrāntiś ca rūpavijñaptir iṣyate / arūpiṇī ca vijñaptir abhāvāt syāt na cetarā //*

[254] This idea is expressed in e.g. Tsn 27-31 where the IN is described as duality and the DN as form.

Next comes a part (27-30) claiming the magic-like nature of dharmas - those of an illusory character (*bhrāntilakṣaṇa*) as well as those which function as an antidote (*prātipakṣika*), to both of which the bodhisattvas are indifferent. Since this part, as well as following ones, [255] do not increase our understanding of the IN, we shall examine XI. 38-39. [256]

> "Le signe de Connotation du Sens en fonction du Verbe, l'Imprégnation afférente, et aussi la clarté qui en sort, c'est l'Indice Imaginaire." [257]

> "L'éclaircissement du Sens et du Mot en fonction du Mot et du Sens, Signe de l'Imagination qui n'est pas, c'est l'Indice Imaginaire." [258]

As is obvious from XI. 38, three main characteristics are attributed to the IN. First ,it is the cause (*nimitta*) of the conception (*saṃjñā*) of the meaning (*artha*) of a verbal utterance (*jalpa*), secondly, the impression (*vāsanā*) of the word, and thirdly the object (*artha*) resulting from this impression. Thus we are introduced into a three-phased process: there is a cause of an impression, an impression in the mind by this word and the understanding of it.

In XI. 39 the case is much clearer. The key-word here is "appearance" (*prakhyā natā*) referring to the seemingly external world that we know through language and perception of objects. This apparent reality is the cause (*nimitta*) of the unreal imagination (*asaṃkalpa*). Thus, again we may notice that the IN is the very outcome of the imaginative activity of the DN. We are told that if there is a cognitive image of an object by verbal designation, or a word (*nāma*) is evoked by the perception of an object, (*artha*), these perceptions are unreal in so much as they are merely apparent. There is no corresponding extra-mental reality since all there is, is the imagination.

Msa XIV. 34, which corresponds very closely to Mvb III. 7ab, [259] implicitly relates emptiness (*śūnyatā*) to TSB, both by testimony of its commentary and by the similarity to the verse in Mvb. In Lévi's translation:

> "Quand il a connu la vacuité de l'inexsistence, la vacuité de l'existence telle ou telle, la vacuité naturelle, on dit alors qu'il connaît le vide"[260]

Placed in the conceptual context of Mvb III. 7ab, it is quite obvious that the IN is

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[255] XI. 34-35 concern "mind-only" saying that mind has the aspect of duality, which is nothing new, and that there are no other dharmas than mind.

[256] It should be noted that e.g. Erich Frauwallner (1969, p. 312), at least in XI. 39, prefers to translate the word *artha* with "Gegenstand", that is, "object", a reading which I adopt in my interpretation of these verses

[257] Msa XI. 38:*yathā jalpārthasaṃjñāyā nimittaṃ tasya vāsanā / tasmād apy atha vikhyānaṃ parikalpitalakṣaṇaṃ // 38 //*

[258] Msa XI. 39: *yathā nāmārthamarthasya nāmnaḥ prakhyānatā ca yā / asaṃkalpanimittaṃ hi parikalpitalakṣaṇaṃ // 39 //*

[259] Mvb III. 7 ab: *abhāvaś cāpy atadbhāvaḥ prakṛtiḥ śūnyatā matā /* The resemblance between the commentaries by Vasubandhu (?) is also striking.

[260] Msa XIV. 34: *abhāvaśūnyatāṃ jñātvā tathābhāvasya śūnyatāṃ / prakṛtyā śūnyatāṃ jñātvā śūnyajña iti kathyate //*

considered empty by virtue of its very nature. The IN as mere illusion, the outcome of the mind's bifurcation into subject and object is in no way real. The IN is utterly devoid of own being.

In Msa XVIII. 81, there is another echo from the Mvb,[261] which in the context of impermanence relates the IN to unreal objects (*asadartha*). Thus Msa:

> "Sens de Non-être, Sens d'indifferenciation, Sens d'Imagination, Sens de sous-Apaisement de la différenciation; voilà les quatre pour les Sages"[262]

It is obvious that the concepts associated with the IN are "unreal objects" (*asadartha*) and "imagined objects" (*parikalpārtha*). Although the commentaries on the Mvb III. 5cd-6ab and the Msa XVIII: 81 both link the IN to the concept of "unreal objects", the Msabh combines it with the concept of "impermanence" (*anitya*) while the MVbbh seems to connect impermanence with the DN.[263] As for "unreal objects" we already know that any object perceived by definition requires the experienced distinction between a perceiving subject and a extra-mental object. This experience is the very core of the imagined nature. The objects perceived are thus imaginary and unreal.

In Msa XIX. 51, the IN is related to the "clinging to duality" (*dvayagrāha*), duality being, as we also have seen in the Mvb [264], the central concept in the description of the IN. In the present context it is negatively related to the CN, which is the insight into true reality, devoid of the clinging to duality. Msa XIX. 51:

> "La connaissance qui a la Quiddité pour Phénomène, qui est isolée de la Prise de dualité, qui est manifestée comme le Corps de la Turbulence, sert aux Sages à détruire celui-ci."[265]

Although it is only in the Msabh that the connection between Msa XIX. 77 and TSB is made, it is implied in the concepts "non-existence" (*abhāva*), "origin" (*prabhāva*) and more weakly in the phrase "[he has] knowledge of understanding by not understanding" (*abodhabodha pratibodha*), which respectively stand for the IN,DN and CN.

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[261] That is to say, Mvb 5cd-6ab. The Msabh explicitly relates *asadartha* to *anitya*.

[262] Msa XVIII: 81: *asadartho 'vikalpārthaḥ parikalpārtha eva ca / vikalpopaśamārthaś ca dhīmatā-ṃ tac ca tu aṣṭayam/ /*

[263] The Mvbbh interprets the Mvb-passage as way of relating all three natures to the concept of "impermanence" which would imply that the Mvb claims that the IN is impermanent because the reality thus designated consist of unreal objects while the DN is impermanent objects (*anityārtha*) because it is the very activity of arising and ceasing objects (*utpādavyayārtha*). The Msabh on the other hand explicitly links unreal objects to impermanent objects: *bodhisattvānām asadartho 'nityārthaḥ / yannityaṃ na asti tadanityaṃ teṣāṃ yatparikalpitalakṣaṇaṃ /*

[264] E.g. Mvb I. 2, I. 5 and III. 4

[265] Msa XIX. 51: *tathatālambanaṃ jñānaṃ dvayagrāhavivarjitaṃ / dauṣthulyakāyapratyakṣaṃ tatkṣaye dhīmatāṃ matam / /*. Note the divergence between Schmithausen's translation and that of Lévi: "Insight which, being devoid of Clinging to both (sc. *grāhya* and *grāhaka*), has True Reality for its object and immediately perceives the mass of Badness (Msabh: = ālayavijñāna), is considered to entail, for the Wise (= Bodhisattvas), the extinction of the latter." (in note 1167 in Schmithausen 1987, p. 473)

> "Il comprehend l´incompréhension, il comprehend la compréhension, il comprehend l´inexistence, il comprehend l´origine, il comprehend la compréhension par incompréhension; c´est pour cette cause qu´on l´appelle Bodhisattva"[266]

5.4 The dependent nature in the Msa

The first clear occurences of the DN in the Msa are found in XI. 13 and onwards, where 13-14, deal with the truth of phenomena (*dharmatattva*) and the next fifteen, [267], deal with the truth related to the conception of magic (*māyā*). In the following part, I will try to present a representative sample of different expositions of the dependent nature related to these themes.

Thus in XI. 13, [268] we learn that the DN is the support of the illusion (*bhrā nteś...saṃniśrayaḥ*), which has been indicated in previous texts. Hence, in the context of the truth of phenomena, the DN is defined as the very fundament of illusion.

In XI. 15, as was noted in the part on the IN in the Msa, the DN is equated with the imagination of the unreal (*abhūtaparikalpa*), which in its turn is compared to magic.[269] By relating magic to the effect of magic (*māyākṛta*), we are once again reminded that the imagination of the unreal is the very cognitive process responsible for the illusion of duality (*dvayabhrānti*).

Since the relation between the DN and the two truths, as seen in XI. 16, was investigated in the IN-part, we may revisit XI. 17 briefly. As was stated by XI. 16, the DN does exist, while the IN in it being apprehended, is granted a conventional existence. The argument is carried on in XI. 17, where the comparison to magic is used to indicate the imagined nature´s dependence on the DN in the context of the shift of basis. Once again Msa XI. 17:

> "En l´absence de l´effet, on perçoit la manifestation de son Signe; de même, quand il y a Révolution du Fond, on perçoit la manifestation de l'Imagination inexistante."[270]

Hence, this verse could be read as follows: when the conventional reality of the IN has been negated by a shift of basis, there is only the stream of awareness left. The imagination of the unreal (*asatkalpa*), which is the DN, and hence the ultimate absence of the IN is thereby realized. In Msa XI. 19 the same argument is transposed into a question of attributing both existence (*astitva*) and non-existence (*na astitva*) to magic. The answer is obvious: The IN does not exist insofar as it is the illusive manifestation of the DN, but it does exist insofar as this illusion is actually apprehended.

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266 Msa XIX. 77:*abodhabodhād anubodhabodhād abhāvabodhāt prabhāvānubodhāt / abodhabodhapratibodhataś ca tena ucyate hetu na bodhisattvaḥ //*

267 As stated by Msabh XI. 14. Lévi seems to have misread its last part though, as he translates *pañcadaśa ślokāḥ* to "cinq vers" on p. 108 and since Msabh XI. 29 says *aupamyārthe slokaḥ.*

268 Cf. n. 242. (Msa XI. 13)

269 Cf. n. 244. (Msa XI. 15)

270 Cf. n. 248.

This main pattern is continued in various shapes until XI. 30, and it will therefore suffice to note some examples. In XI. 21 the apparent reality of the IN as an outcome of the DN is advocated. However, there is only the imagination which is the DN, and no IN whatsoever. Now, to satisfy the demands of avoiding the extremes of reification and denial, XI. 22 qualifies the statement in the preceding verse:

> "L´existence dans ce cas n´est pas exactement l´inexistence, l´inexistence n´est pas exactement l´existence; c´est une indistinction d´existence et d´inexistence qui est attribué à la Forme, etc."[271]

Hence, these ontological statements are necessary requirements in a valid description of reality, but neither must be asserted or refuted too strongly. It is thus impermissible to say that the IN in the DN does not exist. It does, conventionally, since the illusion is apprehended. But it is equally wrong to claim the contrary position. The IN does not exist ultimately in the DN, since there is fundamentally only the cognitive process which is the dependent nature.

In Msa XI. 27 this line of reasoning is applied on phenomena (*dharma*) in such a way that the illusory phenomena which are like magic, those of the IN, are said to exist and yet not. These phenomena, regarded as dependent on the DN, do exist - as duality they do not.

> "Puisque en tant que tels ils existent, que en tant que tels ils n´existent pas, que l´existence et l´inexistence y sont indistinctes, les Idéaux qui ont pour Indice l´Erreur sont d´être et de non-être, et ont l´apparance d´un Trompe-l´œil" [272]

As has been noticed, the Msa repeatedly points at the flow of awareness as being the very substrate of the imagined nature. The cognitive stream, which is the DN, transforms itself into the cognitive categories of a perceiving subject and a perceived object. This is also stressed in the context of ideation-only [273] in Msa XI. 34-35. Thus Msa XI. 34:

> "C´est la Pensée qui a l´aspect de dualité, et l´ayant, c´est elle aussi qui a l´aspect de passion, etc., de Foi, etc.; il n´y a pas d´autre Idéal qu´elle, soit souillée, soit bonne."[274]

The point of mentioning attachment (*rāga*) and faith (*śraddhā*) is of course that both commence the *abidharma* series of the defiled (*kliṣṭa*) and the beneficial (*kuśala*)

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[271] Quoted from Lévi 1911, p. 110. Msa XI. 22: *na bhāvas tatra cābhāvo nābhāvo bhāva eva ca / bhāvābhāvāviśeṣaś ca rūpādiṣu vidhīyate //*

[272] Quoted from Lévi 1911, p. 112, where he also proposes the correction of the ms. *bhāvābhā vaviśeṣataḥ* to *bhāvābhāvāvi°* which, in the context, reads better. Msa XI. 27: *tathā bhāvāt tathā ´bhāvād bhāvābhāvāviśeṣataḥ / sad asanto ´tha māyābhā ye dharmā bhrāntilakṣaṇa //*

[273] The Msabh XI. 33 says: Two verses on the question of "ideation-only" (*vijñaptimātratā paryeṣṭau dvau ślokau*)

[274] Quoted from Lévi 1911, p. 114. Msa XI. 34: *cittaṃ dvayaprabhāsaṃ rāgādyābhāsam iṣyate tadvat / śraddhādyābhāsaṃ na tadanyo dharmaḥ kliṣṭakuśalo ´sti //*

phenomena, which are classified as mental associates (*caitta*).[275] Thus, no matter what phenomena are experienced, they are ideation-only. There is also the emphasis on mind (*citta*) as that which may assume a dual form and as that which the IN is dependent on, that is, the dependent nature.

The next part which contains very explicit definitions of the TSB, ranges between verses 36 and 43, and deals with the question of character or nature (*lakṣaṇa*) of reality, as the commentary would have it. DN is defined in Msa XI. 40:

> "Avec une apparence triple et triple, avec l'Indice de Prenable et Prenant, l'Imagination inexistante est l'Indice du Relatif."[276]

Hence, the DN is defined as the imagination of the unreal, which has the nature of subject and object, and which appears in three ways, each of which is divided in three. We will have to consult the commentary to be able to interpret the expression "threefold and threefold" (*trividha trividha*).

> "L'apparance de trois sortes, c'est l'apparance de mot fléchi, l'apparance de Sens, l'apparance de corps. Il y a encore trois sortes d'apparances: l'apparance d'Esprit, l'apparance de Récepteur, l'apparance de différenciation. L'Esprit, c'est ce qui est tousjours souillé. Les Récepteurs, c'est les cinq Corps de Sensations. La différenciation, c'est la Sensation de l'Esprit. La première série de trois apparances a pour Indice le Prenable; le seconde a pour Indice le Prenant. Ainsi cette Imagination inexistante est l'Indice du Relatif." [277]

This would mean that the imagination of the unreal, which is defined as the DN may bifurcate from pure awareness into a state of consciousness, in which there is an experience of objects - in a general sense - as well as self-awareness. Pure mind has evolved into a grasped (*grāhya*) objective part, and into the grasper's (*grāhaka*) subjective part.

The first of the two series mentioned[278] - which amount to three if the expounding of each three items in the second series are counted as one series - are related to the objective part of the mind in the following manner: the appearance of abode[279] (*pada*), object (*artha*), and body (*deha*). As is evident from Msa II. 2 and 5, these

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[275] Cf. Trś 9 ff, Msa + Msabh XI. 37, PSP 4, Adk II. 25, V. 2 etc. Cf. also Chatterjee 1975, p. 112 f.; Stcherbatsky 1979, p. 95 ff; Guenther 1991 (1974), p. 101 f, esp. p. 103. Note the absence of "attachment" in the defilement-group of the abhidharma of the Sarvāstivādins.

[276] Msa XI. 40 :*trividhatrividhābhāso grāhyagrāhakalakṣaṇaḥ / abhūtaparikalpo hi paratantrasya lakṣaṇaṃ // 40 //*

[277] Msabh XI. 40 : */../ tatra trividhābhāsaḥ padābhāso 'rthābhāso dehābhāsaś ca / punas trividhābhāso manaudgrahavikalpābhāsaḥ / mano yat kliṣṭaṃ sarvadā / udgrahaḥ pañca vijñānakāyāḥ / vikalpo manovijñānam / tatra prathamatrividhābhāso grāhyalakṣaṇaḥ / dvitiyo grāhakalakṣaṇaḥ / iti ayam abhūtaparikalpaḥ paratantrasya lakṣaṇaḥ /*

[278] Both are revisited in the context of liberation (*vimukti*) and connected to the concept of shifts or turning abouts (*parāvṛtti*) in Msa XI. 44 (the objective *grāhya*-part) and 45 (the subjective *grāhaka*-part).

[279] Rather than using Lévis translation of the word *pada* to "declinable word", I prefer to choose that of Nagao (1991, p. 80; p. 246, n. 25). Another point is that "abode" would fit more coherently in the objective context. Cf. Msg II. 2, 5.

stand respectively for the extra-mental world, that is, the human surroundings, the six sense-objects and the six sense-organs.[280]

The second series relates to the subjective part thus: the appearance of mind (*manas*), receptor (*udgraha*) and discrimination (*vikalpa*). The commentary expounds these three concepts so that mind is defined as that which is always defiled (*mano yat kliṣṭaṃ sarvadā*), the recpeptor is the five bodies of consciousness (*udgrahaḥ pañca vijñānakāyāḥ*), and discrimination is the thinking consciousness (*vikalpo manovijñāna*). Thus, the subjective part of the mind is, respectively, the intermediate ego-creating seventh consciousness of the Yogācārins called *manas*, the five ordinary empirical sensory faculties, and lastly the sixth thought-consciousness. Since these are inherent in the imagination of the unreal, which is the DN, the commentator may wish to point out that this is the store-consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*).

Among the remaining occurences of the DN, a few, such as XVIII. 81, which has already been examined in the context of the IN, will be chosen. Since I argued that the concepts associated with the IN were "unreal objects" (*asadartha*) and "imagined objects" (*parikalpārtha*), the expression *avikalpārtha* seems to denote the DN. Due to the fact that the Msabh refers to "the object of the discrimination of the unreal" (*abhūtavikalpārtha*), and *avikalpārtha* would mean "undiscriminated object", which is in the domain of the CN, it seems plausible that *avikalpārtha* in the verse is an elliptic form of *abhūtavikalpārtha*. Thus, the DN is once again equated with the flow of awareness.

Msa XIX. 51, as we have seen, considers all three natures from the perspective of the CN, and in the context of the destruction of the mass of badness (*dauṣṭhulyakā ya*) which is equated to the store-consciousness by the Msabh.[281] The insight (*jñā na*) which has true reality (*tathatā*) as its object (CN), and is free from the dual grasping (*dvayagrāha*), which is the IN, entails the destruction of this mass of badness which is the DN.

Thus, there is a temporal dimension pertaining to the progress from the imagined to the consummated. When there is no duality in the DN, the latter is by definition converted into the CN *after* the karmic residues in the mind have been eliminated.

Lastly, I will revisit Msa XIX. 77, which is explicitly related to TSB only in the Msabh, though the concepts involved in the verse implies the connection. As for the DN we may note the concept of "origin" (*prabhāva*), which of course denotes the continual activity of the mind.

5.5 The consummated nature in the Msa

In Msa VI.1 we noted the connection between the absolute (*paramārtha*) as non-duality (*advaya*) and the three natures[282]. Defined as non-duality, the absolute is virtually identical to the CN, which by definition is the absence of the duality of the

280 Cf. also Nagao *loc. cit.*

281 Msabh XIX. 51: */.../ tasya eva kṣayāya saṃvartate dauṣṭhulyakāyasyālayavijñānasya tatkṣayā rthaṃ tatkṣaye /*

282 The explicit connection is made by the Msabh VI. 1.

IN in the DN. This is very obvious in VI. 1, which states that it is neither being (*na sat*) the IN and the DN, nor the non-being of the CN (*nāsat*). Hence the absence of the absolute as CN is negated, though its presence is not positively affirmed, since this would violate the principle of avoiding the extremes of reification and denial. The non-duality of the absolute is further established by once again assuming a middle way between the identity between the CN and the other natures, on the one hand, and the difference between them on the other.[283] To claim the identity between the three natures would reduce the CN to the duality of the IN, and thus it would be a reification of its ultimativity. To claim its difference from the other natures would mean that it would be unattainable, since the transformation of the DN from its IN-mode to its CN-mode would be impossible. The convertibility of the DN would be denied, and hence the means of liberation annihilated.

In Msa IX. 78 it was obvious that the deduced internal formal logic of the TSB could be discerned once again. Due to the IN those things promoting enlightenment seem absent, but from the point of view of the CN they have supreme (*parama*) being. The former non-apprehension has been replaced by supreme apprehension (*upalambha*) of these beneficial objects. Although the notion of the DN is implicit, the usual pattern is evident: the CN is defined as the absence of the IN in the DN.

In Msa XI. 81 we met the notion of the bodhisattvas attaining enlightenment by regarding (*paśyatā*) everything as imagination only (*kalpanāmātra*). Interesting to note, is the fact that this presupposes a non-imagination (*akalpa*) by them. Hence, mere theoretical insight into the ideational nature of reality is not sufficient. Continuous discrimination within this theoretical frame is still a bifurcation of the pure awareness into a perceiving subject and perceived images, which, although of a mental nature, are still objects of perception. Thus, the CN, which is the absence of this duality, will be an actuality only in the true abiding in non-conceptual insight.[284]

Although, by the very formal structure of the TSB, the CN is implicit in many statements pertaining to the IN and the DN, it is only quite explicit in four verses in chapter XI of the Msa,*viz.*13, 14, 18 and 41.

The key-concepts obvious in XI. 13, as I have indicated in previous parts of this chapter, are "duality" (*dvaya*) and "illusion" (*bhrānti*) standing for the IN and the DN respectively whilst "absence of conceptual diversity" (*aprapañca*) is a clear expression of the CN.

These concepts are quite central to the very core of Buddhist thought as we have already noticed. In the words of David Seyfort Ruegg:

> "Le *paramātman* procède de la tranquillité consistant en l'épuisment de développement discursif (*prapañcakṣaya*) touchant à la conceptualisation qui différencie entre la soi et la non-soi (*ātmanairātmya*)."[285]

...or, in those of Chr. Lindtner

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283 Cf. Msg II. 17 and 23.

284 An echo of this is found e.g. in Trś 26-28 and the interpretation which is quite coherent with those of other Yogācāra texts finds additional supported in the Msabh IX. 81.

285 Ruegg 1969, p. 251. Cf. also pp. 297, 380, 426 and 448.

> "All conscious beings find themselves living in an extended world of plurality (*prapañca*). Only the Buddha is beyond *prapañca. /.../ prapañca* also means *our* expansion of the world, or, as one might say, the world presented to us in and by language. The very *modus operandi* of *prapañca* is *vikalpa /.../*"[286]

The *Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra* (Vns), as a canonical and thus an authoritative scripture, is of course one of the sources used to justify the definition of the CN. Vns VIII. 32 says:

> "Si les Bodhisattva ne disent rien, ne parlent point, ne désignent rien et n´enseignent rien à propos d´aucun dharma, s´ils excluent tout vain bavardage (*prapañca*) et tranchent tout conception (*vikalpa*), alors ils pénètrent dans la doctrine de la non-dualité."[287]

These quotations are quite sufficient as indicators of what "absence of conceptual diversity", as one of the properties of the CN, may be. As for the CN´s inexpressibility, the quotation from the Vns is rather expressive. The notion of the silence of the Buddha is a way of showing the inadequacy of verbal designations.[288]

As we continue to explore the occurences of verses pertaining to the CN, Msa XI. 14 stands out as a quite rare specimen of more informal Buddhist thought:

> "En verité, il n´y a rien d´autre que Lui dans le monde, et le monde entier a la raison brouillée quant à Lui. Comment donc, a-t-elle grandi, cette singulière folie du monde, qui fait q´on obstine à ce qui n´existe pas, en laissant complètement de côté ce qui est ?"[289]

In English this passage might be rendered as follows : "There is nothing in the world to set it apart, yet all beings are included in that delusion. How is this singular delusion brought about among men who cling to the non-existent and disregard that which is ?"

This is a clear indication of the conception of reality as consisting of different levels or possibly spheres. There is that which exists, and that which does not, and the exasperation at the ignorance shown towards these obvious facts. Next to come is XI. 18 which needs to be interpreted in the light of XI. 14 to become intelligible:

> "Le monde alors, n´étant plus trompé quand au signe, se conduit comme il

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286 Lindtner 1982b, p. 270-71

287 Vns p. 317. Cf. also Nagao 1991, p. 40 and 42.

288 Note this expression in e.g. Las II. 175, X. 167; Msabh XI. 38 and Msg II. 16. Nagao (1991b, p. 15) sees it as one of the qualifying properties of the ultimate (*paramārtha*)

289 (*mālinī*-meter) Msa XI. 14:*na khalu jagati tasmād vidyate kiṃcid anyaj jagad api tadaśeṣaṃ tatra saṃmūḍhabuddhi / katham ayam abhirūḍho lokamohaprakāro yad asad abhinivisthah sat samantād vihāya //* 14 //. The Msabh explains it by reference to the concepts of "true essence of dharmas" (*dharmadhātu*) and "real nature" (*dharmatā*): Msabh ad Msa XI. 14: *na khalu tasmād evaṃ lakṣaṇād dharmadhātoḥ kiṃcid anyalloke vidyate dharmatāyā dharmasyābhinnatvāt / śeṣaṃ gatārthaṃ / tatve māyopamaparyeṣthau pañcadaśa ślokāḥ /*

> veut; de même, en cas de Révolution du Fond, l´Ascète, n´étant plus tourné à l´envers, se conduit comme il veut" [290]

As was evident in previous parts of the Msa, e.g. XI. 17, the notion of the DN as the cause (*nimitta*) of the IN was linked to the conception of the imagination of the unreal (*abhūtaparikalpa*). When there is no further illusion (*bhrānti*), due to the bifurcation of the imagination, the ascetic (*yati*) acts freely when there is a shift of basis (*paravṛtta*).

Further on in the Msa, we find XI. 41, which explicitly defines the CN:

> "Existence, inexistence, existence et inexistence tout ensemble, en état de Paix et non, sans différenciation, c´est l´Indice Absolu."[291]

This way of expressing the relation between the three natures , as we have seen,is quite frequent.[292]. The ontological categories of existence (*bhāva*) and non-existence (*abhāva*) are of course a repetition of the relation between on the first hand the CN and the IN, and on the second hand the CN and the other two natures in the following manner: the CN and the IN are mutually exclusive, since they are epistemological modes of the DN. In other words, when the world is apprehended in dualistic categories, the DN manifests itself as the IN, and when reality is perceived correctly the DN manifests itself as the CN. Hence, the CN is the *non-existence* of the IN in the DN, and at the same time *existing* due to the absence of the IN. The CN is also both existing and not existing for the same reason. Both are modes of the continuous stream of awareness, mutually exclusive, and thus paradoxically, interdependent.

Moreover, it is tranquil (*śānta*), and still not (*aśānta*), once again for the same reason. As a mode of the DN it is part of the defilements keeping the individual in bondage , and as the absence of the IN it is pure by nature.

Lastly, as more of a substantial property, it is said to be unimagination (*avikalpa*) since it is not conceptually diversified (*niṣprapañcatā*). This is the same as saying that it is the absence of the IN in the DN.

Leaving chapter XI, we may consult Msa XIV. 34-35. As it relates all three

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290 Msc: *patiḥ*. read *yatiḥ*. *ex con tib: brcon*. Cf. Lévi 1911, p. 109 n. 18. Msa XI. 18: *tannimitte yathā loko hy abhrāntaḥ kāmataś caret / parāvṛttāvaparyastaḥ kāmacāro tathā yatiḥ* // 18 //

291 Msa XI. 41: *abhāvabhāvatā yā ca bhāvābhāvasamānatā / aśāntaśāntā 'kalpā ca pariniṣpannalakṣaṇam* // 41 //. Msabh XI. 41 runs as follows in my own translation:
The consummated nature (*pariniṣpannalakṣaṇam*) is suchness (*tathatā*) and it is indeed the non-existence of all the imagined dharmas and the existence since it exists by their non-existence. It is the identity of being and not-being from the indivisibility of being and not-being. Not tranquil from the minor defilements, Tranquil since it is purified by nature. Unimagination since the field of imagination is not conceptually diversifying. By this, the threefold character of suchness is illuminated. Its own character, the characteristic of defilement and purification and the character of unimagination. (Msabh ad Msa XI. 41: *pariniṣpannalakṣaṇaṃ punas tathatā sā hy abhāvatā ca sarva dharmāṇāṃ parikalpitā nābhāvatā ca tadbhāvatvena bhāvāt / bhāvābhāvasamānatā ca tayor bhāvābhāvayorabhinnatvāt / aśānta cāgantukair upakleśaiḥ śāntā ca prakṛti pariśuddhatvāt / avikalpā ca vikalpāgocaratvāt niṣprapañcatayā / etena trividhaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ tathatāyāḥ paridīpitaṃ svalakṣaṇaṃ kleśavyavadānalakṣaṇamavikalpalakṣaṇaṃ ca / uktaṃ trividhaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ /*)

292 Cf. e.g. Mvb I. 13; III. 4-6; Msa XI. 22, 27; Tsn 11-13 and Trś 22.

natures to the concept of emptiness (*śūnyatā*), we may notice that the CN is defined as "emptiness by nature" (*prakṛtyā śūnyatā*). The resemblance between this verse and Mvb III. 7ab[293] and possibly also Trś 24 is striking, and in this context it is quite easy to take the author´s point. The IN is empty since it is mere illusion and thus not existing (*abhāvaśūnyatā*); the DN because it is dependent upon other phenomena (*tathābhāvasya śūnyatā*), and hence not having an own nature; lastly, the CN is empty by nature since it is emptiness itself.

> "C´est le point sans-Signe, et c´est la déstruction complète des différenciations. L´Imagination inexistante l´est du Sans-Vœu"[294]

Thus, the CN is an object in a general sense and of the abode (*pada*) which is signless or causeless (*animitta*), where discriminations are annihilated (*vikalpāṇaṃ saṃkṣaya*) and connected to (*praṇihita*), where there is no imagination of the unreal (*abhūtaparikalpa*). Hence, the CN is clearly designated as the mode of awareness which is devoid of conceptual diversifications, since the bifurcation of the mind into a subjective and an objective part has ceased.

In Msa XVIII. 81, as we have seen, there are four concepts associated with the three natures. Among these four, the concept of *vikalpopaśamārtha* translated as "sous-Apaisement de la différenciation" by Lévi, is clearly a property of the CN. As the CN is the absence of the IN in the DN, the extinction of discrimination is therefore easily recognized as defining characteristic of the CN.

We shall pass over Msa XIX. 51 since it has already been examined from the point of view of the CN and merely restate the fact that the CN is said to be the insight which has true reality (*tathatā*) as its object.

In XIX. 77 it was evident that the bodhisattva was claimed to have knowledge of understanding by not understanding (*abodhabodha pratibodha*). Although the verbal root *bodh* does not clearly imply discursive thought, the meaning of this passage should be fairly clear anyway. Since the CN is the absence of duality in the flow of awareness there is a understanding which is due to the absence of another, illusory, understanding.

The very last obvious instance of the CN being mentioned in the Msa is XIX. 79:

> "Il comprend l´Absolu, il comprend le Point, il comprend le sein, il comprend la vue des étapes, il comprend la puissante destruction des doutes; c´est pour cette cause qu´on l´appelle Bodhisattva. "[295]

The bodhisattva, thus needless to say in the context of the Yogācāra view of the path to liberation, comprehends the consummated nature being the correct perspective of beholding reality. This very straight-forward verse may therefore speak for itself and consummate the chapter on the three natures in the Msa.

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293 Cf. note 217.

294 Msa XIV. 35: *animittapadaṃ jñeyaṃ vikalpānāṃ ca saṃkṣaya / abhūtaparikalpaś ca tadapraṇihitasya hi //*

295 Msa XIX. 79: *niṣpannabodhāt padabodhataś ca margānubodhāt kramadarśanasya / bodhād bhṛśaṃ saṃśayahānibodhāt tena ucyate hetu na bodhisattvaḥ //*

5.6 Conclusions

a) The measure of elaboration of each nature.

IN is designated as duality, as the effect of the DN and as merely conventionally real. It is moreover the cause of the conception of the meaning of a verbal utterance, the impression of this in the mind, and the understanding resulting from this impression. It is the perception of an object caused by apprehending a word designating the object, or the word evoked by the perception of an object. Further, it is empty by virtue of itself, since it is unreal, imagined objects.

DN is described as the support of illusion, that is, the basis of the IN as well as the imagination of the unreal, which was evident in the Mvb. As opposed to the IN, it exists ultimately, says Msa XI. 16. It is moreover technically designated as mind (*citta*), which manifests itself as subject and object. These manifestations are defined as the main alledgedly ontological categories of reality, such as, on the objective part abode, objects and corporeal bodies and on the subjective part mind, the receptor and discriminations.

CN is displayed as virtually equivalent to the ultimate (*paramārtha*) defined as non-duality (*advaya*) and from this point of view those phenomena which promote enlightenment have supreme (*paramā*) being. Moreover, it is designated as inexpressible and devoid of conceptual diversity, and as such non-imagination (*avikalpa*). More informally, it is said that there is nothing but the CN in the world. It is also the outcome of the process of the shift of basis and maintained as empty by nature. It is part of the abode which is unconditioned where all discriminations are annihilated, and it has true reality (*tathatā*) as its object.

b) The measure of integration with pan-Buddhist dogma in general and Mahāyā nistic dogma in particular.

As is the case with the Mvb, the TSB in the Msa is quite well integrated with Buddhist dogma, especially that of the Mahāyāna. The career of the bodhisattva and his skilful means are related to the TSB. The CN is equated with the ultimate, and all three natures are empty in their respective ways. The CN which is empty by nature, is also seen as inexpressible and devoid of conceptual diversification. Further, the notion of the two truths is applied on the TSB, and the three natures are linked to the concept of "the shift of basis". The conception of the avoidance of the extremes, as well as the idea of defilement and purification are found in the context of TSB and the connection to *abhidharma* is found as well. Lastly, the contrary concepts of suchness and the mass of badness (*dauṣṭhulyakāya*) may be mentioned.

c) The measure of integration with other Yogācāra tenets.

In conformity with the Mvb, *ālayavijñāna* and *vijñaptimātratā* are not explicitly mentioned in the Msa, though ideas similar to these conceptions are found[296], some of which in the context of TSB. The notion of the three bodies of the Buddha is

[296] Cf. "Conclusions" to Mvb. These concepts are once again found in the commentary, e.g. *ā layavijñāna* in Msabh I. 18 and XIX. 51. The eight-layered psychic complex in the context of TSB is implied in XI. 40 and *ālayavijñāna* is equated with *citta* in XIX. 76. As for *vijñaptimātratā* it is found as a gloss to the exposition of *citta* in Msa XI. 34-35.

explicit in Msa IX. 60-65[297], though not connected to the TSB. The notion of the shift of basis is very common[298] in the Msa and, as has been shown, also in connection with TSB.

d) The measure of logical coherence and elaboration of the internal structure of the TSB.

The very subtle structure of the TSB, accounting for the concept of "emptiness" within the tripartite structure is missing in the Msa. Although emptiness is connected with the TSB in XIV. 34, it is not part of its formal structure, since each nature is treated piecemally. The fundamental pattern of the TSB expressed as DN-IN=CN is unmistakably present. We may note that the CN as the ultimate is related to the IN in several aspects in VI. 1. The structure is further elaborated by the superimposition of the concept of the "two truths" as well as the application of the idea of the avoidance of the extremes. The latter idea is variously expressed in terms of existence and non-existence or absence and presence of one nature in relation to another. In this context the IN and the CN are mutually exclusive and hence interdependent as modes of the DN.

297 Expressed as *nairmānika*, *sāmbhogya* and *svābhāvika* [-*kāya*]. Cf. Nagao 1991, p. 76.
298 Cf. Nagao 1991, *passim.*

6 The Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Msg)

Since the original Sanskrit ms. of the Msg attributed to Asaṅga, is lost only Tibetan and Chinese translations are availible as source-material.[299] In this chapter, I will use and refer to Lamotte´s French translation, as found in his "La somme du grand véhicule d´Asaṅga" while the location of the TSB in his Tibetan edition is found in the overview of the distribution of the three natures in Msg.[300]

The time of its composition is assumed to be the 4:th century [301] and its relative position within Yogācāra chronology is indicated by the commentary by Vasubandhu (*Mahāyānasaṃgrahabhāṣya*) and quotations from Sns, Mvb and Msa found in it [302].

By a glance at the contents of Msg, as seen in the *Prastāvanā*-part, it is evident that all major Yogācāra doctrines are found within it [303]. Thus, chapter one deals with the store-consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*), which is said to be the support of the knowable (*jñeyāśraya*). Chapter two is devoted to characteristics of the knowable (*jñeyalakṣaṇa*), and presents the three natures, while the third chapter displays the doctrine of ideation-only (*vijñaptimātratā*), which is described as the introduction into the characteristics of the knowable (*jñeyalakṣaṇapraveśa*). We also learn from *Prastāvanā* 5 that TSB is important as a means of avoiding the extremes of reification (*samāropa*) and denial (*apavāda*). The tenth chapter deals with Buddhology; here is found the doctrine of the three bodies of the Buddha.

6.1 The distribution of the three natures in the Msg

Ed.	Ch.	Verse	IN	DN	CN	Notes
87	II	1	x	x	x	Suffixed by *-lakṣaṇa*
87-89	-"-	2		x		DN defined as being ideas (*vijñapti*)
90	-"-	3	x			IN as an apparent object (*arthābhāsa*)
90-91	-"-	4	x	x	x	CN is DN minus IN (*arthalakṣaṇa*).
92-106	-"-	5-14	(x)	x		The ideas of II.2 , *vijñaptimātratā* and*ālayavijñāna* discussed. The dream-simile in II.6

[299] Cf. Lamotte 1970, tome 1, avant-propos p. V-VI; Nakamura 1989, p. 109 and 264. In n. 1 on p. 264 reference is made to T. Hayashiya who is said to have asserted that the major works by Asaṅga were composed between 333 and 353. Also Powers 1991, p. 24 f. Cf. also Schmithausen 1987, part I p. 100 f.
[300] Lamotte, *op. cit.*
[301] Cf. Lamotte 1970, tome 2, avant-propos p. V. On relative chronology Cf. Schmithausen 1987, part I p 11 where he adopts the textual chronology adopted by me. He states, however, that the view that sūtras precede śāstras is bound to lead us astray. References to the Msg are listed under the entry "Mahāyānasaṃgraha" in *op. cit.* part II p. 665-66.
[302] Msg II. 7 quotes Sns VIII. 7 and III. 9 quotes Msa XI. 24.
[303] Cf. *Prastāvanā* 3.

107-8	-”-	15	x	x	x	Suffixed by °*svabhāva*
108-10	-”-	16	x	x		*parikalpa* and *parikalpya* = IN DN = *parikalpya*
110	-”-	17	x	x	x	DN is both IN and CN in a sense
110-11	-”-	18	x	x	x	Two kinds of each nature
111-12	-”-	19	x			Nine kinds of imagination (*parikalpa*)
112-15	-”-	20	x			Ten kinds of discrimination (*vikalpa*)
115-18	-”-	21-22	x			*vikalpa* discussed
118	-”-	23	x	x	x	DN related to IN and CN
118-19	-”-	24	x	x		DN is not the IN
120	-”-	25		x	x	The CN presupposes the DN.
120-22	-”-	26	x	x	x	Similes to the IN and DN. CN is the pure phenomenon
122-24	-”-	27		x		The DN-similes in II. 26 explained
124-25	-”-	28	x	x	x	DN is IN as *saṃsāra* and CN as *nirvāṇa*
125-26	-”-	29	x	x	x	The ”clay as an embryo of gold”-simile
126-28	-”-	30	x	x	x	TSB related to *niḥsvabhāva* [-*tā*]
132-34	-”-	32	x	x	x	TSB related to *pratītyasamutpāda*

6.2 Analytical survey

There are three natures (1) of which the dependent nature comprises the ideas originating in the store-consciousness and consist of the imagination of the unreal (2). The imagined nature is the manifestation of an apparent object which does not exist, since all is ideation-only (3). The consummated nature is the absence of the imagined nature in the dependent nature (4). These ideas are analysed (5), and the doctrine of ideation-only is established by means of the dream-simile (6) deduction and tradition (7-12). The relationship between the store-consciousness and its ideas is clarified by the use of the concepts of an image- (*nimitta*) and a view- (*darśana*) part (13). The investigation of ideation-only is continued (14). The denotations and connotations of the three natures are described (15). An imagination and something imagined are required to form an IN. The former is the thinking consciousness (*manovijñāna*) and the latter the DN. The IN is the form in which the DN is imagined (16). The three natures are neither identical nor different from each other (17). Each nature is of two kinds (18). There are nine kinds of imagination (*parikalpa*), and ten kinds of discrimination (*vikalpa*) (19-22). The DN comprises the other two natures in a sense but they are not identical (23). The DN is not the same as the IN or CN, since it presupposes both of them (24-25). Similes to the IN and DN are introduced, and the CN is said to be the fourfold pure phenomenon (26). The similes to the DN are expounded (27). The DN as imagined is *saṃsāra*, and as consummated it is *nirvā ṇa* (28). This doctrine is explained by the introduction of the ”clay as an embryo of gold”-simile (29). The three natures are related to the absence of own-being (*niḥsvabhāvatā*) (30), and to dependent co-origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*) (32).

6.3 The dependent nature in the Msg

The three natures are introduced in II. 1. Again we may note that °*lakṣaṇa-* and °*svabhāva-* are interchangeable in this context. The DN is the first nature to be defined. Thus II. 2:

> "Qu´est le caractère dépendant (*paratantralakṣaṇa*) ? - Ce sont les idées (*vijñapti*) qui ont la connaissance-réceptacle pour germe (*bīja*) et qui ressortissent (*saṃgṛhīta*) à l´imagination fausse (*abhūtaparikalpa*)..."[304]

There are som key-concepts, some of which will return throughout the chapter. First of all there is the concept of ideas (*vijñapti*), which constitutes the DN. As would be expected in an idealistic system, everything is ideation, even those things that we would assert as objectively and extra-mentally real. Since this theme is by far the most elaborated in this chapter, I will return to the other key-concepts and deal with ideas when II. 5 is examined.

The origin of these ideas is the store-consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*), which, by necessity, has a place of its own within the psychic complex. The perpetual cyclic process by which impressions (*vāsanā*) are stored in it and, like seeds (*bīja*), ripen into new impressions, maintains the DN as the receptacle of the only ideationally real. These ideas are the imagination of the unreal (*abhūtaparikalpa*), which is an expression of the DN. The imagination hence exists, but not in the unreal way it is expressed. Msg II.2 continues:

> "Le support de la manifestation (*ābhāsāśraya*) d´une chose (*artha*) inexistante (*asat*) et fictive (*bhrānta*) est nommé caractère dépendant."[305]

The DN is clearly proclaimed as ideas issuing forth from the store-consciousness and expressed in the imagination of the unreal, which is the locus and necessary condition of the imagined nature.

Now, these ideas of various kinds are enumerated in II. 2, and elaborated in II. 5. They comprise all major ontological categories such as spatiality, temporality, and the components of the cognitive process. In II. 5 we are also told that the last six kinds of ideas are modalities of the first five, which correspond to the old formula of the eighteen *dhātus*.[306]

> "Parmi [les idées énumerées au § 2], l´idée du corps, du possesseur du corps et du jouisseur (*dehadehibhoktṛvijñapi*), c´est les six éléments internes (*ādhyā tmikadhātu*), œil, etc. L´idée qui est connu par les précédentes (*tadupabhuktavijñapti*), c´est les six éléments externes (*bāhyadhātu*), couleur, etc. L´idée qui connaît la précédente (*tadupabhoktṛvijñapti*), c´est les six éléments, connaissance, etc. (*cakṣurvijñānādiṣaḍdhātu*)..." [307]

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[304] Lamotte, *op. cit.* p. 87-88.
[305] Lamotte, *op. cit.* p. 89.
[306] Cf. e.g Stcherbatsky *op. cit.* p. 9 f. Also Adk I. 16 f. on *dhātu.* Although the word also appears in Yogācāra works in the sense of "cause" or "basis" (Cf. Nagao 1991, p. 143-45 and notes 26 and 31) its more *abhidharmic* meaning here is quite obvious.
[307] Lamotte, *op. cit.* p. 92

It is evident that by including all these categories, the subjective as well as the objective aspects of reality are included within the ideational framework.

Since this part which includes II.5-14, mainly discusses the doctrine of "ideation-only."[308], I shall not dwell long on it but confine myself to some noteworthy observations. By means of the dream-simile in II. 6 [309] the author tries to establish an analogy between the awakening from a dream and the realization of its subjective contents one the one hand and the enlightened awakening from the illusion of an extra-mental reality and the subsequent state of ideation-only on the other. What is transferred here is obviously not the relation between an illusory dream-state and the realization of an objective and "real" reality to the problem of "ideation-only". It is rather the transference, by means of an analogy, of the relation between an illusion and the inability to realize its unreality when you are in this state.

Referring to Sns VIII. 7, Msg II. 7 presents the notion of the identity between the images perceived in meditation and the perceiving mind, in order to establish "ideation-only" by reference to canonical tradition. This logical necessity is continued in II. 13, where the notion of the "store-consciousness" is brought within the conceptual framework of the doctrine of "ideation-only":

> "Quand on considère l´idée de connaissance-réceptacle (*ālayavijñānavijñapti*) comme une idée objective (*arthavijñapti*), alors on doit reconnaître (*veditavyam*) que toutes les autres idées (*tadanyavijñapti*) forment son idée-image (*nimittavijñapti*), tandis que l´idée de connaissance mentale (*manovijñā navijñapti*), avec le support (*sāśrayam*), forme son idée-vision (*darśanavijñapti*). Les idée-images (*nimittībhūtā vijñaptiḥ*) étant l´image engendrant la vision (*darśanotpādanimitta*), apparaissent comme objet (*arthavad ābhāsante*) et jouent, à l´égard de la [vision], le rôle de support de naissance (*utpādāśraya*). C´est ainsi qu´on établit l´existence du Rien qu´idée (*vijñaptimātratā*)."[310]

The cognitive flow, the "store-consciousness", bifurcates into the form-part, being the images perceived and the seeing part, being the perceiving "thinking consciousness". Both these parts correspond to the grasped (*grāhya*) objective idea and to the grasping (*grāhaka*), subjective idea. These perceived forms originate the seeing and appear as objects. Hence, the seeds of impressions in the "store-consciousness" evolve into the seen part and transform it into a seeing part, not the other way around. This is, in other words, the process by which the stream of awareness evolves into duality, the process by which the dependent nature becomes the imagined nature.[311]

In Msg II. 15 the connotations and denotations of the words for the three natures are investigated. Given the definition of the DN as being "ideation-only" and the

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[308] Cf. the note to II. 7 in Lamotte 1970, tome 2, notes et références p. 18*, §7: "La démonstration de la Vijñaptimātratā sera continuée aux § 11 et 14."

[309] The dream-simile is also found in Las, p. 38; Vś and Vśvṛ 16-17; Mvbbh V. 17; Vms p. 429. Cf. also Hattori 1982, p. 235 ff.

[310] Lamotte, *op. cit.* p. 103.

[311] This process is described in detail in La Vallée Poussin 1935, p. 153 f.f. Cf. also the discussion in Nagao 1991, p. 125 f.f.

support of the IN, the question is asked why it is dependent and why it is denoted as such:

> "-Parce qu´elle est issue (*utpanna*) de ses propres imprégnations-germes (*vā sanābīja*), elle est dépendante des conditions. Parce que, après sa naissance, elle est incapable de subsister par elle-même (*svataḥ*) un seul instant, elle est nommée dépendante."[312]

We can once again see that the DN is the very activity issuing forth from the "store-consciousness" by its own impression-seeds. To account for the axiomatic karmic process within the ideational structure, the DN must depend on previous causes *within* itself. Each cognition is the effect of previous impressions, hence it is dependent. The designation "dependent" is thus relevant since the DN by its nature conforms to the law of dependent co-origination.

In II. 16 mainly the IN is analysed. We are taught that it takes an imagination (*parikalpa*) and an imagined (*parikalpya*) to make an imagined nature (*parikalpitasvabhāva*). Of these, of course, the DN is the imagined, being as we have seen, the raw material out of which the unreal object is created:

> "La nature imaginaire, c´est l´aspect (*ākāra*) sous lequel on imagine la nature dépendante."[313]

To the question posed in II. 17, as to whether the three natures are different (*bhinna*) or identical (*abhinna*), the answer is, not unexpectedly, that they are neither. The DN is said to be dependent in one sense (*paryāya*)[314], imagined in another, and consummated in still another:

> "En quel sens la nature dépendante est-elle «dépendante» ? - En tant qu´elle dépend d´autre chose pour naître: les imprégnations-germes (*vāsanābīja*)
> En quel sens est-elle «imaginaire» ? - En tant qu´elle est objet (*nimitta*) de l´imagination (*parikalpa*) et qu´elle est imaginée (*parikalpita*) par cette dernière.
> En quel sense est-elle «absolue» ? - En tant qu´elle n´existe absolument pas (*āyantikābhāva*) de la façon dont elle est imaginée."[315]

The DN is thus seen both as the basis of reality, as the flow of awareness which can assume the imagined as well as the consummated nature, and then again not quite, since it is the CN which is the absolute. This must be so, since the CN is defined as

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[312] Lamotte, *op. cit.* p. 107.
[313] Lamotte, *op. cit.* p. 109.
[314] In the context of the "logic of convertibility", Nagao analyses the term *paryāya* and notes that it "...encompasses a wide range of meanings including such meanings as 'mode', 'kind', 'occasion' and so forth. Having the complex of these meanings in mind, paryāyeṇa has been translated as 'from one aspect', a translation that intends the meaning 'convertibility'. While the one reality is convertible to be of the dependent nature on a certain 'occasion', or 'from a perspective', or 'alternately', the same dependent similarly becomes the imagined or the consummated" (Nagao 1991, pp. 133-34).
[315] Lamotte, *op. cit.* p. 110.

the absence of the IN in the DN. Hence, on the ontological level the DN is the fundament, the inevitable stream of cognition, which has to occur to make any desired change possible. On the epistemological level, however, it is a matter of shifting perspective, where mind acts upon itself and assumes another, consummated, nature, which is the ultimately real reality.[316]

In II. 18, the DN and the other natures are said to be twofold. The DN is seen as dependent, first, in a substantial way regarding its function in the psychic complex. Secondly it is stated to be dependent in a formal way with respect to defilement and purification. In other words, it is the soteriological ground by which the imagined which is dependent on it, may disappear and the DN hence shift to its consummated mode.

> "Dans la nature dépendante (*paratantrasvabhāva*), combien y a-t-il d´espèces (*katividha*) ? - Sommairement (*samāsataḥ*), il y en a deux (*dvividha*): 1° dépendence à l´égard des imprégnations-germes (*vāsanābīja*), 2° dépendence consistant en une foncière indifférence (*svabhāvāpariniṣpanna*) à l´égard de la souillure (*saṃkleśa*) et de la purification (*vyavadāna*)."[317]

The perspective enabling an identity between the DN and the other natures in II. 17 is inverted in II. 23. Without actually establishing a proof for the argument that insofar as the DN, in a sense, is either one of the three natures, it is neither of the other two, the point can be taken in the light of II. 17. Substantially the IN and the CN are modes of the DN since it is the stream of awareness which may be changed from within itself and experience duality or pure awareness. Soteriologically, however, it is important that they be separated to enable the shift from the bonds of defilement to the purification that leads to liberation.

The relationship between the DN and the IN is investigated in II. 24. It is argued that the DN is not to be confused with the IN. Among the reasons displayed are the impossibility of the notion (*buddhi*) to exist before the name (*nāman*) does. If the DN and the IN were identical and there is a variety of meanings of a word but only one thing, then the thing would have a variety of natures. Here, of course, name as always, stands for the imagined nature and, hence, notion and thing stand for the dependent nature.

In II. 25 the DN is related to the CN and both are shown to exist by means of deduction: if the DN does not exist as it appears (as IN) and the CN cannot exist without the DN, how come there is not a universal absence of reality ? If the DN and the CN did not exist, defilement and purification would not either. But they do and hence there is no complete absence of reality, and hence again the DN does exist.

A number of similes are introduced in II. 26[318] and elaborated in II. 27 to clarify the significance of the DN. The general shape of the problem is how perception is possible without an extra-mental object. Two examples may suffice to illustrate the argument. Thus II. 27:

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[316] Cf. e.g. Mvb I.5, Tsn 20-21, Trś 21-22 and Vms 530-31.

[317] Lamotte, *op. cit.* p. 110-11.

[318] By reference to the Vaipulyasūtra which is merely an epithet of the Mahāyāna sūtras. Cf. Nakamura 1989, p. 154.

"1. Ils se demandent: « Comment l'inexistant peut-il être perçu (*viṣaya*) ? » Pour écarter cette hésitation, le sūtra compare [la nature dépendant] à une magie (*māyā*)." [319]

"3. Ils se demandent: « Comment, en l'absence d'objet (*asaty arthe*), peut-on subir des impressions (*upabhoga*) agréables ou désagréables (*iṣṭāniṣṭa*) ? » Pour écarter cette hésitation, le sūtra compare la nature dépendant à une rêve (*svapna*)." [320]

In II. 28 the well-known "Clay as an embryo of gold"-simile in II. 29 is anticipated by an exegesis of a statement in the *Brahmaparipṛcchāsūtra* that the Lord (*Bhagavat*) neither sees *saṃsāra* nor *nirvāṇa*. This is interpreted as referring to the DN being both imagined and consummated[321]:

"Bhagavat, en s'exprimant de la sorte, avait en vue l'identité (*nirviṣeśa*) du Saṃsāra et Nirvāṇa. En effet, cette nature dépendant, par sa partie (*bhāga*) imaginaire, est le Saṃsāra ; par sa partie absolue, elle est le Nirvāṇa."[322]

The simile in II. 29 is introduced by reference to the *Abhidharmasūtra* in which the Lord is said to have claimed the existence of three phenomena: The one which is found in the sphere of defilement (*saṃkleśa*), the one which is found in the sphere of purification (*vyavadāna*) and that which is found in both parts of the matter. The intention of these statements, II. 29 continues, is their connection to the three natures insofar as the IN, which is within the DN, is found in the sphere of defilement, whereas the CN, which also is part of the DN, is found in the sphere of purification. Consequently the DN inheres both defilement and purification. The first part of the simile runs thus:

"Ainsi, dans l'argile aurifère, on constate (*upalabhyate*) trois choses: l'élement terre (*pṛthivīdhātu*), la terre (*pṛthivī*) et l'or (*kāñcana*). Dans l'élement terre, la terre qui ne s'y trouve pas est perçue (*upalabhyate*) tandis que l'or qui s'y trouve n'est pas perçu. Quand on a brûlé (*dah-*) l'élemet terre par le feu (*agni*), la terre n'apparaît pas, tandis que l'or apparaît. L'élement terre, quand il apparaît comme terre, a une apparance fausse (*mithyābhāsa*); quand il apparaît comme or, il a une apparance vraie (*tattvābhāsa*). Par conséquent, l'élement terre rentre dans les deux parties à la fois"[323]

II. 29 goes on by connecting this picture to the illustrated matter, that is the three natures, by suggesting that the false imagined nature will appear instead of the consummated as long as the idea (*vijñapti*) is not burned by the fire of intuitive

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[319] Lamotte, *op. cit.* p. 122.
[320] Lamotte, *op. cit.* p. 123.
[321] The designation "clay as an embryo of gold" is quoted from Nagao as the literal translation of *kāñcanagarbhā mṛttikā* though he prefers to call it the "gold-ore"-simile (Nagao 1991, p. 68). As for the *Brahmaparipṛcchāsūtra*, Cf. Lamotte 1970, tome 2, notes et références p. 22* and Nakamura 1989, p. 272 and *loc. cit.* n. 31.
[322] Lamotte, *op. cit.* p. 125. The claim that the DN is both the IN and the CN in a sense was made already in II. 17.
[323] Lamotte, *op. cit.* p. 125-26.

knowledge (*nirvikalpakajñāna*). As would be expected, the consummated nature will appear if intuitive knowledge is applied. Consequently, both the defiled IN and the pure CN are inherent in the dependent nature, which is once again expressed as the imagination of the unreal (*abhūtaparikalpa*).

Once again it is evident that the DN is held to be the necessary prerequisite of human action for liberation. A change of moral attitude as the means of purification requires sentience and the presence of the goal requires a container. The dependent nature supplies both the axiomatic stream of awareness as the substratum of the defiled and a locus for the purified consummated nature.

In II. 30 we find another exegesis. On this occasion, the TSB is used to clarify the seeming inconsistency between contradictory statements about a property of the phenomena, namely that they are said to be both eternal (*nitya*), transitory (*anitya*), and neither. The formal pattern used in II. 28 and 29 is employed to claim that the DN in its consummated aspect is eternal, in its imagined aspect transitory, and, comprising both these aspects it is neither eternal nor transitory. This pattern is applied henceforth on other properties of phenomena. We thus find e.g. the adjective empty (*śūnya*) and its opposite (*aśūnya*) and the absence of this pair (*advaya*) related to the CN, the IN, and the DN respectively. Other properties of importance related to TSB in this manner, are self (*ātman*), [own-] nature (*svabhā va*) and other properties pertaining to the paradox of the phenomena being both dependently originated and, therefore, empty of own being.

Finally, in II. 32, TSB is related to dependent co-origination. First, it is once again stated that the psychic eight-layered complex is kept in motion by the reciprocal influence of the store-consciousness, here called maturing-consciousness (*vipā kavijñāna*), and the empirical consciousnesses. The maturation of the seeds of impressions from the empirical consciousnesses are repeatedly transformed into new impressions *ad infinitum* according to the principle of dependent co-origination. The characters of the phenomena involved in this process are said to be respectively the support (*āśraya*), i.e. the dependent nature, the imagined (*parikalpita*) and the essence of phenomena (*dharmatā*), i.e. the consummated nature.

Conforming to the notion expressed in II. 28-30 that the DN contains both the IN and the CN and that when one of them is seen in the DN, the other is not, II. 32 continues to set the three natures of the phenomena in an epistemological frame of reference:

> "Ainsi, par celui qui ne voit pas la vérité (*adṛṣtatattva*) et par celui qui la voit, c´est simultanément (*ekakāle*) que ces deux caractères [imaginaire et absolu] sont non-perçus (*anupalabdha*) ou perçus (*upalabdha*) comme existants (*sat*) et non-existants (*asat*). Dans la nature dépendante, l´imaginaire fait défaut, mais l´absolu est présent. C´est pourquoi, quand elle naît, si on perçoit son caractère [imaginaire], on ne perçoit pas son caractère [absolu]; si on perçoit son caractère [absolu], on ne perçoit pas son caractère [imaginaire]"[324]

[324] Lamotte, *op. cit.* p. 133-34.

6.4 The imagined nature in the Msg

The IN is first defined in II.3 and we know from the analysis of II. 4 that it is the appearance of an object which is unreal since ideation is all there is:

> "Qu´est le caractère imaginaire (*parikalpitalakṣaṇa*) ? - C´est se manifester avec l´apparance d´un objet (*arhtābhāsa*), alors qu´il n´y pas d´objet, mais rien qu´idée (*vijñaptimātra*)"[325]

The part ranging from II. 5 to II.14 deals, as has been seen, mainly with the DN being ideas, and not primarily with the IN. There are, however, explicit or implicit instances of the IN. In the dream-simile in II. 6, the relation between an illusory dream-state and a real waking-state is superimposed on the existential situation of every-day reality. The impossibility of realizing "ideation-only" while unenlightened by knowledge of the reality (*tattvajñāna*) is equivalent to the mind´s projection of objectively existing objects, which is the imagined nature:

> "De même que la conscience [de la non-objectivité des visions du rêve] manque pendant la rêve, mais apparaît après le réveil, de même la conscience [de la non-objectivité des vision de l´état de veille] manque chez ceux qui n´ont pas été réveillés par le savoir de la réalité, mais apparaît chez ceux que ce savoir a réveillés"[326]

The illustration of how to comprehend "ideation-only" by means of this simile thus hinges on the unability to realize the true nature of an illusion as long as it is experienced. The core of the simile is thus: From the point of view of waking from a dream, the images experienced are false because they are *subjective*. From the point of view of waking enlightened from an ordinary waking state, the perceptual images are false because they are considered *objective*. In this way the tension between the imagined nature and the consummated is clearly displayed.

In II. 13, as was noted, the "store-consciousness" evolves into a "form" (*nimitta*) -part and a "seeing" (*darśana*) -part corresponding to the notion of the grasped (*grā hya*) object and the grasping (*grāhaka*) subject. This end-result of the evolution of the mind is of course the imagined nature. If the description of the IN in II. 3 was a formal one,and in II. 6 an epistemological one, the present description displays the functional aspect of the IN.

In II. 15, the connotation and denotation of the word "imagined" is investigated given the definition of the IN in II. 3 as being the manifestation of an unreal object:

> "Parce qu´elle est la cause génératrice (*utpādanimitta*) des méprises (*viparyā sa*) de la connaissance mentale aux aspects innombrables (*aprameyākāra manovijñāna*) ou imagination (*parikalpa*), elle est imaginaire. Parce qu´elle n´a pas de caractère propre (*svalakṣaṇa*) et qu´elle se présente comme une pure imagination (*parikalpamātra*), elle est nommé imaginaire."[327]

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[325] Lamotte, *op. cit.* p. 90.
[326] Lamotte, *op. cit.* p. 93.
[327] Lamotte, *op. cit.* p. 107. Cf. Mvb III. 7-8 where the IN is said to have "no-characteristic"

Thus, the IN is imagined since it is the generative cause of all the delusions of the "thinking-consciousness", i.e. imagination, which, as has been shown, consists of the bifurcation of the stream of awareness into subject and object. This basic disposition of the mind gives rise to all kinds of illusory convictions about the nature of reality. Furthermore the IN is said to be "imagined" because it has no characteristic of its own, [328] and because it appears as mere imagination.

A more substantial exposition of the process whereby the IN comes into being is displayed in II. 16. This process requires two components to qualify as an imagined nature.

First of all: an imagination (*parikalpa*) which is equated with the thinking consciousness (*manovijñāna*) is involved. The reason for this is that the thinking consciousness inheres discriminations (*vikalpa*). It is kept in continous operation by the seeds of its own impressions of expression (*svābhilāpavāsanā*)[329] and the impressions of expressions of ideas (*vijñapti*). The IN is thus functionally located in the thinking consciousness and operates by the incessant impressions of words and ideas which again evolve. The constructional nature of the IN is evident:

> "Parce qu´elle imagine en construisant de toutes manières, elle est nommée imagination (*sarvathā kalpena parikalpyatīti parikalpaḥ*)"[330]

Secondly, the IN requires a raw material to work upon, which is once again the DN.

We are also taught the functional aspect of IN, and in this context several important aspects of the operation of the imagination are asked:

> "Quel est l´objet (*ālambana*), la préhension des caractéristiques (*nimittodgrahaṇa*), l´adhésion (*abhiniveśa*), l´émission vocale (*vāksamutthā na*), le discursus (*vyavhahāra*) et l´imputation (*samāropa*) par lesquels elle imagine ?"[331]

(*alakṣaṇa*), which may be equivalent to claiming that it has no "own-characteristic". As for *viparyāsa*. Cf. Adk III. 16, V. 8-9, VI. 15 and ch. IX p. 252. Thus Adk V. 8: "Il y a quatre méprises: prendre ce qui est impermanent (*anitya*) pour permanent (*nitya*), ce qui est douloureux (*duḥkha*) pour heureux (*sukha*), ce qui est impur (*aśuci, aśubha*) pour pur (*śuci*); ce qui n´est pas un «soi» (*anātman*) pour un soi (*ātman*)." In the context of the refutation of the notion of a person (*pudgala*) it is said in Adk ch IX: "Fort bien; mais il s´ensuit que le Pudgala ne peut être discerné par la connaissance mentale, car le Sūtra établit clairement que la connaissance mentale nait en raison de deux conditions, l´organe mentale (*manas*) et les *dharmas*. - Comment d´ailleurs expliquerez-vous le Sūtra qui dit: « Reconnaître un moi dans ce qui n´est pas moi, c´est méprise de notion, de pensée, de vue » ?" (p. 252 in la Vallée Poussin 1971, tome V.) *Svalakṣaṇa* in Adk VI. 14: "...Le caractère propre, c´est-à-dire la nature propre (*svabhāva*)."

[328] The concept must be interpreted by reference to the concept of *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* which stands for "generality", i.e. those characteristics common to all conditioned entities such as impermanence, suffering, emptiness and selflessness. Hence, *svalakṣaṇa* stands for "individuality", the characteristic marks which distinguish one class from another. An entity without an individual characteristic is therefore non-existent.

[329] *Abhilāpa* is found in Las II. 175 and X. 167 (as *anabhilāpyā*) and in Adk VI. 15. The location of *abhilāpa* in the sphere of existence where *saṃvṛti* is applied is indicated by the the fact that *paramārtha* is considered unthinkable (*acintya*), inexpressible (*anabhilāpya*) and unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*). (Cf. Nagao 1991, p. 15). Hence,*abhilāpa* is part of the conventional language which is practical but unreal.

[330] Lamotte, *op. cit.* p. 108.

[331] Lamotte, *op. cit.* p. 109.

From II. 24 we know that the IN grasps its unreal object by the name (*nāman*) which evokes the image of the object in the mind of the beholder. As for the grasping of marks (*nimittodgrahaṇa*), we have seen in II. 17 that the DN is imagined in the sense that it is the object (*nimitta*) of the imagination. Hence these marks are grasped in the DN which acts as the logically required raw-material of which the imagined nature is compunded. The clinging (*abhiniveśa*) to the DN is due to the perverted views (*dṛṣṭi*) which originate from the vrong view of a self (*ātmadṛṣṭi*)[332] It uses language and sends out words (*vāksamutthāna*) by reasoning (*vitarka*)[333] Verbal designations (*vyavahāra*) used are fourfold,[334] that is, the language used by the imagination stemming from what is seen, heard, thought and experienced. Lastly we are told that the imagination reificates by attributing existence to an unexisting object. This is perhaps the most conspicuous of all the activities of the IN, and this unreal projection is often, as we have seen, used in similes to depict the unreal nature of the IN.

In II. 18, as has been noticed, all three natures are said to be twofold and as for the IN it runs:

> "...elle aussi, est double, car elle est imaginé par l'imagination créant une nature propre (*svabhāvaparikalpa*) et par l'imagination créant des spécifications (*viśeṣaparikalpa*)."[335]

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[332] Cf. Msg II. 20 where *Abhiniveśavikalpa* is the idea adhering to erroneous views. It is held to be associted with the 62 kinds of views which originate from the view of a self which comes from a reflexion which is not correct (*ayoniśomanasikāra*). Adk V. 7 is devoted to the five views: view of I and mine (*ātmātmīya*), view of eternity and destruction (*dhruvoccheda*), view of denial (*nā sti*), view of high and low (*hīnocca*) and view of cause and path (*hetvamārga*). The commentary glosses view of I and mine as view of a self (*satkāyadṛṣṭi*), view of eternity and destruction as view of grasping the extremes (*antagrāhadṛṣṭi*). As for the extremes, cf. Eckel 1985, p. 30 on nihilism (*ucchedavāda*) and eternalism (*śāśvatavāda*). Further on it glosses view of denial as erroneous view (*mithyādṛṣṭi*), view of high and low as consideration of views (*dṛṣṭiparāmarśa*) and view of cause and path as consideration of moral and rituals (*śīlavrataparāmarśa*). Cf. also notes to Adk V.7. Vasubandhu's commentary on Adk corresponds perfectly to Sthiramati's commentary on *dṛṣṭi* in Trś 12.Cf. also *Dīghanikāya* I. p. 12-39 and *Saṃyuttanikāya* IV. p. 286.

[333] In the *abhidharma* of Trś 14, *vitarka* and *vicāra* (deliberation), although numbered among the secondary defilements (*upakleśa*), they can be either beneficials (*kuśala*) or defilements (*kleśa*). Trśbh explains *vitarka* as an indistinct state of mind (citta), a volitional and constructing discernment by *manas*. Cf. also PSP 4. In Adk I. 33 Vasubandhu presents the opinion of the Vaibhāṣika to whom both *vitarka* and *vicāra* are considered to coexist within the five sensory consciousnesses. Vasubandhu's own view is found in Adk II. 33. He appears to claim that they do not co-exist, they are rather consequtive; *vicāra* follows from *vitarka*. A discussion of these matters is found in Anacker 1984, p. 77 n. 14. Chatterjee says: "vitarka is 'what is this ?'. Vicāra is 'this is that'". (Chatterjee 1975, pp. 122-123)

[334] Cf. Sns II.3: "Celui qui s'est longtemps complu et réjoui dans l'expérience de ce qu'il a vu, ouî, connu et senti, est incapable de conjecturer, d'inférer ou d'apprécier le Nirvāṇa qui coupe toute expérience et détruit la personnalité" Part of the Sanskrit is reconstructed by Lamotte thus: *dṛṣṭaśrutamatavijñātavyavahāra*. Cf. also Sns IX. 14. In Adk IV. 75, the meaning of the four words is explained.

[335] Lamotte, *op. cit.* p. 111. There are numerous lists of *vikalpa, parikalpa, kalpa* and *vikṣepa*, the textual location of which are indicated in the note to Msg II. 18-21 in *op. cit.*, notes et références p. 21*, § 18-21. Is this an echo of Sns VI. 4, where it is said that the IN is names (*nā ma*) and conventional symbols (*saṃketa*) by which own-nature (*svabhāva*) and specifications (*viśeṣa*) are attributed to things (*dharma*) permitting their indication (*prajñapti*) in verbal designations (*vyavahāra*) ?

Thus the IN creates both an own-nature (*svabhāva*) and specifications (*viśeṣa*). From previous descriptions of the IN it is evident that it appears as an extra-mental object which is unreal since all is "ideation-only". To create own-nature amounts to exactly the same. The word "*svabhāva*" is here used in the sense of existing by itself and not dependent on other phenomena. The creation of specifications[336] is the requisite of making an phenomenon individually recognizable.

In the following part, ranging between II. 19 to 23, own-nature and specifications are mentioned among four imaginations in II. 19, and among the ten distractions (*vikṣepa*) of the bodhisattva in II. 21.[337] The antidotes to these distractions are found in II. 22:[338]

> "Pour contrecarrer le concept de nature propre (*svabhāvavikalpa*), il est dit: « La matière, ô Subhūti, n'est rien qu'un mot » (*nāmamātram idaṃ Subhūte yad idaṃ rūpam iti*).
> ...Pour contrecarrer le concept de spécification (*viśeṣavikalpa*), il est dit: « De la nature propre, il n'y a ni naissance, ni destruction, ni souillure, ni purification » (*svabhāvasya hi notpādo na nirodho na saṃkleśo na vyavadānam iti*)[339]

Again, it is clear that the attribution of own-nature to extra-mental objects is the IN, since matter is but a word and hence no entity existing by virtue of itself apart from the mind. As for specification, no indication of individual phenomena is possible since, being dependent, they are empty of own being.

Since the DN's relation to the IN in II. 23-25 has been examined above, I shall confine myself to restate the main themes. In II. 23 the IN and CN are said to be modes of the DN and knowing that the CN is formally defined as the absence of the IN in the DN, the DN cannot be identical to either IN or CN. In II. 24, the difference between the DN and the IN is established by reference to the relationship between name and notion/object.

While, in II. 26 the CN, being explained as the fourfold pure *phenomenon*, is elaborated in II. 26 and the DN is illustrated by means of a number of similes which are further elaborated in II. 27, the IN is merely said to be seen as non-existing.

The celebrated "Clay as an embryo of gold"-simile in II. 29 along with its introduction in II. 28 has already been analysed. Noteworthy is the DN's relation to both IN and CN. Inhering both the IN and the CN and hence both *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa*, the DN serves as a bridging concept, the locus of the absolute and the vehicle of the efforts of liberation. Here, the IN is equated with *saṃsāra*, as we have seen, defilement (*saṃkleśa*) and the false appearance (*mithyābhāsa*) of the DN.

In II. 30 was noted the attempt to reconcile the seemingly contradictory statements about properties of the phenomena by relating the formal pattern of

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[336] As for *viśeṣa*, cf. the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* 7, 8, 25, 31, 37, and 40. This text by Vasubandhu was edited and translated by Lamotte in *ibid.* 1936, pp. 151-263.
[337] Own-being and specification are numbered among the ten imaginations (*parikalpa*) in Msa and Msabh XI. 77. These are also discussed by Nagao in the context of emptiness in Nagao 1991, p. 51-2 and note 2.
[338] In the mss. utilized by Lamotte, II. 22 is either missing or replaced by a quotation from the *Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra*. Cf. also Msa *loc. cit.* and the note to II. 22 in Lamotte *op. cit.*, notes et références p. 21*, § 22.
[339] Lamotte, *op. cit.* p. 116-17.

assertion, negation and exclusive disjunction to the logical structure of TSB as displayed in II. 28 and 29. The logical alternatives chosen also reflect the overriding necessity of avoiding the extremes of reification and denial. The DN, as we have seen, may epistemologically be regarded as imagined and as such partaking in the properties related to *saṃsāra* while regarded as consummated it is designated by concepts related to *nirvāṇa*. This is all well as long as it is a matter of epistemology. However, since the IN and CN are modes of the DN, any statement pertaining to it must refer to its ontological status. Hence, to claim that while the IN is transitory and the CN is eternal, the DN is both transitory and eternal would violate the rule of avoiding the extremes. To claim the transitoriness of the DN would amount to a denial and the claim of its eternality would constitute a reification. The DN is neither, since it is both the IN and the CN. A glance at the properties of dharmas in their imagined mode as e.g. suffering (*duḥkha*), malice (*aśubha*) and empty (*niḥsvabhāva*), makes their *saṃsāric* nature evident.

6.5 The consummated nature in the Msg

The initial definition of the consummated nature is found in II. 4:

> "Enfin, qu´est le caractère absolu (*pariniṣpannalakṣaṇa*) ? - C´est l´absence complète (*ātyantikābhāva*) de tout caractère objectif (*arthalakṣaṇa*) dans le caractère dépendant."[340]

This definition conforms to the typical formal pattern of defining the CN as the DN´s absence of the IN. The IN is indicated by the word *artha* which is part of the definition of the IN in II. 3. Hence, the CN is the epistemological mode of the DN when its objective manifestation has ceased.

Before examining II. 15, we shall briefly return to the dream-simile in II. 6. The purport of the simile was considered obvious. The ideational nature of reality is said to be experienced by those who are awakened (*prabuddha*) by the knowledge of reality (*tattvajñāna*). By applying the definition of CN given in II. 3, it is evident that the absence of the objective character of the DN corresponds to the realization of ideation-only in II. 6. In other words, the stream of awareness which is no longer expressed in duality will remain pure awareness - the consummated nature.

The third part of II. 15 runs as follows:

> "Si la nature absolue (*pariniṣpannasvabhāva*) est l´absence totale (*ātyantikā bhāvalakṣaṇa*) de cette [nature imaginaire dans la nature dépendante], pourquoi est-elle absolue et pourquoi la nomme-t-on absolue ? - Parce qu´elle est immuable (*avikāra*), elle est absolue.
> Parce qu´elle est l´objet [de la pensée] purifiée (*viśuddhālambana*) et la quintessence de tous les bons Dharma (*kuśaladharmaśreṣtha*), on la nomme, à juste titre, absolue."[341]

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340 Lamotte, *op. cit.* p. 90-91.
341 Lamotte, *op. cit.* p. 107-8.

As for the denotation of the CN, II. 15 says that it is immutable (*avikāra*)[342] given the formal definition of CN in II. 4. The meaning of the word "consummated" is thus immutable. The CN, belonging to the realm of *nirvāṇa*, is commonly denoted[343] as the negation of the conditioned and hence ever-changing *saṃsāra*.

Furthermore, it is designated as consummated because it is both the object of the purified thought[344] and the essence of the beneficial dharmas[345]. We have seen before that the CN is connected with purification. In this case it is the object of the purified thought, that is, the CN is experienced when the duality of the IN is removed and there is a state of pure awareness. Since the beneficial dharmas promote liberation, the CN is said to be the very essence of these.

In II. 18 we again encounter the notion of the duplicity of each nature. In the case of the CN, the Msg says:

> "La nature absolue (*pariniṣpannasvabhāva*), elle aussi, est double: elle est absolue en vertu de l´absolu de nature propre (*svabhāvapariniṣpatti*) et en vertu de l´absolu de pureté (*viśuddhipariniṣpatti*)."[346]

The CN is thus considered consummated as, on the one hand, the consummation of the own-nature, and on the other, the consummation of purity. There are at least two ways of interpreting this passage. First, it might seem that both an epistemological and a moral perspective is applied on the CN. That is to say, the CN is consummated as the absence of the imagined in the dependent nature and hence reality seen as it really is - the consummation of the own-nature. The CN is also the purified phenomena, the contemplation of which brings forth enlightenment - the consummation of purity.[347] Secondly, as suggested by the *Upanibandhana* commentary to Msg, the consummation of own-nature is the impure suchness (*samalā tathatā*) and the consummation of purity is pure suchness (*vimalā tathatā*). This interpretation would conform to Mvb 5cd-6ab where it is claimed that the CN is pure and impure being (*samalāmalabhāva*)

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342 Cf. Mvb III. 11cd...*nirvikārāviparyāsapariniṣpattito*, though in Mvbbh ad III. 11, it is written *avikāra*. In both cases it is a determination of the CN.

343 In the Las X. 174 it is designated as (*advaya*) and non-discrimination (*nirvikalpa*) - the very opposites of the IN. Yet it is also portrayed positively as suchness (*tathatā*), as may be noticed in X. 455, as emptiness (*śūnyā*), ultimate limit (*bhūtakoṭi*) and the essence of dharmas (*dharmatā*). In Las X. 418, it is depicted as the very essence of Buddha-hood (*gotraṃ tāthāgatam*). Sns VI. 6 depicts it as suchness and VII. 6 equates it with emptiness regarding the ultimate (*paramā rthaniḥsvabhāvatā*) and selflessness of entities (*dharmanairātmya*).

344 Cf. Sns IV. 8 and VII. 6 where *viśuddhālambana* is equated with the ultimate (*paramārtha*), and Sns VII. 25 where it is said to be the CN.

345 As for beneficial phenomena, i.e. those that promote enlightenment, cf. e.g. Msa XI.37, PSP ch. 4 and Trś 9. These classifify the *caittas* into five groups among which one is the beneficial phenomena. In Trś 8, 9 and 11 the apprehension of the six-fold sense-object is said to be either beneficial, unbeneficial or neither. In Trś 30 the "absolute" is said to be beneficial (*sa evānāsravo dhātur acintyaḥ kuśalo dhruvaḥ*).

346 Lamotte, *op. cit.* p. 111.

347 The notion of "purified" (*viśuddhi*) is of course widespread in Yogācāra texts. Apart from Sns IV. 8, VII. 6 and 25, there is Sns VI. 11 where it is stated that the bodhisattvas who know the CN, know the purified [note: *vyavadāna*] character of things. In Las II. 192 we learn that the ultimate nature of the CN is pure (*śuddha*). The same idea is expressed in Mvb I. 21, III. 5cd-6ab and Tsn 17.

Since II. 23 and 25 which contain references to the CN have already been examined, it will suffice to represent the outline of its treatment in these passages. Inverting the argument in II. 17, II. 23 shows that the three natures are also mutually exclusive - the DN as CN exludes both itself and the IN. In II. 25 the existence of both the DN and the CN is established by means of deduction. The axiomatic status of defilement and purification negates the absence of reality and thereby the existence of the DN and consequently the existence of the CN is proved.

In II. 26 the CN is claimed to be the fourfold pure *phenomenon*: the essential purity, the immaculate purity, the purity of the path leading to the essential purity and the purity of the object creating the path. Thus:

> "La pureté essentielle (*parakṛtivyavadāna*), c´est-à-dire la vraie nature (*tathā ta*), la vacuité (*śūnyatā*), la pointe du réel (*bhūtakoṭi*), le sans-marque (*animitta*), l´absolu (*paramārtha*), et encore l´élément fondamental (*dharmadhatu*)...
> La pureté immaculée (*vaimalyavyavadāna*), c´est-à-dire la même [pureté essentielle] en tant qu´exempte de tout obstacle (*sarvāvaraṇarahita*)...
> La pureté du chemin conduisant à la [pureté essentielle] (*tatprapākaṃ mā rgavyavadānam*) à savoir tous les Dharma auxillaires de l´illumination (*bodhipakṣyadharma*), les vertus (*pāramitā*), etc...
> La pureté d´objet destinée à engendrer le [chemin] (*tajjanārtham ālambanavyavadānam*), c´est-à-dire l´enseignement de la bonne loi du Grand Véhicule (*mahāyānasaddharmadeśanā*). Parce que cet enseignement est cause de pureté (*vyavadānahetu*), il n´est pas imaginaire; parce qu´il est un écoulement (*niṣyanda*) de l'élément fondamental pur (*viśuddhadharmadhatū*), il n´est pas dépendant.[348]

348 Lamotte, *op. cit.* p. 121. As for *tathatā* (suchness) in Yogācāra texts, cf. Las X. 174, 455; Sns VI. 6; Msa XI. 41; TSN 30 and Trś 25. Its presence in the *Ratnagotravibhāga* is indicated by Ruegg in Ruegg 1969, p. 276 and in connection with the MSg in *op. cit.* p. 95. Schmithausen, referring to the Msg (in 1987, pp. 79-80), depicts the Msg´s solution of the problem why supramundane (*lokottara*) knowledge not always arises if its seed (*bīja*), being True Reality, (*tathatā*) is always present. The answer is that such knowledge requires a seed, though not found within the polluted store-consciousness.

Śūnyatā (emptiness) is found e.g. in Las X. 455; Sns VII. 19; VII 29, 30, 31; Mvb I. 2 and III. 7. The affirmative dimension of emptiness, usually defined by the Yogācārins in terms of "presence of an absence" or "being of non-being", is indicated by the equation of emptiness with notions such as those found in the exposition of "the essential purity" in Msg II. 26. This observation is e.g. made in Nagao 1989, p. 214 ff. Ruegg´s treatment of emptiness in the *Ratnagotravibhāga* and Yogācāra works proper is found in Ruegg *op. cit.* p. 313 f. The restatement of Schmithausen´s interpretation of *śūnyatā*in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* is found in Schmithausen 1987, p. 190 ff.

Bhūtakoṭi in the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* was discussed by Ruegg in *op. cit.* p. 163 and on p. 196 in connection with the theory of universal enlightement (*anuttarasamyaksambodhi*). It is also found in Las X. 455.

Animitta (mark-less) as *animittajñāna* (translated as transphenomenal experience) in the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇi* was examined by Schmithausen in *op. cit.*, p. 202 and n. 1326.

The definition of *paramārtha* (the ultimate) in the Rgv is examined in Ruegg *op. cit*. p. 297 f, 309 and 326. *Paramārtha* as it occurs in the *Sacittikā-* and *Acittikā-bhūmiḥ* and the *Paramārthagāthās* of the *Yogācārabhūmi* is found in Schmithausen 1987, p. 220 f.

As for *dharmadhātu*, Ruegg (1969, p. 94 f.) examines the relation between the notion of *gotra* and the concepts listed in Msg II. 26 as found in *Asvabhāva´s commentary. Cf. also p. 315 for

The consummated nature in II. 26 is thus equated with most of the notions related to the conception of the absolute prevalent in Mahāyāna Buddhism. This essential purity becomes immaculate purity when the obstacles (*āvaraṇa*)[349] have been removed. The path leading to this goal consists in enlightenment (*bodhi*) and the ways of achieving it, among other things the ten perfections (*pāramitā*).[350] The purity of the object creating the path is equated with the canonical Mahāyānistic teaching. This is said to be neither imagined since it is caused by purification (*vyavadānahetu*) nor dependent since it is an outflow of the purified realm of phenomena (*viśuddhadharmadhātu*).

The equation of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa in II. 28 and the "clay as an embryo of gold"-simile have already been examined and the relation between the CN and the other natures been clarified as is also the case in II. 30 and 32, why I will not pursue the examination of the three-nature-theory in Msg further.

6.6 Conclusions

a) The measure of elaboration of each nature.

The IN is described as that which manifests itself in the appearance of an object. This is due to mind's bifurcation into a seeing and a seen part which corresponds to the notion of a grasper and a grasped. As such it is the material cause of all mind's delusions. Its imagined nature is furthermore indicated by its lack of own nature (*svalakṣaṇa*). The IN consists, functionally, of an imagination which is equated with the thinking consciousness (*manovijñāna*) and something imagined which is the DN. The IN grasps its unreal object by the name (*nāma*) which evokes the image in the mind of the beholder. The activity of the IN is expressed as due to perverted views (*dṛṣṭi*) and consisting of language, reasoning, verbal designations and reifications. It attributes existence and specified properties to phenomena.

dharmadhātu's relation to *tathāgatagarbha* and p. 323 and 332 for its usage in the Mvb. *Dharmadhātu* in the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇi* is discussed in Schmithausen 1987, pp. 204-6.

[349] Cf. Adk VI. 64, listing *kleśāvaraṇa* and *vimokṣāvaraṇa*and IV. 95-96 listing *karmāvaraṇa, kleśāvaraṇa* and *vipākāvaraṇa.* References to the occurences of different expositions of obstacles are found in La Vallée Poussin 1980, tome III, in the notes on p. 201-2. As for the Mahāyānists :"par *kleśa*et *jñeyāvaraṇa*, désigne non pas les obstacles à la *bhavyatā* à la qualité de pouvoir entrer dans le chemin, mais les obstacles à la délivrance de la pensée" (*loc. cit.*). In the case of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇi*, "the answer of the text is that there are obstructions (*āvaraṇa*) which prevent *tathatā* from becoming the object (and thus the "Seed") of insight" (Schmithausen 1987, p. 79). In Trś 30, and in Sthiramati's commentary on it, the shift of basis (*āśrayasya parāvṛtti*) comes about by the removal of the twofold badness (*dvidhā dauṣṭhulya hānitaḥ*) consisting in removal of the obstacle of defilement (*kleśāvaraṇa*) and of the knowable (*jñeyāvaraṇa*).
Of the two bodies mentioned, i.e. the liberation-body (*vimuktikāya*) and the dharma-body (*dharmakāya*), the former is acquired when obstacle of defilement is removed and the latter when the obstacle of knowable is removed. The first obstacle is related to the *śrāvaka* and is described in Msg ch. IX as the fruit of having suppressed the defilements. The conquering of the obstacle of knowable is related to the bodhisattva and is expressed in the Msg ch. X as the fruit of having acquired wisdom. These matters are discussed in Nagao 1991, p. 24 f. *Dauṣṭhulya* is also found in MVb II. 4-8, 11 concerning *āvaraṇa.*

[350] The perfections are extensively examined in the fourth chapter of the Msg and their relation to the stages (*bhūmi*) is found in Msg V. 5.

The DN is defined as the ideas the origin of which is the storeconsciousness and which consists in the imagination of the unreal. These ideas sort typologically under the categories of the 18 faculties (*dhātu*) which is a clear indication of an intention to cover all reality. It is moreover the very support of the manifestation of a fictive and truly unexisting object, i.e. the IN. As the ever active flow of awareness it bifurcates into a subjective and an objective part. It is expressed as originated by its own impressions and consequent seeds in a virtually endless cyclic process and as such it is utterly dependent on other phenomena for its being. As the very basis of ocurrences of which the IN and the CN are modes it inhers both defilement and purification.

The CN is the complete absence of any objective characteristic of the DN. It is the realization of "ideation-only" by those who have awakened by the knowledge of reality. It is designated as immutable, the object of purified thought and the essence of the beneficial dharmas. It is consummated by virtue of being (*svabhāva*) itself as reality *per se* and also by virtue of purification. This aspect of purity is elaborated by II. 26 into the notion of the fourfold pure phenomenon which is abundantly designated by words indicating the superlative ultimate being.

b) The measure of integration with pan-Buddhist dogma in general and Mahāyā nistic dogma in particular.

The considerable measure of integration of the TSB and major Buddhist concepts is evident from a glance at the Msg. Among numerous explicit and implicit references to such concepts I may suffice to mention a few. The DN´s connection to the 18 faculties, the notion of defilement and purification, the "dream"-simile, and the link to the central concepts of "transitoriness", "duality", "emptiness", "nature" and "self" and their opposites. Furthermore, the functional properties of the IN such as verbal designations, the perverted views and reification are present in the context of the TSB as is also the notions of suchness,ultimat limit, the signless, the ultimate and the realm of dharmas.

c) The measure of integration with other Yogācāra tenets.

There is no doubt that most central Yogācāra tenets are found in TSB-contexts. *Ālayavijñāna* and *vijñaptimātratā* are well integrated with TSB in numerous passages. The idea of the shift of basis is present and the entire chapter X of the Msg is devoted to the three bodies of the Buddha.

d) The measure of logical coherence and elaboration of the internal structure of the TSB.

A large measure of elaboration of the internal structure of TSB in the Msg is obvious. The basic pattern of the TSB which may be formalized as DN-IN=CN is elaborated in various ways. Apart from the close integration of this main structure with the different strata of the eight-layered psychic complex and the conception of *vijñaptimātratā* by means of similes and deduction, there are numerous other examples. The three natures are said to be both different and identical, dual and separated. As the basis of occurences, the DN may be identified with both the IN and the CN and they not to enable liberation. All three natures are defined with reference to each other in both a substantial and a formal manner. The existence of the DN and the CN are both deduced from the axiomatic presence of defilement and

purification and the CN is also shown to be the inversion of the IN by means of application of intuitive knowledge. The notion of the seemingly contradictory properties of phenomena such as "eternity" and "transitoriness" etc are explained by superimposing the structure of the TSB on them. The IN and the CN are mutually exclusive insomuch as both are modes of the DN.

7 The Trisvabhāvanirdeśa (Tsn)

7.1 On Vasubandhu

As for Vasubandhu, the author of *Triṃśikāvijñaptikārikā*, only some very brief remarks on him and his authorship will be made. According to Paramartha[351] (6:th century C. E.), Vasubandhu was born in the beginning of the 4:th century C. E. in Puruṣapura in what was then the kingdom of Gāndhāra by brahmin parents who already had one child, Asaṅga. This Asaṅga, who is the author of e.g. *Mahāyā nasaṃgraha*, is identical to the Āsaṅga mentioned in 2.3., and came to be the catalyst of Vasubandhu´s conversion to Mahāyāna Buddhism. However, before his conversion he studied the *abhidharma* of the Vaibhāṣikas in the Sarvāstivāda order. He then composed his famous *Abhidharmakośa* from the point of view of the Vaibhā ṣikas and later an autocommentary expressing his own Sautrāntika views.

After his conversion he wrote commentaries on the old *Prajñāpāramitā sūtras* and later both Yogācāra and logical works.[352]

There has been a debate on the issue of whether there were one or two Vasubandhus. Erich Frauwallner has argued in favour of the latter opinion[353] and claims that there are facts pointing at two datings of Vasubandhu. Buddhist tradition is supposed to have mixed these two datings. Frauwallner then assumes the existence of two Vasubandhus:

a) Vasubandhu the elder (320-380 C. E.), was the younger brother of Asaṅga the Yogācārin and converted to Mahāyāna in his early years. He commented upon many of the older *sūtras*, upon the works of Maitreya (cf. 2.2.) and the works of Āsaṅga.

b) Vasubandhu the younger (400-480 C.E.) converted to Mahāyāna in his older days. He composed *Abhidharmakośa*, a number of works on logic and finally the Yogācāra works *Viṃśatikā* and *Triṃśikā*.

Examples of proponents of the assumption that there was only one Vasubandhu, are Hajime Sakurabe and Lambert Schmithausen[354].

Modern editions of the Tsn by Vasubandhu[355] are based upon two Sanskrit manuscripts and one or both of the two Tibetan translations[356]. I have used de la

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[351] The exposition of the life of Vasubandhu is based on Anacker 1984, p. 11 ff. Cf. also Nagao 1987 and Takakusu 1905, p. 33 f.

[352] Cf. Nakamura 1989, p. 268 ff. for an exhaustive exposition of the works of Vasubandhu.

[353] Frauwallner´s views can be found in 1951, p. 21 ff. and 1961,*passim*.

[354] As for Sakurabe, cf. Nakamura 1989, p. 268, n. 3. Schmithausen argues in 1967, p. 129 ff. Cf. also Schmithausen 1987, p. 262 f., note 101: "...I use the expression "(works of) Vasubandhu the Kośakāra" when referring to (the author of) Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, Vyākhyāyukti, Karmasiddhi, Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā, Pañcaskandhaka, Viṃśatikā and Triṃśikā /—/"

[355] As for the choice of the abreviation "Tsn", it is mainly a matter of habituation to one of the alternative names of this treatise, *viz. Trisvabhāvanirdeśa.* The alternative names may be found in Tola & Dragonetti 1983, p. 228. As for the authorship of the Tsn and related matters, cf. la Vallée Poussin 1933b, p. 147; Mukhopadhyaya 1939, p. i and v. Note the parallel passages of other, mainly Yogācāra works indicated in pp. 32-48 in *ibid.*; Tola & Dragonetti 1983, pp. 227-28; Nakamura 1989, p. 271 with notes. Note that Schmithausen (1987, p. 263 n. 101) claims that the authorship of the Tsn needs reconsideration due to some doctrinal peculiarities of the group of works to which the Tsn belongs.

[356] Information on these matters may be obtained from e.g. Nakamura, *ibid.*.and Powers 1991, pp. 66-7.

Vallée Poussin´s edition[357] when referring to the Sanskrit text. The disposition of the text which consists of 38 verses[358] and its main contents is as follows:

7.2 An outline of the Tsn

V. 1-5	The three natures are described.
V. 6-9	On the eight consciousnesses and their relation to the DN as imagination of the unreal.
V. 10 ff.	The profundity of the three natures is due to each nature being existent and yet not, dual and unitary, defiled and purified and lastly identical. (Verses 10-21)
V. 11-13	Each nature does exist and yet not.
V. 14-16	Each nature is dual and yet unitary.
V. 17	The IN and the DN are defiled and the CN is purified.
V. 18-21	The three natures are identical.
V. 22 ff.	A certain order within the TSB. (Verses 22-25)
V. 23	The order of the TSB from the point of view of convention.
V. 24-25	The three natures are penetrated in a certain order.
V. 26	The three natures are related to duality.
V. 27-30	The magic-simile illustrates the TSB.
V. 31-34	TSB practically related to knowledge (*parijñā*), cessation (*prahāṇa*) and attainment (*prāpti*)
V. 35-36	Arguments advocating the concept of "ideation-only".
V. 37-38	All this leads to enlightenment which has the nature of the three bodies of the Buddha.

7.3 The three natures in the Tsn

From the disposition above it is clear that an isolated treatment of each nature is impracticable and misgiving, since the text is arranged thematically. I shall therefore mainly pursue the investigation in numeral order. I have consistently quoted from the translation made by de la Vallée Poussin.[359]

The initial verse states that the profound object of investigation is the three natures:

> "Les doctes tiennent que le profond (voir 10) objet de la connaissance est trois natures, *parikalpita, paratantra, parinispanna.*"[360]

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[357] Cf. la Vallée Poussin 1933b, pp. 154-57. The extensively annotated edition by Tola & Dragonetti, *op. cit.* p. 248 f.f. has been consulted as well.

[358] The Tibetan translation attributed, wrongly of course, to Nāgārjuna contains 40 verses.

[359] It is found in la Vallée Poussin 1933b, pp. 157-161.

[360] *kalpitaḥ paratantraś ca pariniṣpanna eva ca / trayaḥ svabhāvā dhīrāṇāṃ gaṃbhīraṃ jñeyam iṣyate* // 1.

This profundity is explained in Tsn 10 as consisting of the three facts:

a) Because defilement and purification are existing and non-existing.
b) Because they are dual and unitary
c) Because the three natures are not different in characteristics.

This link between defilement (*saṃkleśa*) and purification (*vyavadāna*) and TSB is even more evident in Tsn 17 wherein it is said that the IN and the DN are defiled and the CN is purified. [361]

In the four verses following on the initial one, the three natures are presented. In Tsn 2 and 3 their internal relation and the names of the three natures are explained. Thus Tsn 2 and 3:

> "Ce qui apparaît, c´est le *paratantra*, «dépendant», ainsi nommé parce qu´il procède en raison des causes; la manière dont cela apparaît, c´est le *parikalpita*, «imaginaire», parce que ce n´est qu´imagination."[362]

> "L´éternelle inexistence du mode d´apparition de ce qui apparaît, c´est le *parinispannasvabhāva*, «la nature parfaite ou réelle» parce qu´immuable."[363]

Hence, the IN is once again formally defined as the form that the DN may assume and the CN is the absence of this form of the DN. So the DN, which is called *paratantra,* because it is dependent on conditions (*pratyaya*) may therefore assume two modes of being. Either as discriminations (*kalpana*) or as absence of this activity of the mind. As pure awareness the DN becomes the CN since it is thus never otherwise.

Tsn 4-5 goes on to investigate the function of three natures:

> "Qu´est-ce qui apparaît ? Une idée exempte de vérité. Comment cela apparaît-il ? En dualité. Qu´est-ce que l´inexistence de ce mode d´apparition ? La qualité qu´a ce qui apparaît d´être exempt de dualité." [364]

> "Qu´est-ce que l´idée exempte de vérité ? La pensée, parce que celle-ci n´existe absolument pas de la manière dont elle est conçue (comme sujet de connaissance) et de la manière dont elle conçoit les objets." [365]

Thus, in Tsn 4 the question is that of what appears, how it appears and what would be the result of the extinction of this manner of appearance. Since we already know

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361 This link is also very obvious e.g. in Sns VI. 11; VII. 11; in chapter I of the Mvb, esp. I. 21 and Msg II. 18, 25 and 29

362 *yat khyāti paratantro 'sau yathā khyāti sa kalpitaḥ / pratyayādhīnavṛttivāt kalpanāmātrabhāvataḥ // 2*

363 *tasya khyātur yathākhyānaṃ yā sadāvidyamānatā / jñeyaḥ sa pariniṣpannaḥ svabhāvo 'nanyathātvataḥ // 3*

364 *tatra kiṃ khyāty asatkalpaḥ kathaṃ khyāti dvayātmanā / tasya kā nāstitā tena yā tatrā dvayadharmatā // 4*

365 *asatkalpo 'tra kaś cittaṃ yatas tat kalpyate yathā / yathā ca kalpayaty arthaṃ tathātyantaṃ na vidyate // 5*

from the foregoing formal definition of TSB how these conceptions are linked to the TSB, it is evident that the IN is duality (*dvaya*), the DN is the imagination of the unreal (*asatkalpa*)[366] and the CN is the absence of duality (*advaya*) in this imagination. On numerous occasions these concepts have stood as functional expressions of the three natures why Tsn 5 will be examined.

The object of interest here is the imagination of the unreal, which is said to be the mind (*citta*).[367] The reason for this, says the text, is that it does not exist the way it is imagined (*kalpyate*), nor the way it imagines (*kalpayati*) something (*artha*).

Knowing from the preceding verse that the imagination of the unreal, which is the mind, appears in duality, the meaning of Tsn 5 is easier to comprehend. The way it is imagined is the subjective part of mind´s bifurcation, while the way it imagines is the objective part. This would mean that the expression "imagination of the unreal", as well as the question why mind does not exist the way it is imagined and imagines are clear.

The DN is the stream of awareness which does exist, but since it assumes the form of a perceiving subject an a perceived object, it is truly the imagination of the unreal since this duality is deemed illusory. The mind as this duality does not exist.[368] Now, this is no surprise to us since we have been reminded of this in different ways in previous texts.

The next part, Tsn 6-9, relates DN as *citta* to the theory of eight-layered mind. Since a detailed discussion of this dogma lies outside of the scope of thesis, I will present a lengthy quotation of Lambert Schmithausen on this passage:

> "*citta* is divided into ālaya- and pravṛttivijñāna; the former is the cause (*hetu*) and is called '*citta*' because it is an accumulation of (or filled, covered, "set" with) the Seeds [into which] the Impressions of Pollution (i.e. pollutive factors) [turn] (*saṃkleśa-vāsanā-bījais citatvāt*); ālayavijñāna, also called '*mū lavijñāna*', is by nature, [the result of karmic] Maturation (*vipākātmaka*) and thus called '*vaipākiko ´bhūtakalpaḥ*', in contrast to pravṛtti-vijñāna which is *abhūtakalpa* in the sense of arising (*vṛtti*) as the representation or appearance (*vitti*) of either an object (*dṛśya*) or a perception/cognition (*dṛś*) [of an object]. The text thus takes ālayavijñāna as the result of Maturation containing all Seeds but not as an actual cognition of an object /.../."[369]

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366 The words *asatkalpa, abhūtaparikalpa, abhūtakalpa* ,etc, are interchangeable in this and other Yogācāric text since they clearly stand for the same concept, that is that of "imagination".

367 *Citta* as a technical term for the concept of "mind" is quite frequent in Yogācāric texts. Samples of its distribution in mainly the context of TSB are found: Sns VII. 10; Las II. 180, III. 98, IV.2, X. 241, 569; Mvb I. 22, II. 5; Msa XI. 34; Tsn 6, 7, 29 (as *mūlacitta*); Trś 16 (as *acittaka*) and 29.

368 Cf. also Tola & Dragonetti *op. cit.* p. 233 and Kochmutton 1982, p. 91 f. Noteworthy is Nagao´s interpretation of *khyātur* (Nagao: *khyātṛ*) in Tsn 3 translated as "appearer" and designated as a "religiously oriented subject". He correctly identifies it with the DN and, needless to say, I willingly accept his claim that the *concept* of the "appearer" is foundational in the three-nature theory for what is the imagination but the stream of awareness. (Nagao 1989, p. 10 f. and p. 141).

369 Schmithausen 1987, p. 405 (n. 719d). Cf. also p. 102. As for the etymology of the word *citta* in Tsn 7 and elsewhere, cf. *ibid.* p. 536 (n. 1433). Note the three stages of the transformation of the mind (*vaipākika, naimittika* and *prātibhāsika*) in Tsn, which is also found in Trś 1-2. On this matter Cf. also Kochumutton 1982, pp. 94-97.

Next to come is a part which ranges from Tsn 11 to 21 and which deals with TSB under four different themes as indicated in the beginning of this chapter[370]. The first sub-unit comprises verses 11-13 which deals with the statement that the three natures are existent and yet non-existent. This is done, as we have seen in previous texts, in order to avoid the extremes of reification and denial. Thus Tsn 11:

> "Le *parikalpita* est saisi comme existant et n´existe absolument pas; donc on tient qu´il a pour caractères être et non-être."[371]

This means that it would constitute a denial to claim the IN´s utter unreality since it is indeed grasped (*gṛhyate*). How could there be suffering due to illusion otherwise? However, it would be too much of a reification to claim its existence since it is but an imagined mode of the DN.[372]

Tsn 12 which deals with the DN is in fact formally a restatement of Tsn 11 but it does add something more substantial:

> "Le *paratantra* existe d´une existence illusoire, n´existe pas de la manière dont il apparaît: donc: [on tient qu´il a pour caractères être et non-être]."[373]

Thus, formally Tsn 11 says that the IN exists since illusion is experienced but not as a dual mode of the DN. Tsn 12 says that the DN exists as an illusion but not as the IN - in its dual mode. That is, in Tsn 11 the IN exists as DN but not in itself and in Tsn 12 the DN exists as illusion but not in this form. This is mainly a play with words unless we pay attention to the word *form* (*akhyānam*). Remembering Tsn 2 and 4 we may restate the argument in Tsn 12 by saying that the DN exists as illusion (*vidyate bhrānti bhāvena*) since illusion is an act of imagination and hence real but it does not exist in the illusory form that is beheld. To sum up: The IN exists because it is perceived and the DN exists because it is this very act of perception. The IN does not exist as this perceptual form since it is illusory and the DN does not exist either insofar as it assumes this form.

As for Tsn 13 dealing with the CN, we have already met this play with words in Mvb I. 13 and III. 4. Thus Tsn 13:

Tsn 6: *tad dhetuphalabhāvena cittaṃ dvividham iṣyate / yad ālayākhyavijñānaṃ pravṛttyā khyaṃ ca saptadhā //6.*

Tsn 7: *saṃkleśavāsanābījaiś citatvāc cittam ucyate / cittam ādyaṃ dvitīyaṃ tu citrākārapravṛttitaḥ //7.*

Tsn 8: *samāsato 'bhūtakalpaḥ sa caiṣa trividho mataḥ / vāipākikas tathā naimittiko 'nyaḥ prātibhāsikaḥ //8.*

Tsn 9: *prathamo mūlavijñānaṃ tad vipākātmakaṃ yataḥ / anyaḥ pravṛttivijñānaṃ dṛsyadṛgvittivṛttitaḥ //9*

370 Cf. Tsn 10

371 *sattvena gṛhyate yasmād atyantābhāva eva ca / svabhāvaḥ kalpitas tena sadasallakṣaṇo mataḥ // 11*

372 The same line of argument is found e.g. in Msa XI. 16 where the two truths are brought in to account for this, and it may be noticed in Msa XI. 25-26 as well: (...*dvayaṃ tatra yathā nāsti dvayaṃ ca eva upalabhyate*)

373 The words within brackets are added by me for the sake of coherence.
vidyate bhrāntibhāvena yathākhyānaṃ na vidyate / paratantro yatas tena sadasallakṣaṇo mataḥ //12

"Le *parinişpanna*existe en non-dualité existe en non-dualité, est l'absence de dualité: donc [on tient qu'il a pour caractères être et non-être]."[374]

What is said is merely that, in negative terms, that the CN does not exist as duality - as the IN - and that, in positive terms, it does exist as the absence of duality - not as the IN.

The following sub-unit deals with the three natures as both dual (*dvaya*) and unitary (*eka*). As in the preceding part, the analysis made in the Tsn of the IN and the DN are formally very similar.

In Tsn 14 -

"La nature qu'imagine les sots (*parikalpita*) est dualité et unité: car la chose imaginée est de dualité (sujet-objet..) et a pour unique nature l'inexistence de dualité."[375]

- the fools (*bala*), that is the ignorant, merely behold the imagined nature. This IN is dual due to the very nature of the imagined object which we know is the bifurcation of mind into the subjective perceiver and the object perceived. However, this bifurcation is the cleavage of the imagination which is the DN, as Tsn 4 once again may inform. Hence, the IN is by its very definition dual but genetically unitary. The IN is the *dual* outcome of *one* stream of awareness.

By the same argument and for the same reason,the DN is also dual as well as unitary . Thus Tsn 15:

"La nature nommée *paratantra* est dualité et unité: car elle apparaît en dualité et a pour unique nature d'être illusoire."[376]

It appears as duality since the imagination appears in duality but this illusory appearance is just the splitting in two of one cognitive process. There is altogether no duality in the imagination as the Mvb I. 2 would have it. [377]

As the reading of the first part of Tsn 16 is ambiguous, different solutions have been proposed to establish an acceptable interpretation of it [378]. As I hope to have shown in previous chapters, the narrative, and much more so the formal-logical structure of these texts is very rigid and should therefore be the imperative indicator of how to interpret ambiguous readings. By reference to Tsn 10, which expounded

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[374] Words within brackets are mine.
*advayatvena yac cāsti dvayasyābhāva eva ca / svabhāvas tena nişpannaḥ sadasallakṣaṇo mataḥ //*13

[375] *dvaividhyāt kalpitārthasya tadasattvaikabhāvataḥ / svabhāvaḥ kalpito bālair dvayaikatvātmako mataḥ* // 14

[376] *prakyhānād dvayabhāvena bhrāntimātraikabhāvataḥ / svabhāvaḥ paratantrākhyo dvayaikatvā-tmako mataḥ* // 15

[377] *...abhūtaparikalpo 'sti dvayaṃ tatra na vidyate*

[378] Tola & Dragonetti (1983, p. 241) along with la Vallée Poussin (1933b, p. 155) chooses the reading *dvaya-bhāva-svabhāvatvād* which they translate: "because it is nature (only) in relation to duality" (p. 254), other translations deemed contradictory or tautological. Instead they claim that only the CN can be a *svabhāva* in relation to duality. Kochumutton (1982, p. 102), on the other hand, proposes the reading *dvaya-abhāva-svabhāvatvād* which he translates "it is by nature the absence of duality" explicitly accepting that it does not conform to Tsn 10.

the initial verse of the Tsn and the structure of the part consisting of verses 11-13, I support de la Vallée Poussin's translation:[379]

> "La nature *parinișpanna*, de même: car elle est la vraie nature de la dualité et a pour unique nature la non-dualité"[380]

Since *svabhāva* may denote both existence in a general sense as well as the way something may exist, the CN in this verse may be said to be dual since the CN is the absence of the IN in the DN and as such the only reality there is in relation to the IN. It is unitary in the sense that it is the one thing left when the IN has been annihilated. Thus, from the point of view of the IN, that is duality, the CN is its only reality in the general sense and from the point of view of unity, that is, the absence of duality, it is this non-duality's way of being. This paramount complexity comes about, of course, since the CN is the absence of the IN in the DN whilst the CN is defined as non-duality and the IN as duality and then that the CN is to be analysed in the categories of duality and non-duality.

Tsn 17 relates TSB to the concepts of purification (*vyavadāna*) and defilement (*saṃkleśa*), as was stated in Tsn 10:

> "Le *parikalpita* et le *paratantra*, c'est l'obscurcissement; le *parinișpanna* , c'est la purification."[381]

This way of relating the three natures to purification and defilement is familiar though the structure of Tsn 17 seems asymmetrical. From the Sns, the Mvb and the Msg, we know that the logical structure of this relation is that the DN in its imagined mode is defiled and in its consummated mode purified,[382] while this symmetry is absent in Tsn 17. Now, this may not seem a serious problem but in view of the symmetry shown in previous texts and having the internal structure of the TSB (CN = DN - IN) well displayed in Tsn 1-5, it needs consideration. Merely ignoring it like Tola & Dragonetti[383] will not suffice and disfiguring the structure like Kochumutton will only confuse matters.[384] Noting the same pattern in Tsn 20 - 21,

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379 Note his *apparatus* on p. 155.

380 *dvayabhāvasvabhāvatvād advayaikasvabhāvataḥ / svabhāvaḥ parinișpanno dvayaikatvātmako mataḥ //* 16

381 *kalpitaḥ paratantraś ca jñeyaṃ saṃkleśalakṣaṇam / parinișpanna iṣtas tu vyavadānasya lakṣaṇam //*17

382 Cf. Sns VI. 11-12, where the IN is equated with "things without nature", the DN with "defiled things" and the CN with "purified things". Mvb I. 1 and I. 21 indicate clearly that the DN as duality (IN) is defiled, and as emptiness (CN) is purified. In Msg II. 18 and 28-29 we find the notion of the IN belonging to the DN as defilement, the CN belonging to the DN as purification and that both are inherent in the DN.

383 "The first two natures constitute the realm of duality, of impurity; the third one the realm of non-duality, of purity" (1983, p. 242).

384 "...although one can speak of *three* natures, as a matter of fact there are only *two* of them /.../ Vasubandhu is somehow admitting that the distinction between *paratantra-svabhāva* and *parikalpita-svabhāva* is not to be taken too seriously..." This is quite contrary to the, I am sure, common view on these matters as expressed by e.g. Eckel 1985, p. 34 f. and Nagao 1991, p. 10 ff. and 123 ff.

it is contradictory that the IN and the DN would be almost identical. We would be left with two conflicting equations: DN - IN = CN and IN = DN ≠ CN.

Rather, as I have argued before, a key to the interpretation of seemingly contradictory or ambiguous statements is to be found in the very formal structure of the text itself and the arguments used in it.

None of the scholars just mentioned seem to have noticed that the following sub-unit contains four verses which relate the CN either to the IN or to the DN, but *not the DN to the IN*, in contrast to the previous two parts containing three verses each, representing all three natures.

Graphically, the relations in Tsn 18 - 21 superimposed on the pattern in Tsn 17 could be represented as follows:

DN (defiled) <-> CN (purified) <-> IN (defiled)

Thus, the CN is the key term in this pattern. The alternative of almost equalizing the IN and the DN has been found contradictory, since the relationship between the three natures is established in previous texts, in Tsn 1-5 and also in Tsn 20 - 21 which is part of this sub-unit. What is left is very obvious from the figure. Tsn 17 and 18 - 21 is written from the perspective of the CN as the purified nature, while at the same time the fundamental structure of the TSB is affirmed.

In Tsn 18 the CN is claimed not to be different from the IN and in Tsn 19 the same is said from the point of view of the IN:

> "Le *niṣpanna* ne diffère pas du *kalpita*, parce que le second a pour nature la dualité qui n´existe pas, parce que le premier a pour nature l´inexistence de cette dualité." [385]

> "Le *kalpita*ne diffère pas du *niṣpanna*, parce que le second a pour nature l´inexistence de la dualité, parce que le premier a pour nature la non-dualité."[386]

Again a play with words. In both verses, the nature of the IN is said to be non-existing duality and the nature of the CN is non-existence of duality. Ontologically, the IN is duality but it does not exist while the CN does exist but not in duality. The existence of the IN excludes the existence of the CN and vice versa.

Tsn 20 - 21 maintains that the CN is not different from the DN from the point of view of both natures:

> "Le *niṣpanna* ne diffère pas du *paratantra*, parce que le second n´existe pas comme il apparaît, parce que le premier a pour nature l´inexistence de ce mode d´apparition."[387]

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[385] *asaddvayasvabhāvatvāt tadabhāvasvabhāvataḥ / svabhāvāt kalpitāj jñeyo niṣpanno 'bhinnalakṣaṇaḥ* // 18

[386] *advayatvasvabhāvatvād dvayābhāvasvabhāvataḥ / niṣpannāt kalpitaś caiva vijñeyo 'bhinnalakṣaṇaḥ* // 19

[387] *yathākhyānam asadbhāvāt tathāsattvasvabhāvataḥ / svabhāvāt paratantrākhyān niṣpanno 'bhinnalakṣaṇaḥ* // 20

"Le *paratantra*ne diffère pas du *niṣpanna*, parce que le second est la naturre propre de la dualité qui n´existe pas, parce que le premier n´a pas pour nature son mode d´apparition."[388]

„That is to say that the DN does not exist in its IN mode and the CN is the very absence of the IN-mode of the DN.

To sum up, in Tsn 17 the IN and the DN were said to be defiled and the CN to be purified. In 18 - 21 the IN and the DN were not compared with each other though both were formally related to the CN from the perspective of purification. In 20 - 21 it was obvious that the point of comparison was the IN and not the DN. In all four verses the tension between duality and non-duality was the main theme. It was also evident that the basic pattern "DN - IN = CN" was the guiding structure.

The conclusion in view of what has been observed is that from Tsn 17 to 21, duality and non-duality, the IN and the CN, defilement and purification, have been contrasted. But this contrast between bondage and liberation was shown by the very structure of the TSB to be possible only on the basis of the dependent nature, the locus of awareness.

From the disposition we can see that Tsn 22 introduces a part (23 - 25) dealing with the three natures:

"Expliquons l´ordre des natures du point de vue du *vyavahāra* et du point de vue de l´entrée dans ces natures."[389]

In Tsn 23 this is made from the point of view of convention (*vyavahāra*) and in Tsn 24 - 25 from the point of view of penetration (*praveśa*). This is to be done in a particular order (*kramabheda*), DN, IN, CN, which is indicated in Tsn 24 - 25.

Thus, in Tsn 23 all three natures are related to convention, [390] that is, the reality which is designated by words - every-day reality:

"Le *kalpita* est le *vyavahāra*; le seconde nature (*paratantra*) est le *vyavahārtar* ; la troisième nature (*parinispanna*) est la coupure de *vyavahāra*.[391]

Hence, at the pivoting point stands the "creator of conventional reality" as the DN, which of course is equivalent to "that which appears" (*khyātṛ*) in Tsn 3. The DN as the imagination of the unreal is thereby given another nuance, that of the verbally active religious subject or in the words of Nagao "transactor of linguistic

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[388] *asaddvayasvabhāvatvād yathākhyānāsvabhāvataḥ / niṣpannāt paratantro 'pi vijñeyo 'bhinnalakṣaṇaḥ* // 21

[389] *kramabhedaḥ svabhāvānāṃ vyavahārādhikārataḥ / tatpraveśādhikārāc ca vyutpattyarthaṃ vidhīyate* // 22

[390] Cf. Nagao 1991, p. 14 ff. and p. 45 ff. La Vallée Poussin (1933b, p. 159) comments: "...il faut entendre l´existence expérimentale, ce qui exist au point de la verité relative: objet et sujet de la connaissance. Tout cela n´est que «représentation» en dualité /—/" This is in accord with the Mā dhyamika, esp. Candrakīrti´s definition of *saṃvṛti*. (Cf. Nagao *loc. cit.*). The usage of the concept of [verbal] convention (*vyavahāra*) in e.g. the context of the IN is quite widespread, e.g.: Las II. 144 (= X. 89), X. 430; Sns I. 2, II. 2-4, V. 2, VI. 4, 9; VII. 10, 13; IX. 14, X. 7 and Msg II. 19.

[391] *kalpito vyavahārātmā vyavahartrātmako 'paraḥ / vyavahārasamucchedaḥ svabhāvaś cānya iṣyate* // 23

conventions".[392] Apart from the DN's role as the stream of awareness which bifurcates into subject and object, we may discern the medium by which this is done, namely language. In this context the IN is of course the verbal designations as the outcome of DN's activities and in conformity with the basic pattern of the TSB the CN is the destruction (*samucceda*) of this conventionally built description of reality.

Now, how are the three natures to be penetrated and in what order ? The order indicated in Tsn 24 - 25 is DN, IN, CN which is quite logical. It must be remembered that from the ontological point of view it has been shown evident that the one thing which has to be existent is the DN. The IN and the CN are epistemological modes of the DN. From the point of view of liberation, the religious subject must first apply introspection which will gradually result in the realization of the imagined nature of her experience. From this will, ideally, follow a gradual elimination of the unreal imaginations, the cessation of the conventional way of apprehending and eventually a pure flow of awareness which is no longer bifurcated into the duality of subject and object.

Hence, the order is bound to be the one displayed in Tsn 24-25:[393]

> "On entre d'abord dans le *paratantra* qui consiste dans l'absence de dualité; on entre ensuite dans le «rien qu'imagination» (*kalpamātra* = *parikalpita*), dualité inexistante, qui s'y trouve [: qui est installé faussement dans le *paratantra*]."[394]

> "On entre ensuite dans le *niṣpanna*, absence de dualité, qui s'y trouve [: qui est la vraie nature su *paratantra*]. Ainsi dit-on alors de lui [du *paratantra*] qu'il est et n'est pas."[395]

In other words, first there is an introspection by the DN into itself. The DN is in itself free from duality, but the dual way in which it has developed is there, though this IN is really non-existent. It is imagination only (*kalpamātra*) and as such, of an illusory nature. The next step is the destruction of this duality, which results in the consummated nature, which of course, is a potential within the DN.

Once again the basic pattern which poses the DN as the substrate of all experience is established: the IN as non-existing duality (*asaddvaya*) is in it (*tatra*) as well as the CN as absence of duality (*dvayābhava*) is in it (*atra*).

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392 Nagao 1991, p. 11. La Vallée Poussin explains it as "la matière de la représentation" (1933b, p. 159).

393 La Vallée Poussin (*ibid.*) claims that this contradicts the Vms p. 531 which discusses Trś 22. As the Vms interprets "*nādṛṣṭe 'smin sa dṛśyate*" of Trś 22, as meaning that one cannot apprehend the DN exactly until the CN is apprehended, this would indicate another order. This could just as well mean that the true nature of the DN is not experienced until the IN has been removed. Since the removal of the IN is equivalent to the emergence of the CN, this is quite logical and more so if we take the rest of Trś into consideration. It says that the CN is neither exactly different nor non-different from the DN (*ata eva sa naivānyo nānanyaḥ paratantrataḥ /*) which, as has been observed in the Tsn, amounts to the recognition of the basic pattern of the TSB: DN - IN = CN.

394 *dvayābhāvātmakaḥ pūrvaṃ paratantraḥ praviśyate / tataḥ praviśyate tatra kalpamātram asaddvayam //* 24

395 *tato dvayābhāvabhāvo niṣpanno 'tra praviśyate / tathā hy asav eva tadā asti nāsīti cocyate //* 25

Tsn 26 restates the discussion in Tsn 11 - 21 by reference to the non-duality and therefore ineffability of the three natures. They are indeed both non-dual (*advaya*) and ungraspable (*alabhya*), since they can be shown to be non-existent in different ways by different use of the word *bhāva*. The IN does not exist (*abhāva*), the DN does not exist the way (*atathābhāva*) it appears and the CN is the non-existence (*tadabhāva*) of the IN.

> "Ces trois natures sont non-doubles, imperceptibles (ineffables) car la première n´existe pas, la seconde n´est pas telle [que la première, telle qu´elle apparaît], la troisième consiste dans l´absence de la première."[396]

The ineffability of the three natures is thus displayed by superimposing the ontological category of existence on the basic pattern of TSB. The only thing graspable by discursie thinking is, of course, the IN but it does not exist. That which exists, the DN, can only be grasped through its appearance as the IN which does not exist. The CN which is the non-existence of the IN cannot be grasped as CN since that is beyond the limit of discursive thought.

Thus, as non-existing in this way, the three natures are non-dual, non-existence being a unified concept.

7.4 The "magic"-simile

Next part, Tsn 27 - 30, is the well-known magic-simile.[397] I have chosen to translate *māyā* as "magic" since it is a term frequently used by the Mahāyāna authors to designate the apparent reality of *saṃsāra* which, being eternal flux, is only relatively real and hence proximate to a magic show.[398] There is a notion[399] that the Indians made a distinction between illusion within the human experience (*bhrama*) which is always correctable, and the transcendental illusion, which is the division between all human experience and the transcendent (*māyā*). This distinction is to a large extent invalid in Yogācāra thought since, as we have seen, the question of *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa* is an epistemological problem, not an ontological one. The notion of "ideation-only" which results not only in a gradation of ideas but also in mistakes within human experience is also an indication of this.[400]

Therefore, it may be expected that the link to the transcendental illusion is still there, albeit of a more formal kind, since illusion can be corrected by further

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396 *trayo 'py ete svabhāvā hi advayālabhyalakṣaṇāḥ / abhāvād atathābhāvāt tadabhāvasvabhāvataḥ* // 26

397 Magic (*māyā*) is mentioned in Msa XI. 15 ff., in the context of TSB, though it is not presented or executed as a simile. From Msabh. XI. 15 ff., which mentions the magic formula, the piece of wood, etc., we may conclude that it refers to the Magic-simile as a commonly know conception.

398 Cf. e.g. Kochumutton 1982, p. 111 f; Tola & Dragonetti 1983, p. 244 f. and Nagao 1991f, p. 69 f.

399 Cf. Doniger O´Flaherty 1987, p. 115 f.

400 In Adk (II. 31; IV. 8; V. 49-53) there is the notion of *māyā* in the sphere of desire (*kāmadhātu*) and form (*rūpadhātu*), and in the first trance (*dhyāna*), since the god Brahma chooses to decieve. Trśbh 12 says that *māyā* means decieving others by showing them that which does not exist, or by distorting reality.

experience. There is also a strong connection to ethics as always in Buddhism. Illusion is no longer so much of a trick, but rather a moral choice, and a possibility of choosing attitude towards that which is held for real.

The structure of the simile is rather complex why I will present de la Vallée Poussin´s translation in a slightly altered but logical form.

27ab. "De même que, par la force de la formule, le «produit de magie» [ou fantôme] apparaît comme un éléphant:
29ab "De la connaissance-racine, l´idée exempte de verité apparaît en dualité:

27cd. "il n´y a là qu´un aspect, et pas du tout d´éléphant".[401]
29cd. "la dualité manque absolument; il n´y a donc là qu´aspect" [402]

28. "L´éléphant est le *parikalpita*; l´aspect d´éléphant est le *paratantra*; l´absence d´éléphant dans cet aspect est le *pariniṣpanna*."[403]

30. "On peut comparer la connaissance-racine à la formule, la *tathatā* (ou réalité vraie) au morceau de bois [sur lequel agit la formule pour en faire sortir l´illusion magique], la pensée (*vikalpa*) à l´aspect d´éléphant, la dualité à l´éléphant." [404]

We may note that verse 27 is a variant of Tsn 28 and that it constitutes the pictorial part of the simile made up by Tsn 27 and 2. This is also formally emphasized by the conjunction *yathā* in 27 and its correlate *tathā* in 29.[405] The simile is entirely executed in Tsn 28 which illustrates the three natures. Tsn 30 is in itself an executed simile in which the illustrated part is a conceptual expansion of that which is illustrated in verse 28.

What is being said in this simile ? For the sake of clarity, a scheme over the statements met can be made:

The elephant = the product of magic = duality = the IN.
The elephant´s form = magic = the imagination of the unreal = the DN.
The absence of the elephant = the piece of wood = suchness = the CN.
(The root-mind / -consciousness = The reading of mantras)

What conclusions may be drawn from this simile ? In Tsn 27 it is said that the only thing which really exists, where an illusory elephant (*hastin*) is seen, is form (*ākā ra*),

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401 *māyākṛtaṃ mantravaśāt khyāti hastyātmanā yathā / ākāramātraṃ tatrāsti hastī nāsti tu sarvathā* // 27
402 *asatkalpas tathā khyāti mūlacittād dvayātmanā / dvayam atyantato nāsti tatrāsty ākṛtimātrakam* // 29
403 *svabhāvaḥ kalpito hastī paratantras tadākṛtiḥ / yas tatra hastyabhāvo 'sau pariniṣpanna iṣyate* // 28
404 *mantravan mūlavijñānaṃ kaṣṭhavat tathatā matā / hastyākāravad eṣtavyo vikalpo hastivad dvayam* // 30
405 Cf. Kochumutton 1982, p. 114 f.

which is a verification of what we have seen before: the unreal has to be contained by something - namely the dependent nature.

The absence of the elephant (*hastyabhāvo*) in this form is a piece of wood (*kāṣṭha*). The magician thus uses a piece of wood when he reads his suggestive *mantras,* by which the illusion of an elephant is created. To the enlightened and liberated mind there is only a piece of wood. This represents suchness (*tathatā*), true reality, reality *thus*- the consummated nature.

The incantations of the magician is the root-mind (*mūlacitta*) or root-consciousness (*mūlavijñāna*),[406] which is equivalent to the store-consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*), since all conceptions to the Yogācārins, true as well as false, take place in the only reality known to them - the reality of ideas.

The container of the impressions of past deeds and the seeds of future empirical reality, along with the reality of the present, is the sum of these ideas, namely the store-consciousness and its transformations.

The imagination has to take place to enable the emergence of the illusion, in the same way as the stream of awareness, which is our mind, has to continue in order to make it possible for the religious subject to turn from the defiled to the purified, from the imagined to the consummated, from *saṃsāra* to *nirvāṇa*.[407]

Tsn 31 - 34 forms a part dedicated to the penetration of the true reality of things (*arthatattvaprativedha*).[408] In this process there are three phases -knowledge (*parijñā*), cessation (*prahāṇa*), and attainment (*prāpti*) - which somehow take place simultaneously (*yugapad*).[409] A certain order (*yathākrama*) of the three natures is implied, I presume, to indicate that it differs from that in Tsn 22 in which the DN was first penetrated, then the IN, and lastly the CN.

> "Quand on pénètre [ou comprend] la nature vraie des choses, se produisent simultanémet, à l´endroit des trois «caractères» [ou natures], dans l´ordre, connaissance, abandon ou cessation, «possession»."[410]

The order of the three natures is evident in Tsn 32-33 and conforms to that of Sns VI. 11, viz. IN, DN and CN. It is also evident that the three concepts of " knowledge", " cessation " and " attainment " correspond to non-apprehension (*anupalambha*), non-appearance (*akhyāna*) and apprehension (*upalambha*). Thus

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406 Cf. Schmithausen 1987, p. 405 note 719 d: "...*mūlavijñāna* (i.e. ālayavijñāna) is stated to be the cause due to which False Imagination (*asat-kalpa*) appears to be two (viz. object and subject), and it is compared with an incantation (*mantra*) due to which a piece of wood falsely appears as an elephant"

407 This simile has been noted and expounded by la Vallée Poussin 1933b, p. 159 f.; Kochumutton 1982, p. 111 f.; Tola & Dragonetti 1983, p. 244 f. and Nagao 1991, p. 69 f.

408 Cf. Mvb chapter III.

409 Cf. Sns VI. 11: "Discovering (*prajñāya*) in *paratantra* things devoid of character (*alakṣaṇadharma*), they expel the defiled things. Expelling (*prahāya*) the defiled things, they obtain (*adhigacchanti*) the purified things."

410 *arthatattvaprativedhe yugapal lakṣaṇakriyā / parijñā ca prahāṇaṃ ca prāptiś ceṣṭā yathā kramam //* 31

we have three isomorphous series of concepts the purport of which is obvious from Tsn 34:

knowledge - IN - non-apprehension (of duality)
cessation - DN - non-appearance (of the form of duality)
attainment - CN - apprehension (of the absence of duality)

Thus, to know the IN means no longer apprehending it, the cessation of the DN is the absence of the IN in it, and the CN is the apprehension of the DN devoid of the sign of the IN. Thus Tsn 32:

> "La connaissance [du *parikalpita*] est sa non-perception; l´abandon [du *paratantra*] est sa non-apparition; la perception, exempte de marques, [du *parinispanna*], est sa possession, sa réalisation." [411]

These components are causally related in Tsn 33:

> "Par la non-perception de la dualité, disparition de l´aspect double; par la disparition de cet aspect, intelligence du *parinispanna* qui est l´absence de dualité" [412]

Tsn 34 relates this to the magic-simile and once again we are reminded that the three phases, or components of the process take place simultaneously. We may now realize that the order expressed in Tsn 31 is the special order in which three natures are related to the three concepts indicated and not the order of the three natures in the process in Tsn 33. The simultaneity of the three natures is then a fact from the point of view that there is only the DN as an *ens,* while the IN and the CN are epistemic modes of it. From the ontological point of view, there is only the DN, and since the other natures are modes of it, they are of course temporally synchronized with it. An other perspective which may be deduced from this verse is the assumption that, epistemologically, the different perceptual images experienced by those beholding the magic show, depend on the spiritual advancement of thoses involved.

> "De même, pour les illusions magiques, en même temps, non-perception de l´éléphant, disparition de l´aspect (ou fantôme), perception du morceau de bois." [413]

The last part, Tsn 35-38, is introdcuced by allusions to arguments for the notion of "ideation-only", [414] which leads to the notion of non-apprehension of objects and

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[411] *parijñānupalambho 'tra hānir akhyānam iṣyate / upalambho 'nimittas tu prāptiḥ sākṣātkriyāpi sā //* 32

[412] *dvayasyānupalambhena dvayākāro vigacchati / vigamāt tasya niṣpanno dvayābhāvo 'dhigamyate //* 33

[413] *hastino 'nupalambhaś ca vigamaś ca tadākṛteḥ / upalambhaś ca kāṣṭhasya māyāyāṃ yugapad yathā //* 34

[414] Cf. La Vallée Poussin 1933b, p. 161; Lamotte 1973, tome II, notes et références p. 19* f. and Tola & Dragonetti 1983, p. 246 f. References made, are those to e.g. Vms 421 f. and Msg II. 14.

mind in Tsn 36. The causality of attainments, initialized in Tsn 35-36, goes on in the *grand finale* of Tsn 37-38 reminiscent of the conclusion of Trś. Thus Tsn 35:

> "Il y des idées opposées relativement au même objet; on voit qu´il y des idées sans objet; aux trois savoirs correspondent des perceptions différents; il y aurait, sans effort, acquisition de la déliverance. En raison de ces quatre;" [415]

There are thus four distinct arguments in favour of the notion of "mind-only":

a) "Because there is contradictory understanding (*viruddhadhī*) in relation to the same object". According to traditional beliefs, due to karma one and the same thing is beheld differently by sentient beings in the different spheres of existence. What the damned see as blood and pus, men see as clear water and the gods as nectar. From this it is concluded that the reality of extra-mental objects is very dubious. [416]

b) "because of ideas without true object" (*vaiyarthyadarśanāt*). Reference is made to dreams, illusions, mirages, etc, where there are no extra-mental object corresponding to the images that are apprehended.[417]

c) "because there would be effortless acquisition of liberation" (*mokṣāpatter ayatnataḥ*). If objects were extra-mentally real the ignorant as well as the wise would behold them as they really are and thus attain liberation effortlessly which is a violation of the notion of the necessity of acquiring supra-mundande knowledge.[418]

d) "because of the three knowledges corresponding to [different perceptions] (*jñā natrayānuvṛtter*)." Objects manifest themselves according to the measure of the knowledge obtained in the spiritual development of people. To the bodhisattvas and the ecstatics objects are transformed and manifested according to their will. To the yogins objects manifest themselves at the moment of the concentration of mind. To those which have acquired intuitive knowledge (*nirvikalpajñāna*) objects no longer manifest themselves.[419]

Now, from the acceptance of these arguments, there will be a theoretical understanding of the theory of "mind-only" (*cittamātra*). Tsn 36:

> "Perception de l´existence de la «pensée sans plus»; d´où non-perception de l´objet connaissable, et en raison de cette non-perception, non-perception de la pensée elle-même" [420]

As we can see, this theoretical understanding leads to the non-apprehension (*anupalambha*) of a knowable object (*jñeyārtha*), which in its turn leads to non-apprehension of mind itself (*cittānupalambha*). By knowable object is, of course, meant any object of understanding, be it considered extra-mental or a perceptual image, feeling, or whatever. By mind itself, hence, is meant any corresponding measure of self-awareness. The interdependence between a perceived object and

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415 *viruddhadhīkāraṇatvād buddher vaiyarthyadarśanāt / jñānatrayānuvṛtteś ca mokṣāpatter ayatnataḥ* // 35

416 Cf. Msg II. 14 and Vs and Vsvr 3.

417 *Ibid.* and commentaries on Msg II. 27 in Lamotte 1973, tome II, notes et références p. 21* f.

418 Cf. *ibid.* and Sns III. 3 and Msa and Msabh XI. 24.

419 Cf. *ibid.*

420 *cittamātropalambhena jñeyārthānupalambhatā / jñeyārthānupalambhena syāc cittānupalambhatā* // 36

the perceiving subject is established by the causal connection between the two: non-apprehension of the object leads to non-apprehension of mind. This line of reasoning - that a purely theoretical understanding of "ideation-only" is insufficient for liberation - is found in Trś 26-28 as well.[421]

This is continued in Tsn 37, which says that from the non-apprehension of these two, viz. knowable objects and mind, in other words duality, comes the apprehension of the true essence of dharmas (*dharmadhātu*)[422], from which, in its turn, comes the apprehension of mastery (*vibhutva*):[423]

> "En raison de la non-perception de ces deux, objets et pensée, perception du *dharmadhātu*, et, en raison de cette perception, perception (acquisition) de la maîtrise." [424]

The last verse of Tsn continues this crescendo of Buddhist soteriology by adding the universal vow of altruism which together with mastery leads to enlightenment (*bodhi*), which is of the nature of the three bodies of the Buddha (*kāyatrayātmika*).

> "Ayant perçu (acquis) la maîtrise, réalisant son bien et le bien des autres, le sage obtient la suprême Bodhi qui consiste dans le triple corps des Bouddhas."[425]

7.5 Conclusions

a) The measure of elaboration of each nature.

The IN is defined once again as the dual form that the DN may assume. This is described as unreal and imagination-only. It is indeed grasped as something existing although it does not exist. It thus exists only as duality - only its non-existence is unique (*eka*). By its very imagined nature it is defiled and only conventional reality (*vyavahāra*). In the context of the "magic"-simile the IN corresponds to the illusive elephant which is the product of magic which is duality.

The DN is displayed as that which appears, which is none other than the flow of awareness, which is depicted as the imagination of the unreal. As such it is dependent on conditions. The DN is functionally described as mind (*citta*), which is composed of the store-consciousness and the empirical consciousnesses. It is held to exist but not in the form it assumes. In its imagined mode it is depicted as defiled, being the creator of conventional reality (*vyavahārtṛ*). In the frame of reference of the "magic"-simile it corresponds to the elephant's form which is the process of magic, which is compared to the imagination of the unreal.

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421 Cf. also Mvb I. 6-7 which exhibits the same line of reasoning.

422 Cf. Msabh I. 6, XI. 14 and Msg II. 26. Cf. also note 348.

423 As for *vibhuti* as a synonym of *āśrayaparāvṛtti*, cf.Msg X. 3-5. In the context of *parāvṛtti*, cf. Msa IX. 48. In the context of the rebirths of the bodhisattva, cf. Msa. XX-XXI. 8. It has been discussed by Nagao in *ibid.* 1991, p. 30 f., pp. 79-80 and p. 143.

424 *dvayor anupalambhena dharmadhātūpalambhatā / dharmadhatūpalambhena syād vibhutvopalambhatā //* 37

425 *upalabdhavibhutvaś ca svaparārthaprasiddhitaḥ / prāpnoty anuttarāṃ bodhiṃ dhīmān kāyatrayātmikām //* 38

The CN is determined as the absence of the dual form which the DN assumes and as such it is never otherwise. By various plays of words it is delineated as that which exists as non-duality and that which is the non-existence of duality. Mutually excluding the IN, it is referred to as purification. Hence, it is equivalent to the destruction of conventional reality (*vyavahārasamuccheda*). Returning to the aforementioned simile it may be noted that the CN is outlined as the absence of the elephant which is the piece of wood and therefore reality as it really is - suchness. In the context of "mind-only", it is depicted as non-apprehension of mind itself ,which results from first theoretically knowing "mind-only" and the subsequent non-apprehension of knowable objects. This gives rise to the conseqent apprehension of the true reality of dharmas (*dharmadhātu*), mastery (*vibhutva*) and supreme enlightenment which is the same as the triple body of the Buddha.

b) The measure of integration with pan-Buddhist dogma in general and Mahāyā nistic dogma in particular.

In Tsn 11-21 the key-note is the importance of avoiding the extremes of reification and denial and the idea of defilement and purification is expressed in Tsn 17. Further instances of central Buddhist conceptions are the "magic"-simile, the notions of convention, true reality of phenomena (*dharmadhātu*), mastery (*vibhutva*) and supreme enlightenment as well as the bodhisattva´s vow of altruism.

c) The measure of integration with other Yogācāra tenets.

Virtually all central dogmas are present in the Tsn in an obvious attempt of systematic integration of the thought of this school. The whole eight-layered psychic complex and its internal structure is related to the DN in Tsn 5-9. The notion of "mind-only", the arguments supporting it and the process whereby the religious subject is led through stages of more refined apprehension towards enlightenment is found in the Tsn in the context of the TSB. The conception of the three bodies of the Buddha is found in the final verse of the Tsn. If the term *vibhuti* is to be taken as a synomym to *āśrayaparāvṛtti* there may be a link to this conception as well.

d) The measure of logical coherence and elaboration of the internal structure of the TSB.

The fundamental structure of the TSB is once again expressed as DN-IN=CN. This structure is extensively elaborated by the close connection between the conceptions of a store-consciousness and mind-only and TSB as well as in the part ranging between 11 and 21. In the latter case the natures are internally related with respect to the concepts of "existence", "duality" and "difference" and their opposites. Later on they are related to each other with respect to the concepts of "convention" and "penetration". As far as the "magic"-simile is concerned it may also be noted that the three natures are related in an elaborate manner. In this context, Tsn 34 claims that the three natures are simultaneous as opposed to Tsn 24-25 and 31-33, which stresses the diachronic perspective. This may be interpreted ontologically as well as epistemologically. In the first case they are simultaneous since the IN and the CN are modes of the DN and in the latter, since those who behold the magic show may experience different perceptual images according to their spiritual development.

8 The Triṃśikā (Trś)

References made to the *Triṃśikavijñaptikārikā* (Trś) by Vasubandhu and to the commentary by Sthiramati is based on the critical Sanskrit edition of Trś by Sylvain Lévi.[426]

From pp. xi-xvi and p. 175 in *op. cit*, it can be inferred that Lévi had at his disposal one copy of a Nepalese manuscript, subsequently two copies from Kathmandu plus the Tibetan translation.[427] The edition seems to be based on the Nepal manuscript corrected by the Tibetan translation. The Kathmandu manuscripts furnished the basis of the critical apparatus[428]

We find two corrections of the manuscript made by Lévi in verses 13: *mado vihiṃsāhrīr* instead of *mado 'vihiṃsā*, and 28: *yadā tv ālambanaṃ jñānaṃ* instead of *ālambanaṃ vijñānaṃ*.

The Trś, written by Vasubandhu in the fifth century C. E[429], I assume to have been intended as a *summa*. As such it was the final form of the ideas constituting the Yogā cāra philosohy for reasons as follows:

a) External testimony by historians Paramārtha and Bu-ston.[430]

b) Dharmapāla's compilation of the several commentaries to Trś which is unique in its kind and the foremost Yogācāra text in east Asia.[431]

c) The absence of an autocommentary to Trś.[432]

d) Its position as the last orthodox Yogacara work.[433]

e) Its briefness, all main Yogācāra ideas are contained in thirty verses.[434]

f) Its elliptical style exhibiting a number of shortened forms even of words expressing ideas of major importance.

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[426] Lévi 1925. Apart from the Lévi Sanskrit ed., there is one by Maheśvarānanda 1962. The Tibetan translation is found in Tibetan Tripiṭaka (Peking ed.) 113. 5556 (*kārikā*) and 5565 (*bhāṣya*). A Tibetan edition was made by Teramoto 1933. A Chinese translation is found in Taisho XXXI. 1586 (*kārikā*). As for translations into European languages there are e.g. those by Hermann Jacobi 1932; Sylvain Lévi 1932; Erich Frauwallner 1969; Thomas Kochumuttom 1982 and Stefan Anacker 1984. Further bibliographical information is found in e.g. Nakamura 1989, p. 268 f.; Powers 1991, p. 64 f. and Potter 1983, p. 75 f.

[427] In *ibid.* p. xiii.

[428] Cf. *ibid.* p. 175 ff.

[429] Cf. Frauwallner 1951, p. 21 f.; 1961, p. 129 f.; 1969, p. 350 f. and 425; Nakamura 1989, p. 268.

[430] According to Chatterjee 1975, p. 38; Frauwallner 1961, p. 130; Anacker 1984, p. 22 f. Cf. also Tāranātha p. 172 and supplementary notes p. 395 f.

[431] Cf. Chatterjee *ibid.*; la Vallée Poussin 1928, tome 1 in the inner sleeve and Nakamura 1989, p. 276 f.

[432] Sthiramati wrote the bhāṣya, Vasubandhu did not. As is apparent from Nakamura 1989 p. 268 ff., Vasubandhu wrote a very large number of commentaries on the major innovative Yogācāra works. He also wrote autocommentaries such as Vśvṛ. I believe that the absence of an autocommentary to Trś, which is very systematic and comprehensive, indicates that he wanted to state the final form of Yogācāra thought. Cf. also Frauwallner 1969, p. 383.

[433] Cf. Chatterjee *ibid.* and Frauwallner 1961, p. 130 and 1969, p. 351.

[434] Cf. Lindtner 1992, p. 273 and Frauwallner 1969, p. 351and 383.

g) Its reliance upon, frequent allusions to, and almost literal quotations of Sns and Las, the former of which is among the first Mahāyāna scriptures to contain Yogācā ra ideas.[435]

8.1 A summary of the Trś

1. The transformation of consciousness is *saṃsāra*.
2. *Ālayavijñāna* is a karmic device, *manas* is the ego-function and the perception of objects is the senses.
3. The karmic device is described.
4. The karmic device is described metaphorically.
5. The karmic device's cessation is defined. Ego-function vs. the karmic device.
6. The ego-function is described.
7. The ego-function's cessation is defined.
8. The senses are defined.
9. The mental associates are classified.

10-14. The Yogācāra map of phenomena - its phenomenology - relevant to human experience,is displayed.

15. The senses' relation to the karmic device is described metaphorically.
16. The result of the senses' cessation is defined.
17. All this is discriminations which do not exist ultimately. All is in fact perception-only.
18. How to save the *karma* idea in an idealistic philosophy.
19. The karmic device is described.
20. Discriminated phenomena do not exist ultimately (see 17). It is the imagined nature.
21. The very act of discrimination is made necessary. It is the dependent nature. Seen thus, it is the consummated nature.
22. TSB's internal relations are described.
23. Reinterpretation of the *Prajñāpāramitā* view of reality as essentially empty.
24. TSB is described from the standpoint of emptiness.
25. The ultimate naturelessness is seen as suchness and perception-only.
26. Discriminations are an obstacle to perception-only.
27. The theoretical insight in perception-only is also a discrimination.
28. Absence of discriminations implies absence of apprehension, which implies perception-only.
29. This is supramundane knowledge.
30. Which is liberation and the *dharma*-body of the Budhha.

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[435] Cf. the introduction to the chapter on Las and Lindtner 1992, p. 273 ff. who states beyond any reasonable doubt that Trś has quoted the Las (Trś 20 quotes Las p. 66 and Trś 28 quotes Las p. 69, Vaidya edition (p. 163 and 169 respectively in the Nanjio edition)) and the Sns (Trś 23-25 and 30 are based upon Sns VII. 24).

8.2 Central Yogācāra tenets in the Trś

Explicit statements on the three natures are found in Trś 20 - 24, but due to the high level of integration of principal Yogācāra tenets, I will provide samples of the arguments leading up to TSB prior to that part. I will quote from the translations by Sylvain Lévi.[436] Thus Trś 1:

> "La Métaphore des termes «Soi» et «Essence» qui fonctionne en tant de façons... C'est sur la Transformation de la Notation qu'elle (se produit). Et cette Transformation est de trois sortes".[437]

The metaphors (*upacāra*) of "self" (*ātmā*) and "phenomena" (*dharma*), denoting all things subjective and objective, develop (*pravartate*) in many ways, that is, many metaphors are applied to the transformation of consciousness. These metaphors, which do not designate any phenomena in their own right since there is nothing besides consciousness, take place, it is known, in the transformation of consciousness (*vijñānapariṇāma*). That is to say, consciousness is momentary and is produced every instant, and this is its transformation which is of three kinds (*tridhā*).[438]

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[436] The translation of the Trś along with the Trśbh, is found in Lévi 1932, pp. 62 ff. Since fragments of the verses sometimes are interspersed into the commentary in the translation, I have tried to recombine them without distorting the actual wording

[437] *ātmadharmopacāro hi vividho yaḥ pravartate // vijñānapariṇāme 'sau pariṇāmaḥ sa ca tridhā //* 1.

[438] In spurious and dubious cases of interpretation, I have consulted Sthiramati's Trśbh. I interpret the words *ātmā* and *dharma* as metaphors for the subjective and objective respectively on account of the enumeration of synonyms to these terms, made by Sthiramati in his Trśbh ad Trś 1 ab. It might be possible to translate *dharma* to "events", if relying upon the arguments put forward by Schmithausen 1967, p. 129 ff. It is being argued that Vasubandhu retains unmistakable traces from his former Sautrāntika period. For a glimpse of the discussion as to whether Vasubandhu wrote ADK as a Sautrāntika, cf. the references given in *ibid.* p 109 ff.

As for the possible interpretation: " ...consciousness is momentary and is produced every instant, and that is its transformation", I am inclined to adhere to the theory above that Vasubandhu intermingled some of his former Sautrāntika interpretations of consciousness with the Yogācāra dogmas proper. This assumption is supported by the findings of Yoshifumi Ueda 1967, pp.155-167. In this work, he tries to show that the transmission of Buddhist thought made by Hiuan-tsang and Dharmapala to China and Japan, is not in accord with the very statements made by Vasubandhu and his commentator Sthiramati in Trś and Trśbh respectively. Hiuan-tsang et al. claim that "the transformation of consciousness" (*vijñānapariṇāma*) evolves into "the seer and the seen" (Cf. *ibid.* pp. 156-160), which Ueda tries to prove to be a gross misunderstanding of the Trś. The obvious Yogācāric idealism mingled with the Sautrāntika theory of consciousness' momentariness found in Trs', is thereby disregarded by them. Adherence to Ueda's view would thereby require a careful reading of some modern translations of Trś such as that found in Kochumuttom 1982, the interpretations of which are based on the translations of Hiuan-tsang .

Concerning the rendering of the word *hi*, cf. Lindtner 1982a, p. 33: "...flere smæord ... / *hi* /... i reglen har en meget precis semantisk funktion" and also to his 1982b, p. 26 n. 79: "*hi* is used as technical term to indicate something which is logically or empirically obvious, in no need of further elaboration". However, it is difficult to determine when *hi* has an exclusively metrical function, and when it has a precise semantic one. I presume that it must be considered contextually.

Trś 2 continues:

> "Concoction, Mentation, et Notification de domaine; Parmi elles, la Concoction, c´est la Notation appelée de Tréfonds; elle a toutes les semences"[439]

From Trś 5 and 8, it is obvious that "ripening" (*vipāka*) is the actualisation of latent impressions to become new "consciousness-moments". "Reflecting" (*manas*) is an intermediate reflecting consciousness, and "perception of objects" (*vijñaptir viṣayasya*) is the six empirical or sensuous consciousnesses. These constitute the three kinds of transformation of consciousness. Among these, "ripening" is that called "store-consciousness" (*ālayavijñāna*), which has, or perhaps *is*, all the seeds being potential acts of consciousness.[440]

We have thus seen the evolvment of the mind into its three strata, and we have also noted the main characteristics of the "store-consciousness". In Trś 5 the *manas* is discussed along with the "store-consciousness":

> "Le Refoulement se fait à l´état d´Arhat. Logée en elle, fonctionne, avec elle comme objectif, la notation apellée le Mental qui consiste en Mentation."[441]

The devolvement (*vyāvṛti*) of the store-consciousness, which consists in the destruction of defilements and the subsequent non-production of further ones, takes place (*pravartate*) in the state of Arhat (*arhatva*).

Depending on it (*tadāśritya*), developes (since the store-consciousness receives the impressions of the reflecting consciousness and since their activities are bound to each other) the consciousness called *manas*. It has the store-consciousness as support (*ālambana*) and constitutes the "ego-function". Due to its nature of always reflecting (*mananātmaka*), it is called *manas*.[442]

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439 *vipāko mananakhyaś ca vijñaptir viṣayasya ca / tatrālayākhyaṃ vijñānaṃ vipākaḥ sarvabījakam* // 2.

440 The three kinds of transformation of consciousness mentioned are:
a) "ripening" (*vipāka*) which is "store-consciousness" (*alayavijñana*), b) "reflecting" (*manana*) which is "reflecting consciousness" (*manas*) in Trśbh ad Trś 5- 6. It is called *kliṣṭa manas* because it is always defiled by different kinds of clinging to the notion of an ego, and c) "perception of objects" (*vijñaptir viṣayasya* ,) which is the "empirical consciousnesses". In Trśbh ad Trś 15-16 it is stated that "the perception of objects" is the "apprehension of the sixfold object" (*ṣadvidhasya viṣayasya*) mentioned in Trś 8. Another term for these emprical consciousnesses introduced in Trśbh ad Trś 15 is *pravṛttivijñāna*. Note the peculiarity of the cognitive activity of the "store-consciousness" in the Trś 3. Concerning its cognitive activity, cf. Schmithausen 1987, pp. 104-106 and notes 101, 102 and 610.

441 *tasya vyāvṛtir arhatve tad āśritya pravartate / tadālambaṃ manonāma vijñānaṃ mananātmakam* // 5

442 Sthiramati defines the *Arhat*-ship in the terms of ADK VI 50 ab (Cf. Lévi 1932, p. 78 n. 2). *Manas* is introduced here in the Trś for the first time. It is found in ADK I. 33; II 177 and 305. It should not be confused with *manovijñāna* (thought-consciousness) which is one of the six empirical consciousnesses (Cf. Trś 16). As for *mana*´s "ego-function", my interpretation is based on the words of Trś 5 saying: "...*manonāma vijñānaṃ mananātmakam*" and also upon the *ātmā* - centered defilements which accompany it (Cf. Trś 6). Cf. also Schmithausen 1987, p. 83 and p. 376, note 599.

So far *manas*, the seventh consciousness. In Trś 8 the third transformation of mind is presented:

> "C´est la seconde Transformation. La troisième, c´est la perception du sextuple domaine. Bonne, mauvaise, ni l´une ni l´autre."[443]

What has been said about *manas* concludes the second transformation. The third transformation of consciousness is the apprehension of the sixfold sense-object (*ṣadvidhasya viṣayasopalabdhi*) which is respectively: eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and thought-consciousness. This apprehension is either beneficial, unbeneficial or neither (*kuśalākuśalādvaya*), that is, it promotes, it does not promote or it is irrelevant to enlightenment.[444]

Its main function is indicated in Trś 9:

> "Elle est associée avec les (Essences) de l´Ordre de l´Espirit Omniprésentes, déterminées spécialement, bonnes, et aussi avec les Passions, les Sous-Passions; elle a trois impressions."[445]

From Trś 10 onwards it is evident that this apprehension is associated with mental associates (*caitta*):

a) universal (*sarvatraga*), which are those enumerated in Trś 5 and which occur in every *citta*, that is, present in every moment of consciousness. These are five in number;

b) specific (*viniyata*), the five which are certain only with specific sense-objects, that is, they are not necessarily present in every moment of consciousness;

c) beneficial (*kuśala*) are those that promote enlightenment. They are eleven in number, though only ten are enumerated here. It is also associated with:

d) defilements (*kleśā*), which are the major unbeneficial mental associates which constitute obstacles to enlightenment and

e) secondary defilements (*upakleśā*), which are subsidiary unbeneficial mental associates of which there are twenty.

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443 *dvitīyaḥ pariṇāmo 'yam tṛtīyaḥ ṣadvidhasya yā / viṣayasopalabdhiḥ sa kuśalākuśalādvayā //* 8

444 The six consciousnesses and their objects are:

<u>respectively:</u>	<u>corresponding to:</u>
materiality (*rūpa*)	eye-consciousness (*cakṣurvijñāna*)
sound (*śabda*)	ear-consciousness (*śrotravijñāna*)
smells (*gandha*)	nose-consciousness (*ghrāṇavijñāna*)
taste (*rasa*)	tongue-consciousness (*jihvāvijñāna*)
tactiles (*spraṣtha*)	body-consciousness (*kāyavijñāna*)
phenomena (*dharma*)	thought-consciousness (*manovijñāna*)

This is evident from Trśbh ad Trś 8: "...*rūpaśabdagandharasaspraṣthavyadharmātmakasya*" and the *Pañcaskandhakaprakaraṇa* wherein Vasubandhu`s "*dharma*-theory", his phenomenology, is displayed. The correspondence as depicted above is found in *Pañcaskandhakaprakaraṇa* 1 and 5. My interpretation of *advaya* as "neither" is in opposition to Anacker`s choice of "both" (in Anacker 1984, p. 186). Cf. Trśbh ad Trś 8d. Cf. Stanley 1987, p. 58.

445 *sarvatragair viniyataiḥ kuśalaiś caitasair asau / saṃprayuktā tathā kleśair upakleśais trivedanā //* 9.

The apprehension´s sensations are of three kinds: pleasure, pain and neither.[446]
The relation between the empirical consciousnesses and the store-consciousness is obvious from Trś 15:

"Dans la Notation-Radicale, la naissance des cinq Notations (se produit) selon le Facteur-causal, ensemble ou non, comme pour les vagues dans l´eau."[447]

Depending on conditions, that is, depending on the presence of ripened seeds, the five consciousnesses: eye-, ear-, nose-, tongue- and body-consciousness arise. Either all five or not, the consciousnesses appear ,depending on the causes present. They originate on the root-consciousness (*mūlavijñāna*), if there are any ripened seeds from, or in, *ālayavijñāna* to become consciousnesses. " Just like waves on water" (*taraṅgāṇāṃ yathā jale*) is a simile intended to illustrate that the five consciousnesses originate on the root-consciousnessjust like waves originate on water .

Since the production of waves is dependent on the presence of causes in the water, the five consciousnesses originate dependent on the presence of seeds in the root-consciousness. Since waves appear one by one, or many at the time, interacting, disappearing, appearing in a constantly changing pattern, the five consciousnesses originate in consciousness-moments on the root-consciousness, in a similar manner

Sthiramati quotes a well-known metaphor from Sns V. 7,[448] used in the same context, which is also quoted in MSg I. 4 and KSP 32, 37 in the same context, despite the different comprehension of the root- or store-consciousness in these texts. I therefore believe that my adoption of his interpretation of the metaphor is adequate. In Las II. 99-113, it is explicitly stated that the metaphor is meant to indicate the identity between the water and the waves and thus between the empirical consciousnesses and the store-consciousness.[449]

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[446] Chatterjee (1975, p. 112 f.) claims that "Next in importance are the "mentals" (the *cetasikas* or, more briefly, the *caittas*). Strictly speaking, only these should be classed as dharmas, and Vasubandhu takes cognizance of these alone" which is a doubtful statement since Vasubandhu enumerates all one hundred phenomena in his *Pañcaskandhakaprakaraṇa* .
The classification of dharmas into the five groups mentioned is in perfect accordance with PSP 4 and Msa XI. 37. Eleven "beneficial" dharmas are mentioned in *Pañcaskandhakaprakaraṇa* 4 including *upekṣā* (equanamity) which is missing in Trś for, to my knowledge, reasons unknown. Concerning "its sensations are of three kinds" (*trivedanā*), consult *Pañcaskandhakaprakaraṇa* 2 and also ADK VI. 3. As for the interpretation of this and the following verses in ADK and the use of unorthodox translational theories, Cf. Broido 1985.
[447] *pañcānāṃ mūlavijñāne yathā pratyayam udbhavaḥ / vijñānānāṃ saha na vā taraṅgāṇāṃ yathā jale* // 15.
[448] "La connaissance-réceptacle, profonde at subtile, comme un courant violent, procède avec tous les germes /.../". (*ādānavijñāna gabhīrasūkṣmo / ogho yathā vartati sarvabījo* /) Quoted from Lamotte 1935a, p. 186 and 58.
[449] The word *mūlavijñāna* is also found in Trśbh ad Trś 7. As for the metaphor: "just like waves on water" (*taraṅgāṇāṃ yathā yale*), Trśbh ad Trś 15 says that it is an example (*dṛṣṭanta*) intended to show how the functional consciousnesses (*pravṛttivijñāna*), are originated (*utpatti*) from the storeconsciousness (*ālayavijñānana*), either simultaneously (*yugapad*) or not (*ayugapad*). There is also a striking, though possibly irrelevant, similarity between Sthiramati´s interpretation of the metaphor and the description of waves seen in Italo Calvino's *Palomar*, Torino 1983 (Swedish transl. Stockholm 1985 pp. 7 ff.). In both cases it seems that the relevant properties of waves on water, are those that are observed without prior knowledge of scientific explanations.

As we proceed, we come closer to concepts and conceptions related to the TSB. In Trś 17, the familiar concepts of "discrimination" (*vikalpa*) and "ideation-only" (*vijñaptimātratā*), anticipates the notion of the imagined nature:

> "La Transformation de la Notation est (simple) Imagination; ce qui est imaginé par elle n´a pas d´existence; donc tout est simple Notification."[450]

This transformation of consciousness mentioned in Trś 1 and elaborated in Trś 2 - 16 is a discrimination (*vikalpa*) or mental construction. What is discriminated is the same as an unreal "conventional" reality and it does not exist in its own right. Sthiramati claims that Vasubandhu avoided the extreme of reification by maintaining the non-existence of that which is imagined by the transformation of consciousness. By the same token, he avoided the extreme of denial by affirming that all is "ideation-only". The reason why the discriminations of the transformation of consciousness are unreal, he says, is that it has no real (*asat*) objective support (*ālambana*). This is established by Sthiramati by the use of the common arguments supporting the unreality of an extra-mental reality.[451] Consequently, all that we know is perception-only (*vijñaptimātratā*), that is, projections of mental constructs.[452]

The nature and function of these discriminations is indicated in Trś 18, by reference to the transformations of consciousness discussed in Trś 17:

> "La Notation est semence universelle; la Transformation va de telle ou telle façon, par influence réciproque, de sorte que telle ou telle Imagination naît."[453]

Store-consciousness, we know without further justification (*hi*), is all the seeds (*sarvabījaṃ*). It my perhaps be difficult to conceive of a consciousness apart from its contents, in which case the seeds *are* the store-consciousness. Consciousness-moments are produced in whatever way, according to the residues from the empirical consciousnesses, which become seeds to constitute new consciousness-moments.

This reciprocal influence between the empirical consciousnesses and the store-consciousness is the basis for the workings of the mind. All discriminations are due to the ripened seeds.

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450 *vijñānapariṇāmo 'yam vikalpo yad vikalpyate / tena tan nāsti tenedaṃ sarvaṃ vijñaptimātrakam* // 17.

451 Cf. Trśbh ad Trś 17

452 Comments on the translation of Trś 17 are found in Ueda 1967, p. 155-167. Kochumuttom, I believe, erroneously uses the Vms commenting on Trś 17 to interpret this *kārikā* in particular and the Yogācāra system in general, as an expression of realistic pluralism (1982, p. 147). Cf. Ueda *loc. cit*. and note 133. The important *terminus technicus* "*vikalpa*" will be discussed later. According to Trśbh ad Trś 17, the last word of the karika: "*vijñaptimātraka*" has the *ka*-ending for metrical reasons only.

453 *sarvabījaṃ hi vijñānaṃ pariṇāmas tathā tathā / yāty anyonyavaśāt yena vikalpaḥ sa sa jāyate* // 18. Concerning *hi*, cf. note 438.

8.3 The three natures in the Trś

Now, I presume, the main tenets of the Trś, previous to its presentation of the TSB, have been indicated. The first occurence of the IN is that of Trś 20:

> "Quelle que soit la chose qui est imaginée particulièrement par quelque Imagination-particulière que ce soit, c´est là une Nature Imaginaire, et cela n´existe pas".[454]

Anything which is known, by any act of discriminative thinking, is an entity that cannot be defined in terms of causality.[455] What is known in such a way is (seen in its) imagined nature (*parikalpitasvabhāva*). The imagined nature does not exist, and this non-existence should be understood in the sense that knowledge of something´s imagined nature, is no real knowledge at all.

Thus, from Trś 17-18 it is evident that the three-fold transformation of consciousness is a discrimination. The evolvement of the store-consciousness into the *manas* and subsequently, or possibly simultaneously (cf. Trś 15), the empirical consciousnesses, amounts to nothing less than a bifurcation of the stream of awareness. This bifurcation of mind into a subjective and an objective part is equivalent to the transformation of mind into the empirical consciousnesses, since any act of cognition presupposes this distinction. The IN is further said to arise in this reciprocal process, in which the impressions of perceptual activities which are tainted by the subject-object distinction, become seeds which continuously ripen into new acts of cognition.[456]

The DN and the CN are met in Trś 21 which, once again, restates the basic pattern of the TSB: DN - IN = CN:

> "La nature Relative est une Imagination-particulière qui naît des Facteurs-causaux. L´Absolue, c´est l´état de la précédente quand elle est toujours séparée de la première"[457]

The dependent nature (*paratantrasvabhāva*) is the very substrate of which discriminated entities are born. It is the act of discriminating which is born out of conditions (*pratyayodbhava*), out of cause and effect. In other words it is dependent co-origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*).[458]

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[454] *yena yena vikalpena yad yad vastu vikalpyate / parikalpita evāsau svabhāvo na sa vidyate //* 20.

[455] Cf. Trśbh 20 : *na hetupratyayapratipad ya svabhāvaṃ;* "Sa nature n´est pas explicable par le jeu des Causes et des Facteurs-causaux". Quoted from Lévi 1932, p. 115. Cf. also Sns VII. 10.

[456] Cf. the arguments for the temporal priority of Las to the Trś and the latter´s dependence of the former in the introduction to Las and notes 120-27 : (Las p. 61) *...punar api mahāmater āha yat punar etad uktaṃ bhagavatā yena yena vikalpena ye ye bhāvā vikalpyante na hi sa teṣāṃ svabhāvo bhavati / parikalpita evāsau /*

[457] *paratantrasvabhāvas tu vikalpaḥ pratyayodbhavaḥ / niṣpannas tasya pūrveṇa sadā rahitatā tu yā* 21

[458] Cf. Trśbh 21ab: *iti parair hetupratyayais tantryata iti paratantra utpadyata ity arthaḥ / svato ´nyahetupratyayapratibaddhātmalābha iti yāvad uktaṃ bhavati /* ; "*Paratantra* (relatif), c´est: une chose qui est régie (*tantryate*) par d´autres (*para*) qui sont les Facteurs-causaux. C´est comme si

The absolute nature (*parinispannasvabhāva*) is the imagined nature's perpetual separation (*rahitatā*) from the dependent nature. Thus, if the IN is that which is dicriminated (*vikalpyate*), then the DN is the act of discrimination (*vikalpa*). The overall superimposition of the axiomatic causality of all reality is made on the DN, as the very activity which brings about the imagined nature. Trś 21 says that the DN arises from conditions, which is the same as saying that it is in eternal flux.[459]

The CN then, is formally defined as the perpetual absence of the imagined nature in the dependent nature. Due to this fact, says Trś 22, the CN is neither different nor non-different from the DN. This obligatory reservation is seen in most previous Yogācāra scriptures as a safeguard against the extremes of reification (*samāropa*) and denial (*apavāda*).[460]

"Par suite, elle n'est exactement ni autre, ni non autre que la (Nature) Relative. Il faut en traiter comme de l'Impermanence, etc. Tant que l'une n'a pas été vue, l'autre n'est pas vue."[461]

Since the imagined nature is the dependent nature seen wrongly, and the absolute nature is the dependent nature seen correctly, it follows that the absolute nature is to be spoken of as neither different (*na eva anyaḥ*) nor non-different (*na ananyaḥ*) from the dependent. If the CN were different from the DN, the IN could not be removed from the DN, and if it were identical with the DN the notions of defilement and purification would be meaningless. This can be compared with impermanence (*anityatā*) which can be neither different nor non-different from processes (*saṃskā ra*). If impermanence were different from the processes, they would be permanent and if it was identical with them, they would not exist. As for the claim that if the absolute nature has not been seen, the dependent is not seen, the Trśbh must be consulted. How come, it says, can the DN be known when the IN has been removed from it and if it can not be known, how is it shown to exist ? The answer is that since the knowledge of the CN is supramundane knowledge (*jñānaṃ lokottaram*) must precede the knowledge of the DN which is purified mundane knowledge (*laukika jñāna*).[462]

Trś 23-25ab which may have drawn upon Sns VII. 24[463] deals with the TSB from the point of view that all entities are empty of own being:

on disait que cette chose ne possède une Personnalité que par relation avec un terme différent d'elle, à savoir les Causes et les Facteurs-causaux." Quoted from Lévi 1932, p. 115.

459 Cf. Sns VI. 4: *katamad guṇākara dharmāṇāṃ paratantralakṣaṇam/ dharmāṇāṃ pratītyasam-utpāda eva / yad uta asmin satīdaṃ bhavaty asyotpādād idam utpadyate yad idam avidyāpratyayāḥ saṃskārā ityādi yāvad evam asya kevalasya mahato duḥkhaskandhasyotpādobhāvatīti //* Cf. note 58

460 Cf. e.g. Las II. 189; Mvb III. 4-5; Msa XI. 20 f.; Msg II. 17 and Tsn 20-21, 24-26.

461 *ata eva sa naivānyo nānanyaḥ paratantrataḥ / anityatādivad vācyo nādṛṣṭe 'smin sa dṛśyate //* 22.

462 Cf. Trśbh ad Trś 22.

463 Cf. Lindtner 1992, p. 276 f. Sns VII. 24: "Alors, en cette occasion, le Seigneur dit ces stances: Les choses sont sans nature propre, non-nées, non-détruites, calmes depuis l'origine et essentielle-ment nirvânées: sans intention cachée, quel sage parlerait ainsi ? J'ai parlé de l'Irréalité de caractère, de l'Irréalité de naissance et de l'Irréalité absolue. Le sage qui comprend mon intention cachée ne suit pas le chemin de la mort." Quoted from Lamotte 1935a, p. 203. And why not VII. 3-6 as well which define the emptiness of the natures very closely to Trś 24.

"Le Sans-Nature-Propre de toutes les Essences n´a été prêché que par rapport au triple Sans-Nature-Propre de la triple Nature-Propre." [464]

"La première est Sans-Nature-Propre du fait même de son Caractère; la seconde est Sans-Nature-Propre du fait qu´elle n´existe pas par elle-même;[465] le troisième est Sans-Nature-Propre du fait qu´elle est le Sens Ultime des Essences."[466]

Introducing Trś 23, Sthiramati almost certainly refers to the Sns, e.g. VII. 1, when directing the attention to the *sūtra* which maintains that all entities are empty (*niḥsvabhāva*), unoriginated (*anutpanna*) and undestroyed (*aniruddha*). Other parallels to the Sns may be found in the use of the phrase "hidden intention" (*saṃdhā ya*) in Trś 23 also referring to e.g. Sns VII. 1 and 24 , and in the almost identical definitions of the three natures in Trś 24 - 25 ab corresponding to Sns VII. 3-6. It may also be pointed out that the metaphorical descriptions of the three emptinesses in Sns VII. 7 correspond exactly to Sthiramati´s in Trśbh 24-25 ab.[467]

The imagined nature, is natureless by identity (*lakṣaṇa*). Sthiramati claims that the IN is empty since it has own identity merely figuratively speaking (*utprekṣita*). Hence, having no form of its own (*svarupābhāva*), it is empty regarding identity.[468]

The dependent nature is natureless because of its non-independence (*na svayaṃbhāva*), since it is dependently originated (*pratītyasamutpanna*) and thus lacks own being. The way it has come into being - its origination (*utpatti*) - remarks Sthiramati, is not as it appears (*prakhyāti*). Hence, the DN is said to be emptiness regarding arising (*utpattiniḥsvabhāvatety ucyate*).[469]

As for the emptiness regarding the ultimate (EU) (*paramārthaniḥsvabhāvatā*), Sthiramati must once again be consulted. The EU is the object (*artha*) of the supramundane knowledge.[470] The EU corresponds to the CN, since the CN is an unique (*ekarasa*) object (*artha*) of purity (*vaimalya*) and immutability (*avikāra*). Since the CN is also the ultimate [object] of all entities which are dependent (*dharmā nāṃ paratantrātmakānāṃ*) it is the ground of entities (*dharmatā*). Hence, since the DN is ultimately empty due to its dependence on other entities, and the CN is the very essence of the DN, the CN is absence of an own nature (*pariniṣpannasyābhava svabhāvatvāt*). Being the ultimate, unchanging ground of all entities, the CN is also suchness (*tathatā*).[471]

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464 *trividhasya svabhāvasya trividhāṃ niḥsvabhāvatām / saṃdhāya sarvadharmāṇāṃ deśitā niḥsvabhāvatā //* 23. As for the word *saṃdhāya*, note Sns VII. 1. As for its significance in ADK VI. 3 ff., and translational theories in this context, cf. Broido *op. cit.*.

465 *prathamo lakṣaṇenaiva niḥsvabhāvo 'paraḥ punaḥ / svayaṃbhāva etasyeti ty aparā niḥsvabhāvatā //* 24.

466 *dharmāṇāṃ paramārthaś ca sa yatas tathatāpi saḥ /* 25 ab

467 The EI is in both cases described as a flower in the air (*khapuṣpa*), the EA as magic (*māyā*) and the EU as space (*ākāśa*).

468 Cf. Sns VII. 4 which says that the "emptiness regarding identity" (*lakṣaṇaniḥsvabhāvatā*) is the IN since it is established by names and conventions and not by itself.

469 Sns VII. 5 claims that he emptiness regarding arising (*utpattiniḥsvabhāvatā*) is the dependent nature since it is arisen from the force of other conditions (*parapratyayabala*) and not by itself (*na svatas*).

470 Cf. Trśbh ad Trś 24-25.

471 Sns VII. 6 and 7 does in fact distinguish between a double emptiness regarding the ultimate. Sns VII. 6 says that the emptiness regarding the ultimate (*paramārthaniḥsvabhāvatā*) is the

Following Trś 24-25 ab, Trś 25 cd connects the emptiness regarding the ultimate to suchness and "ideation-only" (*vijñaptimātratā*), which anticipates the following verses. Thus Trś 25 cd:

> "Parce qu´elle est ainsi en tout temps. C´est elle exclusivement qui est la Simple-Notification."[472]

The suchness and pure undiscriminative knowledge of the dependent nature as it is in its ultimate sense, is perception-only (*vijñaptimātratā*).

The conclusion of Trś is an extension of the notion of the CN as pure non-discursive awareness why I will present these last verses along with some commentaries. First Trś 26:

> "Tant que la Notation ne demeure pas dans la Simple-Notification, les résidus de la double Prise ne s´arrêtent pas tout ce temps-là."[473]

As long as the impressions of the twofold grasping (*grāhadvaya*) which is belief in the subjective and the objective, become seeds in the store-consciousness there can be no abiding (*na avatiṣṭhate*) in perception-only since there will always be more discriminations born out of the ripened seeds. Trś 27 continues:

> "Même du fait de cette perception: «Tout est Simple-Notification», à quoi que ce soit qu´on fasse fair Halte devant soi, on n´est pas en état de «Simplement cela»."[474]

Even if the yogin says to himself "I abide in perception-only", he does no abide in this state since this conviction is something external, something set up (*sthāpayan*) before him in his mind. Next comes Trś 28:

> "Mais quand la connaissance ne perçoit plus d´Objectif, elle fait Halte dans la Simple Notation, car il n´y plus de Prise quand il n´y a pas de Prenable."[475]

dependently originated entities (*dharmāḥ pratītyasamutpannā*), which are empty by virtue of the emptiness regarding arising and also by virtue of of the emptiness regarding the ultimate. The pure object (*viśuddhālambana*) in entities is the ultimate and since this is not the dependent nature it is called the emptiness regarding the ultimate. The consummated nature is also called emptiness regarding the ultimate because of the selflessness (*dharmanairātmya*) of entities. Since the ultimate is manifested by the emptiness of all entities it is called emptiness regarding the ultimate. This is roughly the interpretation of Sthiramati in Trśbh ad Trś 24-25 ab, wherein the EU is connected to both the DN and the CN.

472 *sarvakālam tathābhāvāt saiva vijñaptimātratā* // 25. I have interpreted "*tathatā*" literally as *tatha* = thus + *tā* = ness.

473 *yāvad vijñaptimātratve vijñānaṃ nāvatiṣṭhati / grāhadvayasyānuśayas tāvan na vinivartate* // 26.

474 *vijñaptimātram evedam ity api hy upalambhataḥ / sthāpayann agrataḥ kiṃcit tanmātre nā vatiṣṭhate* // 27

475 *yadā tu ālambanaṃ jñānaṃ naivopalabhate tadā / sthitaṃ vijñānamātratve grāhyābhāve tadagrahāt* // 28.

But when all discriminations and all that can be grasped has disappeared, there is no longer any support to the mind. Then the yogin does not apprehend anything, and so he abides in consciousness-only (*vijñānamātratā*)

Note that we here have *vijñānamātratā* (consciousness-only) instead of *vijñaptimātratā* (ideation-only). In Trś 29 the CN is further said to be:

> "Sans-Esprit, Sans-Perception, Connaissance Supra-mondaine, Révolution du Récipient par l'élimination des deux sortes de Turbulence."[476]

When the yogin no longer has any mind that grasps, and there is nothing to grasp, he is without mind (*acitta*) and apprehension (*anupalambha*). Since this knowledge is unattainable in ordinary life it is called supramundane knowledge. Resulting from this supramundane knowledge, is a shift of basis (*āśrayasya parāvṛtti*), which is made possible from the absence of impressions, ripening and duality. This shift of basis comes about by the removal of the twofold badness (*dvidhā dauṣṭhulya hā nitaḥ*) consisting in removal of defilements and removal of "knowable". The last verse of the Trś is verse 30 which concludes the process by indicating liberation:

> "Plan Sans-Écoulement, Inconcevable, Bon, Stable, Heureux, Ensamble de Libérations, et aussi (Ensamble) des Essences du Grand Sage"[477]

This state (of ideation-only) is the unafflictable ground (*anāsrava dhātu*), which is so called since the twofold badness has been removed. It is inconceivable (*acintya*) since it cannot be grasped by reason, beneficial (*kuśala*) since devoid of defilements, and stable (*dhruva*) since it will never change. All this being delightful (*sukha*), it is the very essence of the Buddha, emancipation from pain and rebirths, the *dharma*-body (*dharmakāya*) of the great sage (*mahāmuni*).

8.4 Conclusions

a) The measure of elaboration of each nature.

The three natures in the Trs; are not very elaborated explicitly, although the clear attempt to systematize Yogācāra thought seen in the Trs; links them to other central tenets. Another feature of the Trs; is that by reference to the assumption that all entities are empty, each nature has got its empty counterpart.

As for the IN, it is invariably said to be the result of discrimination (*vikalpa*), i.e. that which is discriminated (*vikalpyate*) by discrimination. As the outcome of this activity it does not exist. It is merely perceptual images and hence everything is

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[476] *acitto 'nupalambho 'sau jñānaṃ lokottaram ca tat / āśrayasya parāvṛttir dvidhā dauṣṭhulyahā nitaḥ //* 29. "Badness" (*dauṣṭhulya*) is also found in MVb II. 4-8, 11 (concerning *āvaraṇa*) ; IV. 1 (concerning *pratipakṣa*) ; V. 11 (concerning *anudharma*). MVbbh II. 10, 11; IV. 1, 9; V. 11, 12. *Pañcaskandhakaprakaraṇa* 4; Msabh ad Msa VI. 2. Cf. also Lévi 1911, p. *24 in the introduction wherein the significance of the word is indicated in a summary of the Msa and p. 51 n. 3 as for the interpretation of the word. In Schmithausen 1987, p. 66 f. *et passim* it is translated to "badness"

[477] *sa evānāsravo dhātur acintyaḥ kuśalo dhruvaḥ / sukho vimuktikāyo 'sau dharmākhyo 'yaṃ mahāmuneḥ //* 30.

"ideation-only". By virtue of its unreal character it is empty with regard to identity. Hence, to account for the notion of emptiness which the Yogācārins of course were obliged to interpret, they had to explain exactly in what way the IN was empty. The answer was thus that since it only could be identified as unreal, it was empty by virtue of its own nature.

The DN is depicted as the very transformation of consciousness, i.e. mind's evolution into the eight different consciousnesses on three levels. As such it is as a matter of course substantially connected to all entities within the ideational framework. It is defined as discrimination (*vikalpa*) the generic cause of which is the interdependent causality of entities. In other words, it is kept active by the ever-changing processes of the mind. With regard to emptiness it is held to be empty because of its non-independence. Since the DN is defined as that which depends on other conditions, each component of this process depends for its existence on another component. Therefore no part of the DN possesses own being and so it is empty.

The CN is presented as the absence of the IN in the DN and by reference to emptiness the CN is claimed empty because of its inherent nature which is emptiness. In other words, since the CN is the DN seen as it is, devoid of the IN, and the DN is empty due to its non-independence, the CN is empty in itself. Its emptiness may also be seen in the fact that it is the ultimativity of all entities. Moreover it is qualified with a variety of words and concepts designating the absolute: The CN is suchness and ideation-only. Due to the meditative practise whereby objects no longer are apprehended and the subsequent absence of even apprehension, the CN is said to be without mind, it is supra-mundande knowledge and the shift of basis. Finally it is the unafflictable ground which is the emancipated body equvalent to the dharma-body.

b) The measure of integration with pan-Buddhist dogma in general and Mahāyā nistic dogma in particular.

The TSB in Trs; is well integrated with central Buddhist conceptions. There are the notions of karma, the abhidharmic phenomenology as well as the *prajñāpāramitā* reinterpretation of the conception of emptiness and most of the concepts designating the absolute. The notion of the two extrems is found in Trs; 22.

c) The measure of integration with other Yogācāra tenets.

This integration is by all means very high. The conception of the store-consciousness, its tranformations (*vijñānapariṇāma*) along with its inherent karmic device and the abhidharma is closely connected to the TSB. The theory of "ideation-only", "shift of basis" and the "three bodies of the Buddha" are all associated with the three natures.

d) The measure of logical coherence and elaboration of the internal structure of the TSB.

Once again the basic pattern of the TSB which is everywhere expressed as DN-IN=CN is found. It is however qualified by the addition of the perspective emanating from the assumption that all entities are empty. Another feature of the internal structure of the TSB is evident in the claim that the DN and the CN are neither different nor non-different. The close connection between the TSB and other major dogmas may also be seen as an elaboration of the internal structure.

Conclusions

9 The history of the concept of Trisvabhāva

Assuming that the relative chronology established for the Yogācāra texts chosen is correct, and that the state of development of the three natures proposed of each text is accurate, I will now try to outline the conceptual development of the three natures. First I will use the four criteria chosen in I. 4 separately, with the aim of determining the conceptual development of the three natures from the point of view of the aspect which guided my forming of these criteria. Thereupon I shall try to extrapolate the main shape of the three natures as it changes in time.

a) The measure of elaboration of each nature. I propose that if the description of a nature implicitly or explicitly contains more references to Buddhist conceptions than another, the former is more developed.

The imagined nature has developed in gradually. In the Sns and the Las it is mainly connected to verbal concepts though the emptiness regarding identity is present in the former and the notion of duality is more pronounced in the latter in which the emptiness regarding identity is absent. In the Mvb and Msa the imagined nature is explicitly more related to a wider range of Buddhist concepts. This is even more conspicous in the Msg which also relates the imagined nature to other major tenets of the system. Finally, in the Trś and the Tsn, the imagined nature mainly lies on the same level as in the Msg.

As for the dependent nature, the Sns mainly conjoins it with the notion of dependent co-origination and the emptiness regarding arising as well as the emptiness regarding the ultimate in its first aspect, while the Las to this, among other things, adds that it is the cause of the mind and its mental factors. Mvb and Msa elaborates this further and attach the notions of the imagination of the unreal and mind as well as claiming it to exist ultimately and being the container of emptiness. As with the imagined nature, the Msg links the dependent nature more closely to other major ideas of the system. The Tsn is on the same level as the Msg while the Trs; exhibits even more close links to ideas such as the transformation of consciousness.

The consummated nature is described in generally the same terms by the texts although a measure of elaboration may be noticed. Thus, the Sns equates it with the true nature, purification and selflessness of entities and also with enlightenment as well as the emptiness regarding the ultimate in its second aspect. To this the Las adds terms such as correct knowledge, emptiness, ultimate limit, the essence of dharmas and of buddahood. It is also markedly displayed as a state of mind free from imaginations. In the Mvb and the Msa this abundance of transcendental notions is largely subdued in favour of more formal properties such as absence of duality, the presence of an absence of duality, emptiness and empty by nature. Msa adds that it is the outcome of the process of the shift of basis. The Msg retains the more formal elaboration of the consummated nature of the Mvb and the Msa and also a great measure of designation by transcendental terms reminiscent of the Sns and more so, the Las. As is the case with the other natures, there are more close links to other tenets of the Yogācāra system such as the realization of "mind-only". In the Tsn and the Trś the consummated nature is equated with a number of transcendental notions. In the Tsn there is more emphasis on descriptions of the consummated nature such as that which exists as non-duality and that which is the non-existence of duality,

resembling that of the Mvb. The Trś more explicitly lays stress on the consummated nature and the other natures from the perspective that all entities are ulimatively empty.

b) The measure of integration with pan-Buddhist dogma in general and Mahāyā nistic dogma in particular. I suggest that if a description of three natures is an obvious attempt to reconcile it with other dogmas in comparison to a description where this attempt can not be found, the former is more developed.

As for the Sns there are conjunctions with prajñāpāramitā notions as well as with those of the selflessness of entities, defilement and purification and dependent co-origination. Most conspicuous is, however, the noted attempt of reconciling the notion of emptiness of all entities with the three natures by superimposing the former on the latter, thus shaping three additional "emptiness"-counterparts of the three natures.

In the Las this integration is carried on further. Except for the three empty natures, most of the notions found in the Sns is present. Noteworthy additions are the two truths, explicit expressions of the importance of avoiding the extremes of reification and denial, the shift of basis and the womb of Buddhahood.

As for the Mvb and the Msa, the range of integration is not particularily extended. Notable is the reference to the notion of the middle path in the Mvb and close links to the career of the bodhisattva are prominent in the Msa. The attempts of integration noticable in the Msg are considerable. It may suffice, apart from notions found in previous texts, to mention large-scale amalgamation with central fields of psychology and ontology as well as literary devices such as commonly known similes and metaphors.

The display of integration in the Tsn is not nearly as great as in e.g. the Msg or the Trś. In the latter references are found to the karmic mechanism as well as to abhidharmic phenomenology as well as psychology while the Tsn, being expressly devoted to the demonstration of the three natures, is quite restricted in its attempts of integration.

c) The measure of integration with other Yogācāra tenets. If a description of the three natures is an implicit or explicit part of an attempt of systematic and coherent integration of Yogācāra thought, this description is more developed than a description which fails to convey this.

In the Sns the three natures is neither explicitly nor implicitly integrated with tenets which came to be considered genuinely Yogācāric. The Las, on the other hand displays more or less explicit links to the notions of mind-only, the store-consciousness, the shift of basis and, at least implicitly, to the three bodies of the Buddha. In the Mvb and the Msa there are no explicit instances of ideation-only or the store-consciousness though conceptions similar to these may be found. The ideas of the shift of basis and three bodies of the Buddha are explicit only in the Msa though the latter is not found in the context of the three natures. In the Msg, the three natures is well integrated with other major Yogācāra ideas. This is also the case with the Tsn and the Trs; though the former only implicitly refers to the notion of the shift of basis and the latter adds the transformation of consciousness and the Yogācāra abhidharma.

d) The measure of logical coherence and eleboration of the internal formal structure of the three natures. Any description of the three natures in which the relations between the three natures are more elaborated and coherent is considered more developed than a description in which this is not the case.

The Sns exhibits the basic pattern of the three natures being dependent nature-imagined nature=consummated nature as well as the structure of the peculiar notion of the three empty natures which is expressed as the emptiness regarding identity and the emptiness regarding the ultimate being within the emptiness regarding arising. In the Las the elaboration is carried further by applying other epistemological and soteriological perspectives on the three natures. The measure of coherence is, however, difficult to establish. In the Mvb the three natures and their inverted counterparts which were found in the Sns are condensed into a logically coherent and formally elaborated immaculate symmetry which inhers the notion of emptiness. The notion of avoiding the extremes is also found as a conceptual extention of the three natures. The subtle structure of the three natures found in the Mvb is missing in the Msa which however superimposes the idea of the two truths on it. The Msg reveals a large amount of elaboration of the internal structure of the three natures. The notions of ideation-only and the eight-layered psychic complex are conceptually integrated with the three natures and the natures are both formally and substantially defined by reference to each other and by reference to other ideas. This measure of elaboration may also be found in Tsn where the three natures internal relations are expressed by the use concepts such as "existence", "duality", "difference" and their opposites as well as the concepts of "convention" and "penetration". The subject matter of the text may account for this. The internal structure of the three natures of the Trś, lastly, may not be considered as refined as that of Tsn or even Msg. There is however the addition of the three empty counterparts of the three natures and the close integration into the three natures of some of the notions found in the theory ideation-only and the conception of the eight-layered mental complex.

What, then, could be generally said about the conceptual development of the three natures from the temporal outline of these four aspects ?

To summarize the findings from the applications of these four aspects: It may be said that the elaboration of each nature is steadily rising as time goes with the expected exception of the consummated nature the elaboration of which is constantly quite high. As for the measure of integration of the three natures with Buddhist dogma a general development is certain with peaks noted for the Msg and the Trs; while the Tsn displays a lower degree of integration. The same general development is noted for the integration of three natures within the Yogācāra system though the picture is a bit different. The Sns shows none and the Mbv and the Msa to a lesser degree than the Las. The Msg and the two latter texts all exhibit a high level of integartion. As for the internal structure of the three natures, again it becomes more coherent and elaborated. This is notable from the Sns and onwards until the Msa which is markedly more frugal in its exhibition of the internal relations of the three natures. The Msg and the Tsn shows a high degree of elaboration while this is lessened in the Trś.

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